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ABSTRACT

Proceedings of a conference held to discuss the problems of teaching world history are reported. Eight papers are presented. The first four address the issue of world history as an academic discipline. In "The World History Survey Course" William McNeill argues that major curriculum changes take place in this country only when sound pedagogical reasons for such changes are reinforced by strong administrative reasons. Following this, Howard Mehlinger, in "World History in Secondary Education," addresses problems of teacher training, course purpose, and student acceptance. The third and fourth papers--"World History since Toynbee: The Emergence of Macrohistory" (H. Loring White) and "In Defense of World History" (Alan Wood)--discuss the intellectual origins of world history and explain some of the intellectual hostility toward world history as a field of study. The last four papers deal with how to organize a course in world history. They include: "Approaches to Teaching World History" (Ross Dunn); "Introductory History as Topical Inquiry" (Kevin Reilly); "Modernization as an Organizing Principle for World History" (Cyril E. Black); and "Global History, Modernization, and the World-System Approach: A Critique" (Craig A. Lockard). Included as appendices is the official report on the conference and a report on the founding of the World History Association, both written by Kevin Reilly. (RM)

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1982 WORLD HISTORY TEACHING CONFERENCE

Edited by

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Corrected Edition, 1 August 1983

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The Editors

Preface

The Department of History at the U.S. Air Force Academy has devoted a great deal of time and energy to the teaching of world history for many years. Since Air Force officers may be called on to serve their country in any part of the world at any time, the logic of exposing Academy cadets to all the world's cultures and societies rather than just those of the West in a core history course has long been accepted. Having accepted this basic premise, however, the department found the methods of accomplishing this task were not quite so obvious. For many years, the department relied on L. S. Stavrianos' The World Since 1500: A Global History to provide the basic framework for the course. Around this basic framework, lessons were added to provide emphasis, and periodically the emphasis of the course was changed. The basic framework for the course had remained the same, though, since 1968.

Periodically, individuals within the department had suggested that a new approach be taken towards the teaching of world history, but these suggestions bore no fruit until the fall of 1980. At that time the department organized a committee to examine the Academy's basic world history course in depth and make recommendations for possible changes. The committee struggled for over a year with this assignment, producing a variety of syllabi based upon different approaches, but achieved little consensus. In the fall of 1981, a smaller committee started at the beginning of the process, again trying to define world history, establish a generally acceptable set of assumptions around which to build a course, and find suitable materials to support the course once the conceptual framework had been established. As a result of this 18-month process, the department created an experimental world history course and further addressed the problems of teaching world history by hosting a conference on that subject. That conference, co-sponsored by the American Historical Association (AHA), took place from 12-14 May 1982.

The timeliness of this conference became apparent as the number of registrants swelled from an anticipated 40 to 50 to over 180. Clearly, the Department of History at the U.S. Air Force Academy was not the only faculty wrestling with the issue of world history instruction. With only slightly more than a year's perspective, it now appears that this conference spurred interest in a rapidly growing world history movement. The apparent importance of this conference in raising both the intellectual and practical interest in world history nationwide prompted this department to publish these proceedings. We hope that their publication will continue to add momentum to this movement.

The articles in this report do not appear in order of their presentation. They have been organized with the intent of going from the larger issue of defining world history and explaining its evolution as a field of study to the more specific issue of how to design a course in world history. Also included as appendices are two articles from AHA Perspectives that help to fit this conference into the larger context of a national movement for the advancement of the teaching of world history.

The initial four articles address the issue of world history as an academic discipline. The first article is a transcription of William McNeill's keynote address.

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In his speech McNeill argued that major curriculum changes take place in this country only when sound pedagogical reasons for such changes are reinforced by strong administrative reasons. The pedagogical reasons for teaching world history have existed for decades, but little has been done because of lacking administrative incentive. McNeill concluded that fiscal constraints in the 1980s may be a blessing in disguise for world history advocates by providing the administrative incentive that has so far been absent.

The second article is a transcription of the comments made by Howard Mehlinger at the Thursday evening session, "World History in the Secondary School Curriculum." Mehlinger addressed the difficulty of teachers obtaining training in world history, the problem of course purpose, problems with finding suitable course texts, and the problems of getting the acceptance of both school boards and students for world history at the high school level.

Neither the third nor fourth articles received formal presentation. Both H. Loring White and Alan Wood brought their papers to the conference to share with individuals who might be interested. The articles provide an incisive look into the intellectual origins of world history and help to explain some of the intellectual hostility towards world history as a field of study. White's article traces the evolution of world or macrohistory through its most successful practitioners: H. G. Wells, Arnold Toynbee, Oswald Spengler, Alfred Kroeber, William McNeill, Darcy Ribeiro, and Carroll Quigley. Wood's article explains the slow evolution of world history as a discipline resulted from the legacies of nineteenth century empiricism and positivism. He ascribes many of the difficulties encountered by the historical profession in relating to the general public to the profession's outmoded adherence to these nineteenth-century ideals that have largely been discredited in the public's eye. Wood also argues that the synthesis required to explain world history is the commodity most sought by the general public and least often provided by the historical professon.

The second four articles deal with the more specific question of how to organize a course in world history. The article by Ross Dunn is the transcription of his remarks at the Thursday morning session, "Approaches to Teaching World History." He offered four guidelines around which to build a course in world history: the course should deal with the deeper currents of human development; it should be comparative; it should not be limited by traditional definitions of geographic space; and lastly, it must be concerned with the total process, because the sum of the parts is greater than all of the individual parts examined separately. Kevin Reilly briefly explained his topical approach to the teaching of world history at the Friday morning session, "World History and the College Curriculum." His article is an expansion of those ideas. According to Reilly, the great merit of the topical approach is its ability to generate student interest and to encourage historical thinking. Reilly argues that this process is far more important than the mere memorization of facts. Cyril Black spoke extensively at the Thursday afternoon session entitled "Modernization as an Organizing Principle for World History." His article brings together as a coherent whole all the ideas from both his opening remarks and the answers that he gave to the numerous questions that followed. Black argues that modernization provides a comprehensive approach for teaching world history, and he attempts to diffuse many of the criticisms of the modernization approach. Craig Lockard spoke briefly at the same session. The

article presented in this report, a reprint of an article originally published in The History Teacher, expands upon the main points made by Lockard in his presentation at the conference. He critiques the modernization approach and advocates a world-system approach that he argues is less ethnocentric.

Included as appendices are two articles from AHA Perspectives. The first article is the official report on the Conference on Teaching World History, written by Kevin Reilly as the AHA's official representative at the conference. The second article is a report on the founding of the World History Association at the AHA's annual meeting held in December 1982 in Washington, D.C.

The Department of History expresses thanks to the AHA for its support in co-sponsoring the conference. We would also like to thank William McNeill, Howard Mehlinger, and Ross Dunn for allowing us to transcribe their oral presentations, and H. Loring White, Alan Wood, Kevin Reilly, and Cyril Black for allowing us to publish their articles. Lastly, we would like to acknowledge the gracious granting of reprint rights to the articles by Kevin Reilly and Craig Lockard from AHA Perspectives and The History Teacher, respectively.

John G. Albert

Captain John G. Albert
Course Chairman, World History

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The World History Survey Course

by

William McNeill

It is indeed a remarkable occasion to see so many teachers of history gathered together in these parts to think about world history. This occasion and the numbers who have turned out for the conference are very hopeful signs that world history may yet begin to grow in our school system as it seems to me the subject demands and requires. Certainly, I myself accepted this idea a good many years ago and each year await the sprouting of world history in our schools with a sense of expectation and eagerness. I often have contact with groups and individuals thinking about world history on one campus or another and, therefore, have some sense of the vivacity and energy being put into this enterprise. Yet, unless my sense of reality is seriously skewed, the spread of world history courses and their establishment as a central experience for most, if not all, students in our schools and colleges has not yet become general. This provokes me to ask why. Why has the spread of this kind of course been so slow? Why has this reorganization of our curriculum not taken off in the fashion that it should have done? I suppose I could put that question the other way. What is it that makes curricular change take place, when it does take place? Yet, that kind of historical question is one which I must say is not very easy to answer.

Thinking about what has happened and has failed to happen to world history in my active years, it occurs to me that there were two comparable benchmarks in the history of this country's schooling that would be worth inquiring about. One was the introduction of United States national history into our schools and colleges in the 1880s and 1890s. The other was the spread of Western civilization courses through our colleges in the 1930s. In the first of these affairs, history teachers made a course in the history of the U.S. a standard experience for practically every pupil in this country. Two general factors help explain how it happened. First of all, in the 1880s and 1890s the old, humanistic idealization of Greek and Latin was under attack. The introduction of modern history and modern languages was part of a reform effort that aimed at making the curriculum relevant to the real world. It was also administratively a time when the ideal of high school education for everyone was being propagated. Professional administrators in charge of both high schools and colleges needed justification for this aspiration of extending universal education up to high school level. The answer was that through a course in the history of the U.S., the schools could make American citizens out of all the immigrants, coming especially from Eastern Europe in those days, and turn them into Americans like "us." This assimilationist ideal, this WASP ideal, has come under very severe attack in recent decades, but it was a tremendous and generous accomplishment all the same and dominated our national life for some 60-70 years. Thus, it was an intellectual program and an administrative situation that came together to let the course in U.S. history come on stream in the 1880s and 1890s. At least I think that's what happened. I don't really know because, believe it or not, it was before my time.

The second great curricular landmark was the rise and propagation of Western civilization courses. That I did grow up with. As far as my information goes, there were two principal places where these courses were generated. One was at Columbia University where what came to be called "Contemporary

Civilization" was an offspring of a World War I emergency course for soldiers to teach them what it was they were going across the ocean to defend. Revised and updated in the post-war period, this became a very influential and successful course for undergraduates. The other, one I know much better, was from the University of Chicago, created in 1930 with the idea of bringing together all the humanities. The whole idea of "humanities" was then a new way of grouping departments. Chicago under Hutchins set out to create a basic course in the humanities which put history, literature, art, and music in one bag. This was needed to match parallel survey courses in social, biological, and physical science which were also required of all students.

There were intellectual and administrative circumstances in the 1930s that contributed to the very rapid propagation of courses modeled on these archetypes. One was that Europe remained the dominant center of public affairs. If you wanted to understand the world, Europe was what mattered. But Western civilization courses also had a quite different intellectual attraction, for these courses played Athens against Jerusalem, Enlightenment ideas against Sunday school ideas, rubbing together two ways of looking upon the world which were in tension with one another. They offered an historical and evolutionary vision of the human condition as against the kinds of universalizing moral and theological injunctions which I and nearly all my contemporaries had absorbed from Sunday school instruction. That tension gave the cutting edge to Western civilization courses whose other claim to general attention rested on current events and the centrality of Germany, France, and England in the newpapers.

Administratively, what made for the very rapid propagation of these courses was the Depression. A single basic course is much cheaper than running ancient, medieval, modern courses as had been the normal pattern before. If there had been other courses in art, literature, and music as well, now a college could have one sausage factory for them all. Discussion sections and big lectures were cheap, efficient, and administratively manageable in a way that the multiple courses were not. I think this was the reason the course spread so fast. Deans all over the country saw it as a way of meeting the budget--and an intellectually respectable way at the same time. Accordingly, Western civilization courses developed across this country in the 1930s and 1940s, supported, I should say, by textbook producing firms which made fortunes printing the right textbooks at the right time.

This is my understanding of how the concept of Western civilization courses gripped colleges. Again, I don't want you to think from my somewhat snide remarks that I don't think this was an enormous achievement. It certainly was what made me a historian. It was one of the most dazzling experiences of my life to take that Chicago humanities course. Many thousands of other people have had comparable responses to similar courses in other parts of the country as well.

If you compare this with the situation of world history as it has developed since the Second World War, it seems to me that the intellectual side of things is just as compelling as anything that faced our predecessors in the 1880s with U.S. history or in the 1930s when the Western civilization course was generated. The world after all <u>is</u> with us: Asia, Africa, and Latin America, as much as Europe. We <u>do</u> need to know something about the great cultural traditions that still have a weight and impress upon so many hundreds of millions of our fellow human beings. Effective citizenship depends on it as recent history amply attests.

If you think about the public policy of this country since the Second World War, it is clear that we have been far more successful in Europe than we have been in Asia in achieving those goals that we set for ourselves. The relative success of American policy in Europe and the series of disappointments and failures that we've had in Asia are certainly related to the fact that our educational system gave the American public at large, and those directing American policy in particular, a far better understanding of European reality than was the case with Asia. It was a sign of the ignorance that surrounded our country and our leaders when we involved ourselves, for example, in Viet Nam; our dealings with China since 1945 have been scarcely less clumsy.

The intellectual reasons for making world history a part of students' experience seems to be absolutely compelling. It has seemed so since 1945, and I must say in my youth I assumed that intellectual reasons would be enough. People ought to see that Western civilization was no longer enough and that expansion of attention to the non-Western world was a necessary response to the realities confronting not just the United States, but all humanity in the second half of the twentieth century. But intellectual circumstances by themselves are not enough. You also need administrative pressure to make any really rapid transformation of the curricular situation. In the 1950s and 1960s that is not what happened. There was no move in that direction because the Sputnik boom of 1957 to 1967 meant that all the old financial restraints facing academic administrators were lifted. Administrators courteously told historians to do what they thought best. There was lots of money for salaries. So, "Go and do whatever you like." And it wasn't just historians. Other liberal arts professors were in much the same position.

What did the profession do? In colleges, our attempt was to export the graduate seminar to undergraduate classrooms. This was ridiculous, for it assumed that the only form of teaching that mattered was to train future historians. Yet, what we did is understandable in two ways. The old Western civilization courses had indeed lost most of their cutting edge. That enlivening friction between Athens and Jerusalem was no longer effective, largely because Sunday school had disappeared from the lives of so many of our students. The answer to why put this in and leave that out was no longer self-evident as it had once been. So intellectually, Western civilization classes found themselves in serious disarray. Administratively, too, pressure to teach general courses was withdrawn. Instead, why not let the young instructor teach a course around his dissertation? Professional advancement depended on getting a first book done fast so tenure would come quickly. The way to do that was to teach only what you're going to write, write only what you're going to teach. Historical truth thus became the view of the world from the bottom of a gopher hole. Undergraduates, however, weren't gophers. Compulsory registration in history courses was relaxed. Nobody wanted to teach Western civilization anymore. And students didn't want to go down those professional gopher holes. So, history departments suddenly faced declining registrations. There was a cry for relevancy, and it left the historical profession in profound disarray in trying to respond to this entirely legitimate demand.

What ought teachers of history do about it? That's what we're here to think about. Of course, I think I already know the answer. We should use our very best talents to create world history courses that are coherent, vivacious and that we as teachers can believe in. We must give to our students some sense of the cultural

complexity and fascination of the world in which they must live, and convince them it is better to know about things than to fumble around in the dark and stumble on odd and often uncomfortable surprises, which is what happens if you don't know how the cultural world around you is put together. There is a very real hope for effective world history on the intellectual plane. It is possible to create models of world history courses which will have a coherent and real relevancy for the world of everyday for students who have no intention of becoming professional historians, but who are going to be citizens. The kind of friction that existed between Athens and Jerusalem in our society in the 1930s exists today in our thinking about whether or not human beings are really rational and uniform in their responses to perceived opportunity. The science of economics is based on this proposition. But we also accept the concept of cultural differentiation. From where I stand, there is truth in both. The friction and tension between them seems very similar to the friction between Sunday school and Athens. A course that confronts the issue directly of whether everyone wants to be American like us" or whether there are different paths to the future as there have been different paths in the past ought to have a great impact on every undergraduate's thinking. Is there a process of modernization which is universal and similar everywhere, as Mr. Black argued in his book, or are there different forms of modernization that continue to be different in different parts of the world? That is the question. American policy in foreign affairs hinges on the answer. We ought to have an opinion about it. We really do need to know.

The issue is very real and serious, and courses can be built around it with great effect. Moreover, from the administrative point of view, we're going back into depression, and though periods of economic restriction may not be comfortable, they have great virtue when it comes to curricular reform. It is the case that a single introductory course, well taught and well conceived, is cheap. When academic budgets are cut, a sensible dean enforces a greater uniformity of course offerings. World history courses are the obvious recourse in such a situation. Perhaps the time is at hand--really and truly--for widespread adoption of such courses in this country.

What we need are good models--models analogous to the Columbia contemporary civilization course and the Chicago humanities course that I grew up with. The role of a conference such as this is to explore such possibilities insofar as they have already been generated, to encourage one another to think of new alternatives, and afterwards to try to make such courses. There are many different campuses on which world history is being attempted in some fashion or other and many more on which it's being talked about. Many of these efforts have not been very successful. The effort to bring people together from different backgrounds to teach a new course has proved difficult. The result often verged on an intellectual monstrosity rather than the thing of beauty which we must aspire to.

There are great problems in constructing a course. Above all, it requires a simple and readily intelligible principle of inclusion and exclusion, for you do have to exclude a vast deal if you're going to treat the world. Above all, we must get away from the Western civilization model and strike out anew. This demands a difficult act of personal re-education--a re-focusing of attention and expansion of knowledge. Because that is hard, we must expect some continuation of the kind of

spinning of wheels, with much talk and little action, that has been prevalent for the last 20 years. But the fact that so many of you have come here is a sign that circumstances perhaps are ripening for really effective transformation. I certainly hope so.

This is the greatest practical and intellectual challenge before the historical profession today. It is high time we did something constructive instead of simply wringing our hands. We must address ourselves to undergraduates as citizens who need help in steering a path through a very confusing world. We need assistance ourselves, and a conference such as this can help. Surely, the time has come to act. So, my injunction to you is this: try to teach world history and in due course you will find that can be done. I know it can be done! All it needs is intellgience, effort and energy, and the support of your colleagues and deans. Thank you.

World History in Secondary Education

by

Howard Mehlinger

Each set of generalizations about world history instruction in schools requires all kinds of exceptions and qualifications. Yet, it is necessary to try to generalize, at least at the outset; I am looking at characteristics of world history teaching in high schools as a general overview to set the scene for discussion to follow.

People who say you can't teach world history haven't talked to a high school world history teacher. I don't know when the first world history course was taught, probably back in 1916 or so, and some of it has been going on for a very long time. The complaints about high school world history have been going on for a very long time as well, and the complaints are distressingly the same, whether five, ten, fifteen, or twenty years ago.

The first and obvious complaint, one we've talked about with regard to policy structure, is the problem of coverage. In one year a high school world history course simply tries to do too much. (The same thing can be said about college courses.) A second complaint is that we are not teaching true world history. It's really European history or Western history with add-ons of other parts of the world. Although some books have changed, most courses are on the whole still subject to the same charge. They are fact-filled courses, there are no clear themes, no story. To students it's "one damn fact after another."

What is world history then? Sometimes it's "world cultures," and sometimes "world civilization." Whatever it's called--world culture, world history, or world civilization--you expect to find it at grades nine or ten. In some states or some schools within states, it is required, but typically it's an elective course. It is taken by a smaller proportion of students today than ten, fifteen or twenty years ago. There has been a movement, just as in colleges and universitites, to give students more choice, more freedom on what they would take, and to reduce the number of requirements; as the reduction of requirements in social studies went down, courses like world history began to suffer enrollment losses. So, world history as an elective is not taken by nearly as many students as it once was. Indeed, less than one half of the high school students today or students graduated from high school have taken a course in world history. This means that most high school graduates will have never studied about any part of the world other than the United States, unless perhaps in a geography course in the fourth grade or something. For at least half of the high school graduates, there will be no serious, concentrated study.

It's curious, but the reasons schools offer world history as an elective vary widely, too. There will be some schools where world history is considered a "tough" course, one that you take only if you were planning to go to college. In other cases, and I know of such schools, it is a course for slow learners. There is no explanation one way or the other about how particular schools feel. Probably, it has a lot to do with teachers being assigned to teach the course. This sharply contrasts with American history, which is almost without exception taken at some time in the high school or secondary school. The most common pattern since 1916 has been to take American history three times. You take it in the fifth, eighth,

and eleventh grade, and when you go to college you'll take it again as a freshman. The idea originally, of course, was that since most students did not go on past grade school, they had to take American history before they left school. Then, since some of them did finish junior high school, you gave it to them again just before they graduated. For the few who went on to high school, give it to them one more time and that will be the end of their education. It no longer makes sense to do it the way we do, but we continue the practice. It's tradition, I guess. We are not a "fully modern" society after all.

Let me comment just briefly about teacher education. Very, very few teachers are trained specifically for world history. There are a few teachers, maybe, prepared to teach American history, which is a much more common offering in high schools. And so the colleges and universities are more likely to have a survey course in American history plus courses for people who specialize. That is most unusual in world history.

Only the most foolish or reckless teacher would enter college or university with the idea of wanting to be a world history teacher. In the present job market that would be career suicide. What you do is try to generalize as far as possible, which means you might decide you want to be a history teacher with specialization in American history. Then you would try to cluster enough courses from other areas of the world to go with that so you could gain certification for a world history job, if one should open up. The college or university history department will usually provide you with a host of courses which you can put together, assembling up to 20 hours to certify you in most states. You can put together a course on the French Revolution, Sub-Saharan Africa, Tudor England, something else, and you're a "world history" teacher. There are a few places, Indiana University used to be one, in which a two-semester sequence called "the teaching of world history" was offered. The focus was on advanced readings and studies to focus on the problems of teaching world history. But for a variety of reasons, fewer teachers are coming back to get a master's degree, and courses for "world history teachers" have faded away. It's not too much to say that if you look at the way most colleges or universities handle this job of preparing world history teachers, you'd have to say that it's simply a shocking abrogation of responsibility.

The typical world history teacher takes a total of 120 hours for graduation for a four-year college degree. About 20 of those are professional education and eight of those 20 hours will be in student teaching. They'll take one social studies methods course for three hours of credit, and all those teachers who are planning to teach in secondary schools will be there. They'll have American government teachers, economics teachers, geography teachers, world history teachers, American history teachers, etc. You can understand that the teacher for that social studies methods course is not going to focus on any single subject. He's going to discuss very general topics, such as teaching concepts, and he hopes all his students apply what is taught. In the meantime, the student is picking up courses from the history department with no one matching his selection of courses against what he will actually teach in world history.

I remember that as a high school world history teacher at Lawrence, I decided that I was going to work on a PhD at the University of Kansas to become

the best prepared world history teacher I could be. So, I went to the history department and said I had no intention of becoming a college historian. I liked teaching high school world history, and I wanted to be the best high school world history teacher I could be. I asked for all their courses in world history. They did not have any. I suggested pasting some courses together from the catalog. They said I first had to choose a specialty. Russian history seemed all right; why not that? So, I started learning Russian and preparing myself in Russian history. I also foolishly thought I was going to prepare on China and Japan, but since I would have to learn Chinese and Japanese I backed off from that. I next asked about African history. They said Africa did not have a history. (You can imagine how long ago that was!) I took a course in the British Empire to try to get a course related to African history. I started putting together a program for myself, and I quickly found out I was overtrained!

The same problem exists today. I do not know any college or university that has a well designed program to prepare high school world history teachers. When a teacher begins to think about his course, he has two key problems to confront: problems of selection and problems of purpose. Selection and purpose are clearly intertwined. The selection question is linked to the question of what world history is. History is all the things that happened in the past, and it is the record of things that happened in the past. Given whatever aid is available, historians write a story about the past as best they can, knowing they are not telling everything. The teacher of history then begins to make a selection from that record. You are certainly not going to teach all the history that's been recorded; you're going to be selective. The teacher then has to choose what to teach.

There is still another selection that is going on. That is the selection going on by conscientious teachers who realize that the student is also going to process that information quite differently. What the teacher has selected and what makes absolute and clear sense to the teacher may make no sense at all to the student. Teachers must select those things that can be grounded somehow to the student's experience and made sensible to the student. There are all sorts of obstacles to overcome. Those of you who are high school teachers are fully aware of these. A simple thing like time is one. We can laugh about it, but children need to acquire a certain level of maturity before they can understand time. High school world history teachers, at least those teaching ninth and tenth grades, realize that they have to worry about that. It's not strictly speaking a problem of realization; it's trying to understand things that happened a long time ago. There's conceptual confusion. Words that seem to carry meaning to the historian or to a high school teacher may have no meaning at all to students. We talked today about handling the Renaissance and Reformation in one class period. Well, try to imagine that in a high school course. Renaissance in the student's notes means the rebirth or revival of learning. The student writes that down, but what does "rebirth" mean to a high school student? Is it like a miscarriage or something of that sort? It conveys a certain image to the individual, and the teacher has to start breaking that down before reaching the students.

People ought to have some sort of reason for why they're teaching these courses in high school (or college for that matter), and the purposes for teaching world history are very much confused. I dug out some purposes I found stated from

place to place. One purpose widely used in the mid-sixties was that we teach history to teach students about the nature of history and how historians work. They're going to learn something about the process of history by learning the method of inquiry of historians. It's kind of a career education, but it's different from teaching history because of a certain pleasure of knowing history, a kind of joy of history for recreational purposes. You'll feel better for having studied history. When you're an old person you'll sit down and read history because you learned the joy of reading history. That's a reason sometimes given. Some people say that you ought to teach history because students need to realize the uniqueness of events and people. In that case, history belongs to the humanities. On the other hand, people say you ought to teach history in order to realize the patterns of human conduct. That strikes me as history as a social science. Both purposes make good sense, but they take the students in opposite directions. To understand how things in these institutions and situations came to be as they are is another purpose frequently cited, another reason given is to enable the individual to better understand himself as a product of culture. All of these, one of them, any of them may well be worthy purposes, but there's a confusion of purposes. What it is that you are going to do and the purpose that you choose are likely to guide the manner in which you proceed.

Let me comment briefly on textbooks. Now, no one assumes that every teacher is bound by a textbook. There well may be such teachers, but I have never met one. There are always teachers who elaborate and go beyond textbooks by adding stories to the textbooks, telling anecdotes, ignoring certain parts of the textbooks, and so on. I've never met a teacher who goes page by page through everything in the textbook. On the other hand, the textbook sets the agenda for the course. A new teacher begins the 180-day school year with a 540-page textbook. He subtracts the holidays, vacations, and the football assemblies. That leaves about 140 days. The teacher will figure out how much has to be covered and use the textbook as the agenda toward that end. The traditional narrative textbook continues to dominate the schools and world history courses today just as it did 50 years ago. This narrative textbook is mainly a chronological gallery from the early man to the present day, from Adam to Atom. I'll not elaborate on that textbook since all of you know the textbooks very well. Let me comment on a few alternatives I've tried out over the last 20 years to provide a different approach to the narrative survey. I'll give only a few examples to give you some hint of the range of alternatives.

Stavrianos published a book around 1963 called The Global History of Man. It was a narrative text with a book of readings; schools were supposed to buy both together. The book has an interesting feature. About half of it is a chronological survey in which the main idea is that people lived in regional isolation with only infrequent interactions up to a certain point, and then from 1500 on you have the implication of Western domination and steady interaction. The last half of the book is an area studies approach in which he treated one area of the world after another around the four topics of politics, economics, culture, and something else I've forgotten. By using a flashback device, he would start at the present and then try to flash back to see how we got to the present. His book has been remarkably successful among all the alternatives. It is still in print and is still used in many schools around the country, but it is by no means the best seller.

There were some others. Fenton, who was--in the 1960s at least--probably the leading figure in a new approach to social studies, produced a high school world history book which was divided in two parts. The first half was called The Shaping of Western Society; it was largely a chronological treatment of Western European history with emphasis upon certain key topics, using readings mainly connected by narrative essays. The second part was called Tradition and Change, in which China, Brazil, India, and West Africa were selected. The emphasis was on something called the structure of the discipline and the method of historical inquiry. It did not do very well, but the first edition sold well enough that the publisher was encouraged to reproduce and put out a second version. By that time the mood of the field changed enough so that the revised version added some new goals; I'll cite those for you as examples of what was happening. The goals for the new version dealt with positive attitudes toward the study of history, to develop self-esteem by students, encourage values, develop learning and inquiry skills for acquiring knowledge, with acquiring knowledge last of the six goals. That program has largely disappeared; I think it's out of print.

In the early 1970's David Weissman, a teacher in Oakland, California, produced a book called The Human Experience. It was built around eight modular themes, which Weissman believed would be popular with largely low-achieving students, the kind of students he taught in the Oakland inner-city schools. His topics were a kind of collage, and the chronology is oftentimes missed. The topics were Human Origins, Economics of Survival, the City's Decline, Communication Across Time and Space, World of the Family, Rights and Revolution, the Scientific Spirit, and the Artistic Imagination. That program is also out of print.

John Thompson and Kathy Hedburg produced a book called People and Civilization. It was a narrative, chronological textbook with a teacher's manual, games, role playing, film strips, and audio-tapes to try to make the instruction more interesting to both the students and teachers. That team of authors decided not to try to shake up the whole way schools teach world history. They largely accepted the notion that schools expected a narrative textbook. They tried to stay close to the typical world history syllabus but added some new dimensions that had not been there before, such as comparative history. One of their units dealt with a comparison between classical China and classical Greece. There were others called "Peasants and Warriors," "Medieval Civilization in Europe and Japan," and so on. They also tried to be highly selective in content, dealing with some topics which schools had not typically addressed. They had a most extensive treatment on Islam. But in order to make room, they cut back on some of the traditional treatment about Rome and many of the wars that were typically featured in high school books. They also tried to integrate the arts and humanities in a way that had not been done before. They developed plays on the Industrial Revolution so the students could take part and act out its social effects. The book is now out of print, but it remains the most widely copied single book for teachers. Teachers plagiarized it enthusiastically, but still it didn't match their syllabus; it couldn't be adopted.

Of all of these alternatives, only Stavrianos survived. The narrative text is still the order of the day. Well, what can be done? After more than 20 years of trying to have an impact on high school world history courses, it's tempting to say

that nothing can be done or that everything possible has been tried with only marginal results. It's always possible to conclude that little change is possible, or maybe the course has reached equilibrium and it's what it's supposed to be. However, I'd like to offer two sets of proposals. One I'd call a sort of minimal proposal and the other one a maximum proposal. The minimal one is achievable; the maximum one we, of course, will reject out of hand. It doesn't have a script. Well, let's propose it anyway just to show we're out thinking about things other than the simple minimal proposal.

If we assume that world history will likely remain a two-semester course at the tenth grade level for the rest of this century, at least several points are in order. One is to clarify the purpose. I would clarify the purpose by challenging world history for its citizenship uses in the curriculum. I would make the pitch that it is a necessary part of being an American citizen today. It's part of the necessary knowledge, skills, and understanding to be a responsible citizen in a democratic society to know certain things that only world history can provide. Start pushing that very hard as central to an education for a high school graduate. We haven't done that in a long time. We have to find some reasons why it's essential and then start pushing. That will at least get the course taught again.

I think world history can be personalized more than it is. There's some interest to do that even within the narrative textbooks, but in the interest of covering so much, the level of generalization is such that it's very difficult for students to get any sense of who these figures were. Focusing upon key figures, treating Galileo as a tragic figure in a particular time in European history, the kinds of crisis he faced, and how he worked through it, could be made interesting to students. I'm sure in most books right now Galileo is a sentence in a paragraph about something related to the Scientific Revolution. It's passed off, and Galileo will never be recalled and the student will know nothing about him.

Another thing I would do is provide alternative points of view. Reproduce and distribute to schools which request it, a translation of Soviet textbooks about the United States. High school history teachers can pick out different topics in American history and see what Soviet students are told about the United States in their books. It offers quite a different point of view. We could be doing that from many different countries on topics which they and the United States have had some relationship.

My radical proposal is to abolish the Carnegie unit, which defines a high school class unit as a 50 minute offering five days a week. It has limited the number of courses which a teacher can teach and which schools can offer. It sets a frame about how to time a given class, and, therefore, it seriously restricts the range of offerings one can have. I would begin by wiping out that unit or at least modify the situation so that history might be a unit but not taught separately as world history or American history. Then, I propose that every year for grades eight through twelve students would study both American history and world history, but they wouldn't study the same course every day. We're one of the few countries in which students take the same course every day for a semester or for a year. In Western and Eastern Europe, students take world history, Soviet history, geography, math, science, and so on. But they're not taking those courses every day. If we started students in grade eight with a course in history every year

through grade twelve, alternating American and world history on different days of the week, we could manage the curriculum by chronological blocks. When you got to the senior year of high school, you would have only the period from 1933 to the present that students would be studying both world history and American history. Imagine those two coming together simultaneously so the students are thinking both American and world history from 1933 to the present. They would have a chance to see the American point of view and an external point of view.

Well, that proposal doesn't have a chance. Currently, the high school world history course is reduced to one course in one year. That's packing everything in an 800 page textbook and trying to gallop through with little opportunity for the students to reflect and digest what is good teaching. Nevertheless, that represents my quick and highly superficial overview of where I think world history is in the secondary grades.

World History Since Toynbee: The Emergence of Macrohistory

by

H. Loring White

In 1918-1919, H. G. Wells, the British author and public figure, produced a world history for the common reader. He begins The Outline of History with a statement of the reasons why he, a literary figure rather than a scholar, ventured such an excursion into an area of history so long neglected. Out of the catastrophe of World War I had come " . . . a widespread realization that everywhere the essentials of the huge problems that had been thrust so suddenly and tragically upon the democracies of the world were insufficiently understood," and that "everyone was 'thinking internationally,' or at least trying to do so."[1] Besides this newly awakened concern about international problems, Wells sensed in the general public a great ignorance about the human past, combined with " . . . crude and naive assumptions about history in general."[2] He attributed this problem to the shortcomings of school history, which then taught little more than the details of the lives of national leaders.[3] And he loaded this monumental burden upon his own shoulders because it lay beyond the specialized interests of the history profession: " . . . there did not seem to be any historian available who was sufficiently superficial, shall we say, sufficiently wide and sufficiently shallow to cover the vast field of the project."[4]

Wells took an approach that was narrative and developmental, running a compendious gamut from geological history to modern history. Following his cosmic and geological prelude, humankind emerges out of prehistory and progresses through the Stone Age toward the creation of civilized society. The remaining five-sevenths of the work deal successively with ancient civilization, classical civilization, the Middle Ages, early modern times, and the recent period. Styling it an "Outline," Wells' intent was modest; he claimed that he had " . . . added nothing to history," and that the book was " . . . merely . . . a digest of the great mass of material . . . in the character of a popular writer considering the needs of other ordinary citizens like himself."[5] However, it was his hope (he tells us later on) that he had produced " . . . a just idea of the order and shape . . . of man's development."[6] In addition to narratives of events, the Outline demonstrates its developmental purpose by presenting comprehensive discussions of culture (religion, art, government, ideas, science, society, commerce, etc.), analyses of world-views, and considerations of the historical roles of ideas (scientific understanding, the ideal of righteousness, mankind as a community, liberalism, socialism, Darwinism, etc.). Essentially, this is a narrative history based upon intellectual points of view which Kroeber sees as being a resumption of the lapsed tradition of Enlightenment world history; like Voltaire, Wells was seeking "a natural history of civilization."[7]

However, the significance of the Outline does not--as Wells himself realized--lie in any contribution to either intellectual history or historiography. As " . . . a popular writer considering the needs of other ordinary citizens like himself, "Wells aimed at the imperative of the public's need to find its location in the continuum of history. The measure of his success is that his book has outlived him and become a hardy perennial. Its six principle editions stretch from 1920 to

1969, the latter two revisions being the work of his heirs. There have been reprintings of each edition to meet further demands,[8] and the book is still available. Thus, for sixty years, booksellers have routinely answered buyers' requests for a readable world history by offering them the Outline. Such a record can only be described as phenomenal, both because its presentation has apparently been of some worth to three generations and because the history profession has not managed to supersede it with a less archaic model. Obviously, there is justice in Wells' rather arch comment that "it would indeed have meant disaster to the academic reputation of any established historical authority to have admitted an intention of writing a complete Outline of History . . . ."[9]

Other than Wells, the reading public can name very few other world historians. Probably the only other "name" figures are Toynbee and Spengler, and possibly William McNeill whose work is more recent. Thus, world history has remained a peripheral interest of the profession. However, there have been many others, few of them historians, who have found in world history a subject which vitally interests them. For many of these, the interest has been philosophical rather than historical. These are usually classed pejoratively as the metahistorians or philosophers of history. Frank E. Manuel has adroitly classified them into four varieties: "Theologians," "Neo-evolutionists," "Neo-Marxists," and "Modern Cyclists."[10] The Theologians, who include Reinhold Niebuhr, Christopher Dawson, and Nicolai Berdyaev, view history as an unprogressive working-out of Christian eschatology, recurrent--and thus cyclical--God-ordained dramas of sin and punishment, virtue and salvation.[11] The Neo-evolutionists are the philosopher-scientists, such as Julian Huxley and Teilhard de Chardin, who envision a post-biological period in which evolution is spiritual, toward a higher consciousness.[12] Equally progressive and linear are the Neo-Marxists, who, inspired by Marx's earlier writings about individual freedom, foresee a humane and creative utopia (Nicolai Lemonov, J. D. Bernal).[13] The last group, the Modern Cyclists, are more concerned with history than with philosophy, but, like the Theologians, they chiefly find recurrences, and, like the other three categories, they predict that the next phase of history will be spiritual.[14] Spengler, Toynbee, and Sorokin are the exemplars of the Modern Cyclists.[15]

Thus far, we are hampered by the lack of a name. Usually, the study is termed world or global history or the history of civilization. However, such terms do not convey a very precise sense of the study nor any sense of its relation to the total field of history. Therefore, let us replace them with "macrohistory"; this term conveys a sense of large units of study, such as civilizations or societies, and of large perspectives; it also suggests a contrast with other forms of history which deal with smaller entities, such as nations, chronological periods, locales, or topical subjects. Thus, macrohistory is easily distinguished from other forms of the discipline which, in turn, can be subsumed under "microhistory."

The sources or origins of macrohistory are found chiefly in evolutionary anthropology and in the philosophy of history. Both are studies of human development which attempt to comparatively analyze different societies. The evolutionary anthropologists came first in the late nineteenth century with their ideas of the evolution of culture, but this interest waned in this century as anthropology was taken over by ethnographic studies of primitive cultures, which ignore development in favor of a synchronic or timeless view which stresses

psychological interpretation. The philosophy of history, or metahistory, originated in the eighteenth century with Voltaire and Condorcet, but this universal approach lapsed in the nineteenth century with the rise of the more empirical and particularistic approaches developed by professional historians. However, metahistory was reborn in Oswald Spengler's Decline of the West[16] and in Arnold J. Toynbee's A Study of History.[17] Spengler in the twenties and Toynbee in the thirties and forties achieved popular successes with the general public; the catastrophes of world war and depression had aroused a very great concern as to the fate and survival of the civilization of the West, and these thinkers attempted to formulate historical explanations of the course of civilization which were much more theoretical than the simpler narrative approach of Wells.

In Spengler's view, a civilization undergoes a cycle of organic development that parallels the life cycle: birth, growth, maturity, decline, death. He saw this pattern as rigid and deterministic, an inevitable series of recurrent stages that resulted from the inherent nature of the civilizational organism, a totally internal process that was autonomous in its workings and independent of all external influences. Toynbee was attracted by this cyclical idea of rise-and-fall, but he rejected the rigid, pseudo-biological theory of a life-cycle that was unaffected by external influences. Instead, he created a more open and flexible system, but one equally deterministic and similarly based upon historical recurrences. In place of Spengler's determinism of the organic, Toynbee adduced the Will of God as the ultimate cause of events. They differed also in historical content: Spengler analyzed the elements of culture to find recurrences, whereas Toynbee chiefly considered historical events, focusing upon politics, social developments, and religion. Toynbee also viewed civilizations as linked and influenced by cultural contacts and connections, whereas Spengler had portrayed civilizations as autonomous and discontinuous. Thus, although both men created deterministic systems of history based upon recurrences, Toynbee's system was the more historical, and Spengler's, being based upon culture theory, was more anthropological.

Therefore, while Spengler could be ignored and set aside because of the unhistorical nature of his creation, Toynbee presented a critical problem for the history profession. The result was a controversy that centered on the question of method. In seeking recurrent patterns in the flow of events, Toynbee was attacked for the capital sin of selecting facts to conform to theories, the failure to be empirical.[18] For this and other perceived errors, the grand synthesis of A Study of History was stigmatized with an absolute rejection. The effect of the Toynbee controversy was to denigrate all ideas of world history or civilizational development, and since then, few historians have ventured close to the scene of this debacle. However, in the social sciences, the reaction to metahistory generated new thought. This new thought constituted a return to the temporal and diachronic approaches that had characterized the earlier evolutionary anthropologists. This return to evolutionary studies has forged a new connection between social science and history, and out of the joining of disciplines has emerged macrohistory.

This connection was first established in the theory of the sociologist P. A. Sorokin, but his rather abstruse form of the comparative analysis of civilization was only another variety of metahistory. Sorokin's system is ahistorical in that it

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considers only the stages of cultural evolution, while leaving out people, events, and locations. Like his contemporaries Spengler and Toynbee, Sorokin, in excluding much historical data, created a system that was closed and more concerned with its own internal relationships than with the actualities of history.[19] Instead, the central and germinal figure in the emergence of macrohistory was the anthropologist Alfred L. Kroeber. Like Sorokin, Kroeber was a culture theorist who reacted to the philosophy of history; however, he differed in that he worked empirically, avoided the temptation to create another system, and applied his anthropological methods to the study of history. His general approach was carefully inductive, using methods that were descriptive, comparative, and analytical, and his findings were cautious and tentative. They also can be considered reputable scholarship. Kroeber developed significant conclusions on the patterns of cultural growth, the relation of style to civilization, the factors which identify a particular civilization, the historical role of cultural diffusion in Eurasia, and the convergence of history and anthropology in the creation of macrohistory.[20] In this work, he was the first to discern all of the elements of macrohistory: a global perspective based upon the process of cultural diffusion, a comparative approach that is empirical in considering both similarities and differences, civilization as a holistic unit of historical study, civilizational development viewed as pattern and process, and the use of analytical and systematic methods and techniques taken from the social sciences. Kroeber established the possibility of a larger history; all subsequent efforts owe much to him.

Kroeber, who died in 1960, was not succeeded by any "followers," nor did he stimulate anything resembling a "school." However, in the work of a few historians and anthropologists, many of his ideas and approaches are visible. The most important of Kroeber's direct successors have been William H. McNeill and Rushton Coulborn, both historians. McNeill is the best known because he has pursued the development and propagation of global history to the extent of making it a professional mission. His well known and well regarded The Rise of the West is based upon the propositions that 1) human history is more than the sum of the histories of separate civilizations, 2) there is a historical cohesion that transcends peoples and continents, and 3) this cohesion arises from the spread of cultural innovations by diffusional processes. This book embodies Kroeber's ideas that Eurasian history consists of interactions between its regional civilizations, that these interactions gave to the area a developmental unity that can be summed up in the word "ecumene," and that the operative process in the Eurasian continent's historical development has been that of historical transmission or diffusion. From these ideas, McNeill derived his tripartite functional division of world history into a first period, in which the Middle East dominated world development as the center of invention (to 500 B.C.); a second period, during which the regional civilizations of Eurasia struck a "cultural balance" as independent centers of invention which regularly interacted (to 1500 A.D.); and a third period of recent history, during which the civilization of the West ended this balance and became, like the Middle East at the beginning, the dominant center of invention.[21] In all of this development, McNeill has traced the diffusion of cultural patterns, which he terms clusters of repeatable forms of behavior, and which he views as flowing outward from "metropolitan centers" of invention.[23]

Rushton Coulborn's work also followed Kroeber's ideas, but it took directions different from McNeill's. Coulborn's efforts were concentrated on the nature and

method of comparative studies and on the holistic approach to the study of civilizations empirically to discover similarities and differences between such specific aspects as the role of feudalism, the quality of church-state relations, and the nature of civilizational origins.[24] He also analyzed civilizations in his attempts to define them[25] and to establish a general growth pattern.[26] All of his findings were tentative and speculative, but the evidence for his assertions that civilizations have similar patterns of development was based upon a full consideration of their differences. Therefore, his theory that the origins of civilizations were independent developments,[27] and his conclusions on the developmental cycle of civilization[28] are important contributions to macrohistory. Coulborn died before he could assemble his ideas into a major synthesis, but in a final essay, he presented conclusions about the state of the art of comparative history.[29] Here, he indicated that comparative studies in civilization had achieved a successful beginning, but that the art could not go forward unless it attracted a significant number of historians.[30] He also called for "the establishment of an outline body of doctrine", that would be "a mapping of the field" rather that a collecting of information.[31]

No "outline body of doctrine" has appeared since Coulborn's death in 1968, but as of that date, two major theorists had made significant contributions to macrohistory which constitute new directions in analysis. These figures are Darcy Ribeiro, an evolutionary anthropologist, and the historian Carroll Quigley. Ribeiro, a Brazilian, is one of the recent evolutionists who have turned away from the timeless, synchronic perspective of the "functionalists" because of the failure of that approach to consider the development of culture. Ribeiro also brings to the study a "Third World" viewpoint which seeks to discover the reasons for unequal development, both in the modern world and previously. His theory is global, evolutionary, integrated, and systematic. He begins with a division of culture into three segments: technology, society, and ideology, and he describes them as interacting "imperatives" of history, in that 1) technological progress has been cumulative, 2) society is the result of relations between people and technology, and 3) ideology, i.e., beliefs and ideas, results from the interaction of society and technology.[32] The interaction of these three imperatives constitutes what Ribeiro calls the "civilizational process," and out of the analysis of this process emerges a sequential scheme of development in which human societies are classified as a limited number of structural categories which have succeeded one another in evolutionary stages.[33] Ribeiro periodizes history into an evolutionary series of eight technological revolutions: agricultural, urban, irrigation, metallurgical, pastoral, mercantile, industrial, and thermonuclear--each of which has brought about fundamental changes in the quality of life. In each technological period, a revolution in technology engenders a "general civilizational process" which creates a new social and political entity or "sociocultural formation."[34] Thus, the "Mercantile Revolution" of the sixteenth century unleashed the process of "Capitalistic Expansion," thereby producing three new sociocultural entities, "Capitalistic Mercantile Empires" (such as England and Holland), "Trading Colonies" (Indonesia, India), and "Immigrant Colonies" (North America, Australia).[35]

Ribeiro has created a broad macrohistorical theory which is integrated and analytical and which achieves the fusion of history and social science. It brings together the five elements of macrohistory in that it is global, developmental,

holistic in its approach to civilizations, comparative as well, and highly systematic in its classifications and analysis. Whatever its flaws, it is a new and large hypothesis which calls for testing and verification.

Finally, there is the work of Carroll Quigley, the Georgetown historian, who for 40 years, gave a required course in the "Development of Civilization" to Foreign Service aspirants. Quigley's theory is also systematic and founded on scientific principles.[36] His analysis begins with a demonstration that the study of history, like any science, is an arbitrary organization of the undifferentiated materials of reality. This is too complex to explain in this short presentation, but Quigley's theory is based upon an arbitrary division of the reality dimension of the elements of culture. These elements are the intellectual, religious, social, economic, political, and military levels--each functioning to satisfy, respectively, the human needs for understanding, psychological certainty, companionship, material well being, the organization of power relationships, and group security. These cultural elements may be charted on parallel time lines. The resulting schematic drawing will reveal that some elements have developed to a greater extent than others; thus, in Western civilization today the intellectual, military, and economic elements are far more developed than the religious, social, and political elements. This phenomenon is familiar to social scientists as the "cultural lag," but Quigley's graphic portrayal of this complex of interrelationships is the construct of "historical morphology."[37] Along each individual time line of the morphological structure, there is operating the evolutionary process of history which Quigley labels the "institutionalization of instruments." An "instrument" is any form of human organization which satisfies a need, such as religion, an economic activity, or teaching. In the course of time, all such instruments will develop into institutions; an institution means a decrease in effectiveness because it grows more interested in its own internal activities and purposes to the increasing neglect of its original purpose. This historical process inevitably reaches a point of crisis where strain is termed "tension of development." At this point of "tension of development," one of three things will happen: reform, or constructive change within the institution; circumvention, or the creation of a new instrument; or reaction, a failure to change constructively in which vested institutional interests triumph.[38] Thus, along the six parallel levels of the time line, the process of the institutionalization of instruments is multiplied into the complex tissue of events that we call history.

Quigley, like Ribeiro, gives primacy to the economic level. On this level, each civilization achieves its material development because of an "instrument of expansion"; this economic instrument consists of invention, surplus, and investment. These three elements interact to produce growth, and the tension of development occurs when this instrument of expansion becomes too institutionalized to produce further growth because of the failure to invest. The clash that occurs at this point will result in reform, circumvention, or reaction.[39] The first two possibilities lead to a resumption of the "Age of Expansion," but the latter causes the breakdown which precipitates an "Age of Conflict." Thus, the stages of a civilization are the direct result of two things: the process of the institutionalization of instruments and the morphological complex of the interactions of many such processes.[40] There is no time to consider Quigley's applications of this theory of the history of civilization which results in a system of developmental stages that are determined by the course of these processes.

However, this theory, like Ribeiro's, is a large and roomy hypothesis which is flexible, not rigid, in its determinism and capable of accounting for the differences as well as the recurrences of history.

Except for McNeill, whose application of the ecumenical-diffusional model has been manifested in learning materials, the work of the post-Toynbee macrohistorians has had little effect upon the classroom. As stated and implied above, there are understandable reasons for this. The history of human development on this planet has attracted few first class minds because it has not been professionally rewarding and because it requires an interdisciplinary expansion and cooperation that is beyond the scope of specialized scholars. By default the task has been left to a few brilliant mavericks who have been unusually sensitive to the need of our tumultuous and rapidly changing era for a history in a broader mode. Certainly, this need is one of the educational imperatives of today. The consumers of history are seeking a usable past, a sense of the universals of human experience on which they can found a world-view. It is quite possible that the greatest influence on the future of the history profession will be the quality of its response to the macrohistorical challenge.

NOTES

1. H. G. Wells, The Outline of History (Garden City: Doubleday, 1971), p. 1.

2. Ibid., p. 2.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., p. 3.

5. Ibid., p. 4.

6. Ibid., p. 197.

7. Alfred L. Kroeber, Style and Civilization (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957), pp. 110-111.

8. Wells, pp. 5-10.

9. Ibid., p. 4.

10. Frank E. Manuel, Shapes of Philosophical History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965), pp. 139-158.

11. Ibid., pp. 139-145.

12. Ibid., pp. 145-1[illegible].

13. Ibid., pp. 150-153.

14. Ibid., pp. 153-159.

15. Ralph Turner observed that each is ". . . a 'world saver,' preaching doom in order to promote his own 'style' of salvation." Spengler believed in German superiority; Toynbee preached Christianity; and Sorokin founded the Harvard Research Center for Creative Altruism. See Turner's "Review of Style and Civilization by A. L. Kroeber," American Historical Review 63 (July 1958): p. 935.

16. Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West, 2 vols., trans. C. F. Atkinson (New York: Knopf, 1926-28). The one volume edition was published in 1932 and an abridged edition in 1962, both by Knopf.

17. Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History, 12 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1934-1961).

18. For Toynbee criticism, see M. F. Ashley Montagu, ed., Toynbee and History: Critical Essays and Reviews (Boston: Porter Sargent Publisher, 1956); Edward T. Gargan, ed., The Intent of Toynbee's History, (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1961); Pieter Geyl, Debates with Historians (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1958).

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21. William H. McNeill, The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963).

22. McNeill, The Shape of European History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 24.

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24. Rushton Coulborn, ed., Feudalism in History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956); Joseph R. Strayer et al., "The State and Religion: An Exploratory Comparison in Different Cultures," Comparative Studies in Society and History I (1958-1959): 38-57, 383-393; Rushton Coulborn, The Origin of Civilized Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959).

25. Ibid., pp. 16-21, 181-186.

26. Coulborn, "The Ancient River Valley Civilizations" in New Perspectives in World History, ed. Shirley H. Engle (Washington, D. C.: National Council for the Social Studies, 1964), pp. 144-146. See also The Origin of Civilized Societies, pp. 6-8.

27. Ibid., pp. 9-15, 21-30.

28. Coulborn gives his final statement on this subject in "Structure and Process in the Rise and Fall of Civilized Societies," Comparative Studies in Society and History 8 (July 1966): 404-431.

29. Coulborn, "A Paradigm for Comparative History," Current Anthropology 10 (April-June 1969): 175-178.

30. Ibid., p. 175.

31. Ibid., p. 177.

32. Darcy Ribeiro, The Civilizational Process, trans. Betty J. Meggers (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1968), pp. 2, 6-7.

33. Ibid., pp. 8-12.

34. Ibid., pp. 13-16.

35. Ibid., pp. 14-15.

36. Carroll Quigley, Evolution of Civilizations: An Introduction to Historical Analysis (New York: Macmillan Company, 1961).

37. Ibid., pp. 47-49, 60-65.

38. Ibid., pp. 49-60.

39. Ibid., pp. 69-78.

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In Defense of World History

by

Alan Wood

There can be few things in this world more likely to raise the hackles of the practicing historian than the assertion that the study of world history is a worthwhile enterprise deserving the serious, lifetime commitment of the best minds in the business. World history, with some notable but rare exceptions, has traditionally been regarded as falling solely within the province of the high school football coach or the college freshman survey instructor and, consequently, avoided like the plague by the professional historian out to make or preserve a reputation for himself. There is a very good reason for this: historians abhor generalizations (and well they should) which appear to put too much distance between themselves and the factual evidence on which they are based; unfortunately, generalizations are the very stuff and matter of world history. The scope of the subjects covered in world history is so broad, and time and space so limited, that only by casting a very wide net indeed can one hope to include all the relevant material.

Does this natural suspicion of generalizations then doom world history forever to be exiled to the frontiers of the profession, where its practitioners can indulge their appetites for apparently meaningless generalities without fear of infecting the healthy? Is there no redeeming value to a study of the whole world, no great purpose which it and it alone can serve, no particular insight into the arrangement of the vast multiplicity of human activities which can come from looking at them from the perspective which only distance can afford? Is there no reason why those who labor so diligently in the vineyards cannot climb to a higher prominence from time to time and feast their mind's eye on the panoramic vista of all of human history? For most of the nineteenth and twentiethth centuries, the answers to these questions have not been favorable to world history. In order to understand why this has been so, one must examine certain fundamental assumptions common to the recent past in the West. Many of the most important of these assumptions are a product of nineteenth-century positivism and empiricism, and my intention in dwelling on them is not to disparage the entire intellectual heritage of the nineteenth century on whose tender bosom, after all, we have all been nurtured and grown to maturity. Rather, it is to suggest that in basing our habits of thought in the twentieth century primarily on certain unexamined assumptions of the nineteenth century, we have allowed ourselves to become overly satisfied with only part of the truth. In the spirit of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, who is supposed to have remarked that men are usually right in what they affirm and wrong in what they deny, my quarrel with positivism and empiricism, which I take to represent the dominant influences in contemporary historical scholarship, lies in their claim to have discovered the whole truth, and their denial of the value of insights arrived at by other means.

My purpose in this exercise, among others, is to argue that world history bears the same relationship to specialized history as synthesis does to analysis, as definition to distinction, as collection to division, as essence to accident. As such, it forms a necessary part of the mental process by which we arrive at a full understanding of historical reality. I do not claim to offer any new justification for

world history, nor do I wish to appear to be supporting the invention of another magic formula through which historical phenomena might suddenly be suffused with a significance denied them before and by which the future course of history can in some way be finally predicted. The search for these patterns, whether they be Spengler's organicism or Toynbee's early cyclicism, proceeds from the same source as do all the secular religions of our time and manifests a similar attraction to a dubious determinism of one sort or another. I seek only to remind the interested reader of the importance of a universal perspective in history and to suggest that we should no more abandon the study of world history because of its inherent difficulties than we should cease trying to become better men because we cannot become perfect. The meaning derives from the insight afforded by the task itself and not from the expectation of reaching a definitive answer to all questions at some as yet uncertain point in the future.

At the outset, I should perhaps clarify my own understanding of the subject of history since it is partly and unavoidably responsible for the direction which my interest in world history has taken. Very briefly, I regard history as a record of the past interpreted by recourse to the written evidence which has survived and by scholars trained in the systematic evaluation of that evidence. It is primarily a literary art, relying upon the written word as the medium both for comprehending the full expanse of human experience and for understanding its significance. It is not primarily a science, in the sense that it does not, and ought not, expect human behavior to be rendered predictable merely by a study of the component parts of the human personality. Its final goal is to deepen one's understanding of the meaning of life and one's appreciation of the tragic limitations as well as the ennobling possibilities of the human condition. The ultimate end of historical study is not only the accumulation of knowledge but is, or should be, wisdom, a synthesis of the two disparate worlds of life and thought produced by a combination of speculative reflection and moral judgment. I do not think of man as a passive creature who begins life as a clean slate and whose personality is formed completely by the conditions of his environment. I question the notion that one's influence over one's social environment increases in direct proportion to one's understanding of certain neutral forces which are held to govern it, that history is a gradual unfolding of man's consciousness of these forces, and that ultimately he will be in a position to effect a fundamental alteration in the basic nature of man himself by a manipulation of the external circumstances of his environment. History never was, and never will be, an instrument of bringing about the millennium on earth.

It should be clear from this that I do not regard the impact of nineteenth-century positivism and empiricism, from whose fond embrace twentieth-century intellectuals seem unable or unwilling to extricate themselves, as uniformly beneficial. However much I might be persuaded to recognize certain salutary influences on the study of history resulting from the adoption of many of the rigorous standards of research and analysis developed by the social sciences, I cannot rid myself of some misgivings with regard to both their ends and their means. The hallmark of the scientific method, regarded by those in the nineteenth century who wished to apply it to the study of human behavior as the only reliable means by which true knowledge could be apprehended, is an emphasis on defining the relationship between properties and on identifying certain laws of operation capable of predicting future behavior. Science is interested in the essence of an

object, its inherent and unchangeable meaning, its significance, only in so far as it can be described by its observable characteristics.[2] To identify these laws of operation, it is necessary to accumulate as much information as possible on the behavior of any particular object of study, often requiring for the consummation of this enterprise a considerable division of labor and an extended period of time.

One of the consequences of the positivists' transfer in the nineteenth century of their understanding of the scientific method to the study of man is that research has often become largely a group effort, conducted for the sake of adding to the general storehouse of information, too frequently though certainly not always without regard to the significance or coherence of the finished piece. The principle of basic research, pursued in the natural sciences without any practical purpose in mind, in the hope that some fortuitous combination of hitherto random information will lead ultimately to something useful in the future, becomes allied in the social sciences with the old commonplace expression "knowledge for its own sake" (trotted out for service by those who feel threatened by any suggestion that they ought to be accountable for the topics of their research) to produce a cast of mind resistant to fundamental questions of significance and meaning. As a partial consequence of this, the academic terrain has come over the year to resemble a vast battlefield pitted with a network of foxholes, in which specialists work in relative isolation from each other and with very little regard to the strategic value of their labor. This characterization is not intended to diminish the value of much (perhaps, one hopes, most) of the monographic research being done in the social sciences and history. I am mindful that the broader questions of which I speak must ultimately rest upon a foundation of sound monographic research. Rather, my distrust arises from a fear that too often the means have smothered the ends in an avalanche of paperwork devoted to the perfection of methodology, and that together with our friends in the social sciences we as historians have lost sight of some of the important questions we should be asking of the historical evidence. The field of philosophy has already been buried for so long there is some doubt whether it will ever be found again; we must not allow the profession of history to suffer a similar fate.

It is the pursuit of an answer to some of these important questions that world history has the most to offer. The value of world history, in fact, lies precisely in those areas which are denied validity by the positivist and empiricist traditions. Its greatest utility is on another plane entirely, that of responding to the deeper problem of meaning not only of the individual or even of any given society, but of the world as a whole. We have grown accustomed to hearing that the world has shrunk and that technology and the miracles of modern transportation have brought the world closer together than at any other time in the entire history of the human race--so frequently do we hear this constant refrain that we have ceased to think seriously about the consequences of this development. Platitudes have a chilling effect on the mental faculties, and repeated often enough as those mentioned certainly have been, they cease to be anything more than pale substitutes for thought. But we ignore these problems at our own peril. We must deal with them openly and rationally; to the extent that we allow them to fester unattended in our inarticulate unconscious, influencing our thoughts and actions in ways we cannot understand; we are not free men. We must become aware of the assumptions which govern our lives, as individuals, as citizens of a larger political entity with a common cultural tradition, and as members of the entire global community. This

requires an effort of considerable synthesis, which is a creative act possible only in the mind of the single individual, not a committee.

The importance of synthesis in writing world history cannot be over-emphasized, and in no other area is the departure from the positivist and empiricist tradition more evident. Concentrating exclusively on monographic research, on accumulating "sufficient" factual information on which to base broader generalizations, is clearly impossible in world history, if for no other reason than because the facts themselves are more than a vast army of historians could master in a hundred lifetimes. The very selection itself is an interpretive, synthesizing act of such obvious and sweeping consequences that it is impossible to deny it.

We are all familiar with the wonderful cartoon depicting various preposterous and unusable designs for a simple swing produced by the efforts of a hypothetical committee of specialists. Every conceivable configuration of two ropes, a board, and a tree is put forward, except one in which someone can swing. It does not require a giant leap of the imagination to suggest an analogy between the methods of our committee of aspiring swingers and those employed in the formulation of, for one thing, American foreign policy. Officials in our government are called upon daily to make decisions and set long range policies on a multitude of bafflingly complex matters, producing in the course of time consequences of which they are at best only dimly aware. We should not be surprised at their low batting average; by designing our educational system (our swing, as it were) to produce specialists and only specialists, we have little reason to squawk when its graduates are unable to fit the parts into the whole and have no sense of the final end toward which particular actions ought to be directed. Of course, one can argue, with much truth, that practical decisions are almost always influenced by a host of factors which make a tragic mockery of good intentions and well laid plans: lack of time, of adequate information, or of viable alternatives under the circumstances. Nevertheless, without any sense of the long range purpose of our actions, we risk becoming mere slaves of the contingent and the unforeseen. Intellectuals, who ought to be providing this sense of purpose, are unable to do so, and some even express surprise at the very notion that they should.

Here again I must emphasize that my complaint is not against specialization but against nothing but specialization. Even the applied sciences recognize the importance of synthesis, perhaps because they are in the business of making a swing that people can actually use. Take, for example, the aerospace design industry. When the Boeing company sets out to design a new airplane, it first puts the assignment into the hands of engineers known as configurators, whose special qualification is a broad base of experience in all the relevant divisions of the company such that each has acquired over the years a general knowledge of all the disciplines required to design an aircraft. The principle at work is that only a single mind is capable of integrating the various skills and putting them at the service of the imagination so as to impose consistency, unity, harmony of design, and balance of functions on the finished product. The designs arrived at by these generalists, working individually, are turned over to specialists, who pass on their actual feasibility in flight. The analogy is apt because of the similarity in the relationship between the specialist and the generalist. A world historian does not dispense with specialists, any more than a configurator does. He merely adds to their work in ways in which they have not been trained and relies upon them to help

judge the truth or falsity of his conclusions. The relationship is a symbiotic one, in which the activities of each party are of great benefit to the other. A world historian must begin as a specialist himself and always remain a specialist so that he never loses sight, however lofty the flights of imaginative fancy in which he may be tempted to indulge, of the particular circumstances of actual historical experience.

The great questions of life, why we are here, where we are going, the terrible senseless suffering of innocent people, the proper role of government and the individual, the source of moral law--these are all questions of meaning, of understanding, and as such can be apprehended only by an effort of synthesis. Nowhere is this more true than in the issue of liberalism, which in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has centered on the often conflicting demands of the individual and society, the latter either in the form of the political state or the more amorphous form of public opinion (which preoccupied J.S. Mill). What happened to liberalism when it was exported from Europe? Was it so culture-bound that it was doomed from the moment it was removed from its natural habitat in the West; or was its failure in the non-Western world due not to essential incompatibility but to mistakes in its implementation; or was it merely the victim of historical accidents such as war and revolution, without whose untimely intervention it might have stood a chance of merging with other cultures into a synthesis capable of stimulating the energies of the individual and society to new levels of achievement? To deal with this question properly (and it is one of the most important questions of this century), one must know a great deal not only about liberalism itself, as a political and intellectual movement rooted in a particular institutional background, but also about the cultures into which it was introduced, and how non-Western adherents may have modified the ideas of liberalism to conform more readily to their own cultural traditions. This requires the knowledge and understanding necessary to distinguish essentials from accidentals on a grand scale, in short, a synthesis. Only then will we begin to understand profoundly the difficulties encountered in crossing what has been called the "institutional divide," separating the various cultural traditions of the world.[3]

This nation was founded on a belief in the positive value of pluralistic social and political institutions. Inherent in this belief was the converse notion that this plurality rested on a foundation of shared assumptions regarding the nature of man and his purpose in this life. One might go so far as to say that the genius of the American experiment lay in its capacity to distinguish between the essentials, upon which all could agree, and the accidentals, upon which all could agree to disagree. Whether that same sense of common purpose has survived to the present is certainly not clear, but no one, I think, would argue that its complete disappearance would not have consequences of catastrophic proportions. Although the world today is not a unified state, and probably never will be or never should be, in the sense in which we understand the nation-state, in many ways the proximity and mutual dependence of states which have come about in the twentieth century as a result of the revolution in technology and transportation have created a situation which calls for a new understanding of outward differences and underlying similarities. To avoid this task is to acquiesce in a further descent into international anarchy.

But beyond this question of the world drawing together or becoming smaller, or whatever one wishes to call it, is another modern phenomenon, more difficult to

isolate satisfactorily, which conventional wisdom has seen fit to describe as a "spiritual malaise," a crisis, a lack of direction in the West today. The old sources of comfort to which we once turned for refuge and inspiration, the institutions of the church and the family, have been too badly bruised in the twentieth century to offer much solace to the "alienated" man. The religious impulse in man, once manifested in a belief in a transcendent God, has gradually been diverted into a faith in, first physics, then biology, and then socialist utopias of one form or another. Now that they have all failed to live up to our expectations, this impulse has broken through its traditional channels and follows the path of least resistance through the surrounding countryside, flowing in a multitude of different directions, some destructive, some benign, none with anything profound to say about the major problems. Like Candide, we find ourselves marooned on the shores of a vast and uncharted sea, confused, unable to return from whence we came, and fearful of the unknown which lies ahead. We are a society of subjects, as it were, searching for a predicate. Consideration of the fundamental questions too often has gone by default to philosophers who do not know history, historians who do not know philosophy, social scientists who do not know history or philosophy, theologians who do not know history, philosophy, or the social sciences, or journalists who do not know much about anything at all, including how to write. Those who are qualified keep silent; those who are not, shout their panaceas from the roof-tops. We live in a world in which "the best lack all conviction," as W.B. Yeats put it, "and the worst are full of passionate intensity."

What does world history have to say about these two phenomena, a shrinking world and a crisis of the spirit? If it does have something to say, then is it not simply imitating the positivist preoccupation with being relevant to contemporary problems? The positivist social sciences are indeed concerned with the need to expand knowledge in order that it might be put to practical use for the improvement of society. The key word is knowledge, because it is in this area that world history has very little if anything to offer--the study of world history, pursued only as a means of expanding knowledge, will certainly fail if for no other reason than because the mass of evidence is more than the single human mind, hobbled as it is by the natural limitations of its own powers and the brevity of human life, can reasonably be expected to absorb. The value of world history clearly lies in the realm not of knowledge, but of understanding; this purpose, however, embraces a perception of the nature of the universe and of truth (as susceptible to understanding in terms of essence, as well as behavior, or accident) which is alien to positivism and empiricism. My point is this, that we must be relevant to the essential problems of the world, not the accidental ones. Life and thought ought to be considered mutually exclusive entities only in so far as they represent analytical categories, but that in so far as they refer to the driving force of the human will and intellect, they ought to be integrated with each other to the greatest possible degree. The great crisis of the world today, after all, is not one of action, but of thought.

One might argue that the fact is our knowledge and understanding of all areas of the world have increased astronomically since the end of World War II, and thus we are already in a much better position than ever before to understand such fundamental problems as modernization and Westernization. We already have, in effect, a world history and are not in any particular need of a further reincarnation. This is partially true. We do indeed have a greater volume of

information on the world than did any of our predecessors; but what we need, and do not have and can never have under circumstances in which knowledge is compartmentalized and evaluated only by specialists, is the insight produced by the synthesizing, analytical mechanism of the single human mind.

It has been said that one of the lessons of history is to avoid false analogies. There is much wisdom in this warning; nevertheless, in the course of human history man has frequently confronted situations in which a comparison with the past can, in some limited respects, be productive. There are many similarities, for example, between the problem faced by the early Romans in the first century B.C. of knitting together a disparate and heterogeneous empire, and the central problem faced by the world today in reconciling the cultural and political traditions of the Western world with those of the non-Western world. In both cases the fundamental difficulty was to find some common ground of understanding by which necessary political, social, and economic transactions could take place with the greatest possible degree of order and efficiency. The modern world has thus far failed miserably to solve this problem. The non-Western world has in most cases adopted two models from the West: socialism or capitalism. The former has rejected outright the cultural traditions of the particular countries in which it has been adopted, often attempting to eradicate them root and branch, and the latter has regarded those traditions as basically irrelevant. In both doctrines an antithetical relationship is held to exist between the past and the present, creating a spirit of cultural schizophrenia in which reconciliation is unlikely because it is dismissed as impossible.

The Romans, however, were more successful in this venture than we have been, principally as a result of the intervention of the Roman jurists. These lawmakers adapted the Stoic concept of natural law to suit their particular purposes and devised early on a three-part division of law as a practiical expedient to resolve legal differences which arose among Roman citizens and non-Roman members of the empire. Disputes involving Roman citizens came under the provisions of Roman civil law, ius civile, while those involving non-Roman subjects of the empire came under "national" law, ius gentium. A third category, known as natural law, ius naturale, was regarded as transcending positive law and applying universally to all men at all times. This scheme of law enabled them to argue that some actions or states, such as slavery, were contrary to natural law, but not contrary to positive law. The richness as well as the utility of such an arrangement is obvious. It provided an instrument of unity while at the same time preserving diversity. It was a brilliant solution, in legal terms, of the perennial philosophical problem of the one and the many. For the most part, the Romans confined themselves to the legal implications of this doctrine, and it was not until the canon lawyers of the middle ages, particularly Gratian, again took up the concept that it was transferred to the moral and political spheres. It reached its highest expression in the work of Thomas Aquinas. Since then, as a result of the changes introduced by the continental and English political philosophers of the last 700 years, natural law has been transformed principally into a doctrine of natural rights, characterized by a preoccupation with rationalism, individualism, and radicalism.[4] It is by these later layers of clothing that it is now recognized in the modern age.

I am suggesting by this analogy that in our frenzied efforts to be "scientific" in our approach to the problems of the modern age, we may have overlooked in

natural law a potentially rich tool in understanding the seemingly chaotic proliferation of cultural traditions in the world today and in bringing them into some degree of harmony with the values of the West. Oddly enough, it is a tool which in many ways is also perfectly compatible with some assumptions inherent in the scientific outlook. Whether or not one works in the hard sciences or the social sciences, the final object is to identify certain laws of nature in accordance with which all the phenomena of the natural world (or the human world, as the case may be) can be fully explained; underlying these efforts is a profound faith in the intelligibility of the natural and human order.

I have already raised the issue of liberalism in the modern world. How, then, would that topic be dealt with in my scheme of doing world history? I would argue that the desire for freedom (without here going into a definition of that term, which would be long and laborious) is a fundamental quality of human nature which has been given various expressions in the many cultural traditions of the world. In China, for example, it is true that the interests of the community have been more represented in political and social institutions than those of the individual. But it would be exceedingly unwise to conclude that Chinese culture, therefore, has not found a way to affirm the value of the individual. Both Buddhism and Taoism, and to some extent even Confucianism through its emphasis on moral cultivation, have provided profound avenues of individual freedom. The West and to some extent Japan have been fortunate in their having developed political institutions which protect some freedoms denied to many of the non-Western cultural traditions. But that should not blind us to the essential similarity of the impulse to freedom itself. It is, therefore, nonsense to think (as some recent visitors to the People's Republic of China have done) that an individual Chinese does not value freedom as much as we do; there is no evidence that he does not, but he has not been blessed with the long history of pluralistic social and political traditions which we have enjoyed in the West, and that has made all the difference. In fact, the Chinese by being deprived of freedom may even value it all the more than do we in the West who take it so much for granted.

In like manner one can examine the religious dimension of human nature, the moral dimension, the political dimension, the economic dimension (in which one can explore, among other things, whether or not there is a natural propensity to have and acquire property), and so on. If such questions presume a more sophisticated understanding of the subtleties of history than is present in the American college freshman, then perhaps the rightful place for world history is in the upper division of the undergraduate curriculum. Indeed, one might make a plausible case for its inclusion in the coursework for all graduate students of history, since by doing so we might begin to overcome the effects of over-specialization in our graduate training. Just as biological organisms which become too delicately specialized run the risk of extinction when a sudden change in the environment occurs, we run an equally likely risk of extinction by becoming so specialized that we lose all sense of common purpose in our various areas of individual research. Something must be done to reverse this tide before it is too late.

William McNeill has attributed the disappearance of the survey courses in Western civilization which were so successful in the middle part of the twentieth century to the general disillusionment with progress as a suitable integrating principle in history.[3] Certainly, there is no doubt that the optimism of the

nineteenth century, embodied in Hegel's celebrated remark that "the history of the world is none other than the progress of the consciousness of freedom,"[6] is no longer with us. We are indeed confused; our old moorings seem to have broken loose and set us collectively adrift on the open sea, sans map, sans rudder, sans hope. No one disputes that obvious state of affairs, and I am not proposing any new formula. The ineffable web of circumstances which forms the object of our study, as well as the substance of our private lives, stubbornly refuses to conform to the laws which our limited minds have endeavored to impose upon it and gives every expectation of continuing to do so in the future. But that does not mean that we no longer have any need for the perspective afforded by a general treatment of either Western civilization or world civilization. It would be wiser if we looked upon history not as an object of faith in itself, not as a revelation of the path to future intellectual salvation, as did our predeccessors in the nineteenth century, but rather as an instrument now available to the human mind. We could use this tool both to comprehend the meaning of the world in which we find ourselves such transient visitors and to cultivate the powers of the mind itself, thereby allowing each of us to separate truth from falsehood more easily.

Most history departments in the major research universities in the United States devote very little, if any, attention to the subject of world history. Faculty members whose prospects for tenure and promotion are related to the number of publications they produce in their field of expertise are naturally reluctant to pursue a subject which might slow down the progress of their own careers. Added to this is their understandable hesitation to indulge in generalizations about areas of the world which lie outside the scope of their own academic preparation and which would most certainly expose them to professional criticism by specialists in those areas. These obstacles cannot be dismissed lightly, nor do I know of any easy way by which they might be removed; and yet, they do not diminish the need to broaden and deepen the nature of the questions which we ask of the historical evidence. We now have within our grasp, because of the great contributions of the social sciences in the last two centuries in widening our knowledge of the past, the tools to undertake this great task; what we lack is the vision and the will.

We know more about the world than we did, but we do not know the meaning of what we know, and it is that very meaning that is so urgently required. The problems brought about by rapid technological change, by the struggles between a multitude of ideological surrogates for religion, by overpopulation, by environmental pollution, and by proliferating nuclear weapons, far transcend in their destructive potential those which confronted individual civilizations in the past. In the face of these circumstances, historians have a moral duty and an intellectual responsibility to address themselves, however peripherally, to these urgent questions, with a view to forging out of the diversity of the national traditions of the world a greater sense of common purpose. Only when the world realizes the degree to which each civilization is a manifestation of qualities and experiences common to all civilizations, only when it understands the ways in which the different forms of civilized experience are expressions of a common impulse to order and meaning in life, will it be in a position to confront its probems with a reasonable prospect of success. It seems to me that the perspective gained from a study of world history is particularly useful, even vital, to this enterprise. If such a pragmatic motive in the writing of history is criticized as imposing an unnatural burden of didactic morality on the interpretation of the facts, then I can

only respond that facts, alas, do not speak for themselves, and perhaps more interpretation would shorten the unnecessarily large gap between a public desperately in need of wisdom and the historian in need of a public. We are all of us dependent, in one way or another, on the fortunes of the world around us. We must not allow that link, which binds the objects of our study to the need of the larger community for a clear statement of means and ends, to be severed completely.

NOTES

1. Those contributions are argued very persuasively by Lawrence Stone, the more so because of his ultimate criticism of the social sciences. See his article, "History and the Social Sciences in the Twentieth Century" in The Future of History, ed. Charles F. Delzell (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1977), pp. 3-42.

2. John Herman Randall, The Career of Philosophy, Vol. I (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 249.

3. Karl August Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), pp. 204 ff. My use of the term is slightly different than Wittfogel's, but I could not resist using it.

4. A. P. D'Entreves, Natural Law: An Introduction to Legal Philosophy (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1970), p. 52.

5. William H. McNeill, "Beyond Western Civilization: Rebuilding the Survey," The History Teacher 10 (August 1977): 509-515.

6. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Philosophy of History (New York: Willey Book Co., 1944), p. 19.

Approaches to Teaching World History

by

Ross Dunn

During the past several decades, we educators have been persistently instructing young citizens in the lesson of world interdependence. The metaphors of space-ship earth, the global village, the world as organism are constantly before us in our social science textbooks and in the press. Because the idea of mankind's economic and ecological unity has become something of a cherished conventional truth, it seems to me ironic that we continue to study mankind's history as though it were divided into separate, hermetically sealed geographical compartments, little ones we call nations and larger ones we call civilizations. I try to imagine the history curriculum in the university of some planet of super-intelligent beings in a distant galaxy. These beings have been studying the human evolution of the earth for centuries with powerful telescopes and flying saucer reconnaissance missions. What do we suppose would be the content of their curriculum? Would it include such courses as the Rise of the Roman Republic, Tudor England, Modern Italy, the Age of Jackson? More than likely there would be only one course: history of the earthlings and that taught occasionally and only as an elective.

In this conference we will certainly be hearing the argument that such a course should be required and taught every single semester, and in this space age of ours can we really afford to be any less comprehensive in our view of the past? We are now past the time when we need to argue why Palmer and Colton's famous textbook History of the Modern World is not the history of the modern world at all. Some of the fundamental distortion in the Western civilization approach to the past began to come clear during the educational reform movement of the 1960s. But as the idea of the core curriculum has been revised around the country during the past several years, so have old Western civilization courses been dusted off and reintroduced into the general education curriculum, mainly because they have been on hand for revitalized survey requirements. My guess is that this has been done largely without any serious reexamination of the issue of why Western civilization should be taught again on a large scale.

The revival of Western civilization has been partially disguised by the publication and wide use of a number of lavishly illustrated textbooks which advertise themselves as world history, e.g., Burns, et al., World Civilizations; Wills, World Civilizations; Wallbank and Taylor, Civilizations Past and Present; and Roberts, History of the World. Some of these books have apparently been published in response to a perceived demand to include the experience of Asian, African, and Amerindian peoples in introductory surveys. Borrowing the old Chinese image of the world, we might call these "Middle Kingdom" textbooks. Western civilization dominates the center of the structure, and other peoples and civilizations are tacked onto its outer edge. The thesis of these textbooks holds that in ancient and medieval times civilizations of the Mediterranean, Middle East, India, China, Africa, and pre-Columbian America developed classical styles and achieved great things. Each of these civilizations is celebrated, one chapter after another, implicitly reinforcing the perception of them as distinct realities and closed systems. Then, by about 1500 they have fulfilled their development as "traditional"

civilizations. Suddenly, all attention shifts to Europe. Here, the modern world is invented and its development must be explored in intricate detail in a sequence of four to six chapters. Why the modern world emerges in Europe rather than somewhere else, if examined at all, is explained as a logical fulfillment of characteristics of the medieval age (rationalism, for example) rather than as a consequence of special conditions and opportunities pertaining at the time. In the nineteenth century the Europeans began to take over the world. To put it another way, the once hermetically sealed compartment called the West began to leak profusely into the other compartments, forcing the latter to do something about this foreign substance. The final chapters devote themselves to the encounter between an advancing and powerful Europe and the traditional civilizations which have been idle for five or six chapters.

Structured in this way, the entire non-European world slips largely into silence and obscurity during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, except perhaps in the context of European maritime expansion or the slave trade. My own test in examining the validity of such texts is to ask what attention they give to the central Islamic lands from the eastern Mediterranean to India during the sixteenth through the eighteenth century. In particular, what do they say about the Safavids of Persia, who presided over an important cultural synthesis of development in the Middle East, and continuing expansion of Persian cultural style? Burns says absolutely nothing about the Safavids of Persia. Stavrianos, whose book so many of us have used and continue to use, disposes of the subject in two sentences, while devoting four hefty chapters to Europe during the same period.

We cannot then categorize as a "world historical approach" to the past the surveying of four or five traditional civilizations plus the modern West. Nor can we, as Marshall Hodgson reminded us, hypostatize civilizations by treating them merely as distinct, separate entities. A civilization may be properly defined only in relation to its neighbors. Moreover, a compendium of information on various categories of culture and social change, as we find with Hugh Thomas' otherwise very useful reference tool History of the World, cannot satisfy our need for a framework of the global past.

On the other hand, we must be careful not to equate the study of world history with the history of the world. Most of us who have been involved in this pedagogical movement have so far been largely preoccupied with establishing introductory survey courses--usually at the freshman or sophomore level in universities and perhaps at the sophomore level in many high schools--that might replace or at least provide alternatives to Western civilization or basic American history. Some of these courses take on the great sweep of human history from Olduvai to OPEC in the course of a single semester. Others concentrate more modestly on merely the past 500 years. I applaud both efforts in so far as they take up Professor McNeill's challenge to us to make intelligible by one paradigm or another the history of the human community taken as a whole.

As far as the development of coherent systematic frameworks for the sweep of human history is concerned, Professor McNeill is still, in my estimation, the only game in town, whether we point to the monumental structure he developed in the Rise of the West or to the more schematic microparasite-macroparasite model he presents in his little book The Human Condition. The only other contemporary

historian who has come close to offering a comprehensive structure of world history, in my estimation, was Marshall G. S. Hodgson in his three-volume work The Venture of Islam. He erected an eminently world historical framework for the study of Muslim civilization, but he passed away suddenly in 1968 while at work on a world history whose completion was not near enough to warrant its posthumous publication. Now, the degree to which either modernization theory or the world-system approach of Wallerstein's The Modern World System or Chirot's Social Change in the Twentieth Century may be regarded as suitable structures for world history, I leave to our later session on that subject.

It seems to me, however, that the challenge of world history goes beyond the working out of concepts and organizational tools applicable to the introductory course. The great challenge is to undertake the task of reshaping and reforming the entire history curriculum whether at the secondary or college level so that it reflects a primarily world historical point of view. New courses need to be developed on numerous historical problems which, to quote Jan DeVries, will "liberate historical explanation from the prison of national historical tradition." Only in this way, can we ultimately bring our perception of the structure of mankind's past into line with the important and justified catechizing we do with our students on the subject of world interdependence.

What then are some of the elements of a world historical approach to the teaching and writing of history? First, a world historical point of view will be concerned primarily with the deeper currents of human history, with the narrative of cultural change and encounter, rather than concern with what Fernand Braudel calls "the surface disturbances," the "brief, rapid, nervous fluctuations" of events. World historians must, therefore, be especially sensitive to the work of scholars of social, cultural, demographic, economic, technological, epidemiological, and art history. Of course, much of the work being done in these fields is carried on within the confines of particular national experiences. World historians must be asking questions which define the common realms of experience that all men share. Would-be world historical approaches may have much to learn from the work of students of social change in a medieval English parish. Sensitivity to these questions should keep us well away from the excessive describing and cataloging of political or military events by which a grasp of history beyond national or imperial boundaries is inevitably lost.

Secondly, the world historical approach will be comparative. We should be prepared to take the entire world as our field of historical inquiry and to draw as widely as we can from the inhabited planet for our comparative examples, enabling us to probe the deeper nature of institutions and movements. A comparison of Europe in the sixteenth century with Sung China in the twelfth century yields important insights for our students into the conditions under which modernity was born and precisely what modernity means. In other words, it is through a comparative method that we may give our students a richer grasp of the fundamental vocabulary of institutions and ideologies that constitute the language of world history: divine monarchy, city-states, bureaucracy, nationalism, mysticism, slavery, cosmopolitanism, and so on. All of these concepts should be part of the student's fundamental vocabulary, and they can be better understood if seen in a comparative light. Comparative method as applied primarily to our teaching mission should not be very much concerned with discovering eternal traits

or laws in human behavior nor with erecting systems for understanding civilizations in some sort of timeless manner.

Thirdly, a world historical approach must assume a fresh perception of geographical space. We must distinguish what have been the most important geographical impediments or aids to human interaction and not allow modern divisions of the world into political or ideological units to determine the boundaries of whom or what we study. The Bosphorus may conventionally divide Europe from Asia, but this slender neck of water has historically been of little account in the swirl of cultural patterning in this general part of the world. Our willingness to slice up the world into new flexible regions of study will serve our effort to embrace various historical events and movements in their totality. I have found the conception of the Afro-Eurasian zone of inter-communicating societies extending from the Mediterranean to China and, as worked out in detail by Professor McNeill and Marshall Hodgson, an enduring geographical foundation for teaching world history. In both college and graduate school, I remember being exposed to the Turko-Mongol conquests from the vantage point of Europe, then from the vantage point of the Middle East, and finally from the vantage point of China. I could never quite get the hang of what was going on until introduced to the idea of Eurasia as a single field of history. I have also found the "basin approach" to geography extremely useful when the stress is on cultural diffusion or interaction: for example, Saharan basin, Mediterranean basin, Indian Ocean, Atlantic, and Pacific. An essential part of teaching from a world historical point of view must be an all out attack on spatial and geographical ignorance of the younger generation. When my San Diego State students fail to identify the Rocky Mountains on the map of the United States, I may despair of their ever making acquaintance with Khorasan. But the great importance of Khorasan in the history of Eurasia cannot be denied, and so we start every semester with an old fashioned map quiz. Now, my students know where Khorasan is, though I am not sure about the Rocky Mountains.

Finally, world history should be concerned with total processes. Though we have divided our curricula largely into the histories of particular nations or particular civilizations, the fact remains that the broadest and most momentous events and movements in world history have rarely taken place within such confines. We must be ready to take up the process first and examine its fullest dimensions and implications without regard to the conventional academic division of time or space. A few years ago I was involved in team teaching a very rewarding course in which we took up the process of slavery and slave trade in the Atlantic basin during a time period of about 350 years. The center of the Atlantic Ocean was the geographical center of our course, and we embraced all the lands around the rim of the Atlantic to analyze this problem. I think that students came to understand the deeper causes and consequences of this phenomenon far better than they might have by studying slavery as an adjunct to the history of Africa, Latin America, or the United States.

Our task is not to figure out two or three or four approaches to the history of the human community that we can agree are valid. Our challenge is rather to discover ways of shedding the conventional obstacles of myth, tradition, and geographical division which have prevented us from developing a sensitive vision of the whole canvas of humanity pushed back through time. Early in the fourteenth

century, the great Persian scholar Rashid al-Din wrote what must be regarded as the first real world history: a work that embraced not only the history of the Muslim lands from North Africa to India, but also China, Byzantium, and even the barbarous Franks. He had, like many educated Muslims of his time, a consciousness, as Marshall Hodgson has it, of the ecumenic scene as a whole. It is remarkable, I think, that we have regressed since then in our cosmopolitan vision, owing I suppose to the weight of nationalist ideology and the pervasive narcissism which the Western world contracted in the nineteenth century. The only way our students will grasp the implications of an interdependent world and perhaps in some way help us avoid the final war is to get them to see not only the modern origins of interdependence but the commonality of the human experience at least over the past 50,000 years.

Introductory History as Topical Inquiry

by

Kevin Reilly

The Problem and a Proposal

The traditional civilization course, Western or world, is not working because it is based on nineteenth-century positivist epistemological and pedagogical assumptions which are untenable. Some of these assumptions may be briefly summarized: that facts "speak for themselves" or lead to predictable conclusions; that facts are finite so that it is possible to "cover a field"; that facts exist in hierarchies of importance and generality, i.e., some facts are "basic"; that knowledge is a reflection of reality rather than of the questions asked; that education is the transfer of knowledge from teacher to student; that this transfer properly occurs according to the hierarchical steps which reflect reality, i.e., "basic" facts first.

The pyramid is the model for such a view of knowledge. Students are given first the basic building blocks. Then, they are helped with the next layers of generalizations, principles, and ideas until they reach the apex of truth. Creativity might consist in the discovery of a new block, and such discoveries might even lead to substitutions at a higher level, but few positivist educators imagined that the truths at the apex would change appreciably or that there might be no apex at all.

The twentieth-century intellectual revolution has not only eliminated the possibility of an apex, but it has also discarded the model of the pyramid. If we were to look for a twentieth-century model of knowledge, it might be the open-ended spiral. In fact, the difference is more profound than that. The idea of a "model" of knowledge is a twentieth-century idea that only became possible when knowledge became problematic; and, for the most part, we now look instead for models of knowing, learning, thinking, or creating.

Whether we refer to post-Newtonian science, analytical philosophy, the sociology of knowledge, progressive education, historicism, or "the new history," the impetus of twentieth-century thought is to explore the act of thinking rather than the structure of reality. And in doing so, the certainties of the old positivism have been overthrown. We have discovered the role of the observer in the observation, and the position, interest, or participation of the knower in what is known. We have realized that the same facts can be interpreted differently, that facts are often products of prior "interpretations" or point of view. We think in associational, intuitive, and experiential ways that often have nothing to do with neat models of induction, deduction, and building blocks. We "create" facts as much as we "discover" them. Their truth value or importance is not absolute, but is relative to certain standards of validation and the way we pose our questions. There neither is nor can be a definitve set of facts on even the smallest of subjects. We learn by asking questions. Education is not the transfer of information even if we knew what information the student needed, and we do not. Education is the cultivation of thinking skills, and there are no simple rules for teaching people to think.

On the whole we have learned to accept those conclusions of the twentieth-century epistemological and pedagogical revolution. For the most part, we do our own historical research with those methodological insights, and knots, in mind. We even base courses on the awareness that each generation writes its own history. We expect our own writing to be revised and "reconstructed." Much of Croce, Collingwood, Beard, and Robinson has become common sense. We still have a residual faith in the obduracy of "facts" perhaps. Even those of us who were educated to believe that "1492" was the pre-eminently important fact, only to have it dug from under us by archeologists of Viking settlements, still have a hard time swallowing the twentieth-century recognition that facts are only human constructs, selected from an infinite number of possibilities and based on one of many possible perspectives, interests, or concerns. But even here, when forced, we admit that there is no set body of factual information that "every schoolboy" must know. Facts, we recognize, depend on the questions asked; they are selections from the infinite morass of human experience; they are not "basic," only relevant to particular questions. We know all of that, even if we sometimes resent it.

Then why do we still teach our introductory history course in Western or world civilization as if the twentieth century had not arrived?

In 1874 the Columbia College history faculty offered the following three (of six) questions in its "specimen" history examination:

1. Draw a parallel between the revolting customs of Mexico and the barbarities practiced contemporaneously in the most polished countries of Europe. What one feature sunk the Aztec superstition far below the Christian?

2. What is the supposed origin of the Bulgarians? When did they invade the Roman provinces? Give an account of the inroad of Zabergan in 559. Narrate the subsequent history of the Bulgarians.

3. Beginning at 100 B.C., briefly trace the history of the Netherlands to the foundation of the Dutch Republic in 1579.[1]

I think it is safe to say that many professional historians today would have trouble with that exam. I would fail it. Although I could say something about the ceremonial human sacrifices of the Aztecs, I'd have a considerable "value problem" with the first question. Anyone who could ask such a question would not value my answer. As for the other two questions, I would have a decided factual problem: I wouldn't know enough.

But I am struck by two other things about that exam. First, it clearly shows, in ways that could never have been imagined at the time, the degree to which each generation poses its problems, phrases its concerns, deems what is important, and writes its history. That of course is the lesson of historicism and the wider twentieth-century revolution that I have belabored. That is precisely why we have recognized that substance is secondary: the subject matter changes. But the second thing that strikes me is how closely, excluding the substantive content, that

exam resembles those we still give our students today. We ask about the contemporary equivalent of the Bulgarians of Zabergan as if a) such knowledge were the basic baggage of the well-educated person and b) the student would correctly follow the line of thinking of the examiner.

It would be unfair to place that exam side by side any particular specimen from 1980, but we have all given and taken enough exams to recognize that only the names have been changed. In fact, we probably rely more on short answer "objective" questions (with the aid of the asterisks in the Instructor's Manual to remind us of what everyone should know), but even when we ask essay questions, they usually take the same form. I would characterize it as the closed-system memory form. Despite the essay format, the student is not expected to say anything new or original, nothing that has not been said in class or in the reading. The student is not expected to think, but only to recall as much of the information (ideas, generalizations, biases as well as facts) as has been presented by teacher and text. The assumption in grading such exams is that the basic information and the interpretations or conclusions are given (a closed system). The student need only remember and write. In fact, it was rather common practice when I was a student for the grader to deduct points (from a presumed 100) for items that were not included in the answer; even today, students sometimes respond to a poor paper with the query "what did I leave out?"

I started by saying that the traditional civilization course was not working. I think now we can be clearer about the reasons for that. Students do not have to read Dewey or Wittgenstein or hundred-year-old history exams to know that closed-system memory transfers of irrelevant information do not appeal to them. They do memorize such closed systems of information in business courses in order to succeed, and sometimes they do so in humanities courses out of professional goals, duty, or intense personal interest in the subject.

But without a strong, pragmatic, preparatory, or personal predisposition to a subject, modern students are not going to memorize what seem to be irrelevancies. Many of them know, without formal exposure to modern pedagogical theory, that they want to be encouraged to think for themselves. Many others, who have not been allowed to develop the acquired taste of thinking, only know that they want to be interested. We are the ones who are in a position to recognize, intuitively or with the insights of modern pedagogy, that their request is not only legitimate but proper. We can recognize that it would be a disservice to them to package information instead of interesting them in thinking. We can know, more surely than they, that the particular subject matter is of transitory significance but that the ability to think critically and independently is of permanent value. I am suggesting that we change the goals of the introductory history course, even civilization course, from that of transferring information to teaching students to think historically. I am suggesting that such a change would be in keeping with both the conclusions of the twentieth-century intellectual revolution and the interests of our students: that it would be both more intellectually defensible and popular.

I think it is also a social necessity. We live in a world whose basic ingredient seems to be change. I keep thinking of the "antique" sign above a restaurant in Los Angeles that read "Established 1964," but we could just as easily recall the return

of Henry James to New York City in The American Scene almost a hundred years ago. Change is the hallmark, the bewildering fact, of twentieth-century life. To think historically in an age which discards certainties with soda bottles is to think about change. And change is our speciality. The abilities to inquire about the way things change, to ground the present in the past while understanding the discontinuities, to chart the possibilities and limitations that the past has shaped for the present and future, to understand the dynamic of social causation and the power of human intervention, to draw on prior experience and still decipher the uniqueness of the present -- all of these abilities are as much the stock in trade of historians as is our factual knowledge of a particular time and place. And these are the skills that our society cries out for.

"Ours is the age," Max Scheler wrote, "when man has become for the first time in history, fully and thoroughly, problematical to himself." The same changes that swept away the certainties of positivism and the comforts of tradition have revealed the problematic in every aspect of life. What is masculine or feminine? What does sexuality have to do with love? Does religion make us more moral? Why do we obey governments, gods, or consciences? Where there used to be ready answers, indeed rarely questions, our century has substituted problems. If they are problems created by the sweep of historical change, then it is through an understanding of historical change that we must seek the answers. Just as earlier ages could cite the subject matter of historical example to answer basic questions, we can inquire about history as process. As change makes our reality increasingly problematic, knowledge of change--historical knowledge--is our only knowledge.

Lord Acton's injunction to study problems rather than periods is especially germane to the introductory history course because it allows the historian to engage students directly with issues that concern them. Most college undergraduates do not come to us with an interest in Hellenistic Greece, the twelfth century, or the Age of the French Revolution. But they do come to us with an interest in the problems of modern society: ecology, energy, crime, sexism, abortion, divorce, inflation, and the like. Very often our students present these problems to us in implicitly historical terms. They ask "haven't women always been" such and such, or "how did this energy thing come about," or "haven't there always been wars." Instead of dismissing these questions as irrelevant or poorly formulated so that we can return to our lecture on Roman history, let us use their interest, formulate the historical questions explicitly, and make the introductory history course a vehicle for teaching our students to think more deeply about current problems than they do in the temporal vacuum that modern society provides.

When we structure our course in terms of historical periods, even with the proviso that all of this discussion about ancient Rome will be of some relevance to their concerns, we are one step removed from their immediate interests. They don't see the connection. Often we don't make connections. Frequently, they never start thinking.

If, on the other hand, we direct our inquiries explicitly to ecological problems, for instance, we have their interest; the mental engines are already running, and they will follow and fight us through an historical exploration. We can "cover" as much "information" as we would in a history of Rome. We may even

find some aspects of Roman history relevant to the investigation. But our historical inquiry would be controlled by the quesitons we asked in a way that would demonstrate the utility of historical study. Thus, students would not only learn the information of our particular ecological history, but they would also learn to think more historically about ecological issues on their own, especially if we challenged them with our interpretation, encouraged them to weigh evidence, and suggested the resources for other views, approaches, and information. That experience, repeated again and again in historical investigations of other problems, would have the ultimate goal of teaching students to explore any new problem historically. At that point, the introductory history course would be far more useful than an accumulation of information, quickly forgotten because it never mattered to them. At that point, students will have become historical beings, eager for and able to work towards historical explanations of any problem. They will have learned "history" as an ability to think about the temporal dimension of human experience instead of having forgotten "history" as subject matter.

Which Topics, Issues, or Problems

Once we have committed ourselves to teaching history as inquiry (in the Greek sense of "historia") and to explore the historical dimension of current topics, issues, or problems, our choice of topics is secondary. Just as we have no epistemological sanction for requiring that students know one rather than another of an infinite number of facts, we have no basis for insisting that they know about one topic rather than another.

In order to speak most directly to the interests and needs of our students and society, the topics should probably be defined in ways that do not deviate sharply from the popular, social construction of these problems. The perception of such problems in the media is at least a useful starting point, even if our histories may point to different formulations. I think that the problem with historical issues anthologies in the last few decades has been that, despite their welcome attention to issues of interpretation, they have focused on the problems of historians (the Pirenne thesis, a twelfth-century Renaissance, the causes of the English Civil War) instead of the problems of students and the wider society. Since the introductory course may be the only history course that many students take, its value lies in aiding all students to think more historically rather than in training more historians. For the same reason, it is probably best to explore a number of problems rather than a single one. The investigation of a number of topics should also enhance the students' predisposition and ability to ask and answer historical questions. We learn numbers by applying them to more than fingers. We learn to think historically by thinking about more than ecology.

I also think it is appropriate, whether we are teaching Western or world history, that we begin with the problems of our own Western civilization. Some of these problems may concern the role of the West in the world: problems of energy, ecology, foreign aid, and war obviously do. All of our Western problems might be better understood with comparative studies of non-Western cultures. But the problems of our own society are the ones that concern our students. Thus, we would not structure a unit around the problems of caste, ritual purity, or Islamic law, but we might discuss any of those phenomena in a unit on racism, ecology, or

wherever the comparison seemed instructive. Much of the recent debate about teaching Western vs. world history is based on the positivist model: "how do we 'cover' the West and still 'include' more?" A topical approach properly eliminates that problem.

Our society has given us a veritable treasure of problems that might be pursued in the introductory history course. More to the point, any society can define its problems in an infinite number of ways.

I have found it pedagogically fruitful to define the topics of inquiry broadly enough to place the current media sensation in context ("sexism" rather than "abortion" and "racism" rather than "busing"), but not so vaguely as to defy analysis ("how have people lived together?") or so abstractly as to deprive them of current interest ("behavior," "society," "technology," "culture," and "religion"). In my text The West and the World: A Topical History of Civilization, I defined nine general topics in the following way: Men and Women, Love and Marriage, Individual and Culture, City and Civilization, War and Violence, Politics and Morality, Economies and Work, Race and Racism, Energy and Ecology. The dichotomous, or dialectical, definition (sometimes stretched) seemed a useful way of focusing on questions of relationship as well as stimulating thought about a wide diversity of human experience. Little would have been lost, however, by such titles as the following: Sexism, Love, Individuality, City Life, War, Political Morality, Work, Racism, and Ecology. Just as each of these could be defined in innumerable ways, so are there innumerable other possibilities. Among other issues that are current and pertinent (and also explored in a body of historical literature) are childhood, population, climate, crime, fashion, food, and bureaucracy, to name only a few. The list is as endless as the facts of history. As in anything, we choose in order to articulate, and we do so on the basis of our own knowledge, interests, and values. We can also serve our society and our students by making choices that have social relevance as well as personal interest.

Topical vs. Chronological Organization

There is a story about a young student in India who had only an introductory arithmetic text with which to learn mathematics. The result of gargantuan effort was that he learned everything there was to know about every whole number. He knew each number intimately because he studied them as objects, not tools. He knew numbers, not mathematics.

The study of chronology can be like that Indian student's study of numbers. When the years, centuries, or periods become the object of study, one learns associations with static categories. Such categories bring one no closer to an understanding of the historical process. Knowledge of years can, in fact, impede historical understanding by becoming a substitute for it.

One cannot understand historical questions without chronology any more than one can do math without numbers, but in both cases it is the ability to use the numbers that matters. Students must understand that the numbers are only tools to historical investigation, not the object of study itself.

The organizational principle of a course is an implicit statement about what is to be learned. When we organize a course in terms of chronology, we are telling students that knowledge of the numbers (dates, centuries, periods) is what is most important. But chronology is, at best, a difficult structure for teaching history as a mode of inquiry.

To teach history as inquiry, we should take the subjects of inquiry seriously enough to organize the course around them. If during the semester we propose to investigate such problems as sexism, love, urban life, and war historically, then the course should be organized around those topics. In that way, we tell the students that they will be expected to think more historically about each of these problems.

In my first draft of The West and the World, I set out to discuss each of the issues historically without regard to the particular period that my investigation would lead to. If the questions I raised were best answered by an investigation of ancient history, fine. If it seemed the most useful account could emerge from consideration of a longue durée, I wrote a broader survey. If I thought the problem was distinctly "modern," I confined my account to recent history. I still recommend that approach. In response, however, to the reviews of teachers who were committed to a chronological organization of the course, I rewrote these chapters to deal with sub-issues of the problem in particular, albeit in broad, chronological periods. I am unable to defend that approach in any other way. I did, however, add a topical chapter outline so that the book could be used topically or chronologically.

There is evidently a good deal of concern among teachers of the introductory history course over the question of where the break in the two semester course should occur. There are proponents of 1500, 1650, 1715, and other dividing points. One pre-publication reviewer of my own book expressed this concern with the comment that my chapter 13 ("Politics and Ideals: Secular States and Middle Classes") on Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Locke was unworkable because Machiavelli had to be taught first semester and Hobbes and Locke had to be taught during the second.

I cannot see the value of this debate. It is, I feel, one of the dangers of a preoccupation with chronology. I see no sound pedagogical reason for teaching ancient and medieval history during the first semester or modern history during the second semester. There would be problems certainly in exploring each topical issue from Adam to Atom: the long view provides only one kind of historical understanding; students should think through shorter historical processes as well. But any given semester might justifiably include explorations into either ancient or modern history, or both. In fact, the course could be taught in any number of semesters.

Topical history has too often been confused with recent history. I think this is itself a confession of an inability to think historically. The historian, as opposed to the antiquarian, studies the distant past as well as the recent past in order to better understand the present. Thus, we are in the best position to show our students the relevance of the long view and the ancient experience as well as the more recent. We show the relevance of historical inquiry by choosing issues of current interest, but also by not limiting ourselves to current history.

In my own work I have accepted the convention of a first semester of mainly ancient and medieval history and a second semester of modern history. Again, I cannot defend it as anything but a compromise with the established civilization course.

The Civilization Model

The civilization model of the introductory history course originated in a request by the War Department during World War I that Columbia College teach a course in "War Aims." After the war, the faculty involved suggested a change to "Peace Issues" and by 1919 had evolved a course called "Contemporary Civilization." It was never simply a history course. It replaced the previously required history course, and it was taught by members of the departments of philosophy, economics, and geography as well as history and government. It was intended originally as a study of the great issues of "the last century" in order "that men should understand the forces which are at work in the society of their own day." It was required of all freshmen with the intention that it would give "the student, early in his college course, objective material on which to base his own judgments," and thus "be aided in an intelligent participation in the civilization of his own day."

Besides the post-war concern for "civilization," we see in that announcement much of the interest of the "new history" in creating citizens who could read the daily newspaper and participate intelligently in the emerging world. There was also a touch of the traditional positivist conviction that there was "objective material" that one could learn at the beginning in order to get on to "judgments" later in college and career.

The early success of the course owed much to the sense of urgency about the "insistent problems, internal and international," which the talented faculty tackled in class discussions and in papers prepared for student reading.

Recalling the enthusiasm of writing papers that would genuinely aid students and instructors to think through the problems of the post-war world, Justus Buchler has written:

> In those days when you were requested to do a piece for C.C., you found yourself doing it; you couldn't resist, and anyhow, you had always wanted to do something like it--that's why you were collaborating in a new enterprise.[3]

Mimeographed essays and then books (including John H. Randall's The Making of the Modern Mind) "both reflected and influenced a tendency," according to Buchler, "to delve farther into the past in quest of the meaning of the present." The contemporary civilization course was more than the ancestor of both general education and Western civilization; it was a laboratory of instructors and students who were writing, teaching, and learning in order to develop historical understanding of the problems of their Western society and the world.

Much of the energy of that enterprise continued in the classrooms, the weekly instructors' lunches, and the yearly dinners of instructors and student representatives after the Second World War. But by the 1940's the course had also become institutionalized to a degree that was not possible in the '20s and '30s. Textbooks of information and Columbia's own anthology of primary sources had replaced essay manuscripts that had circulated with the urgency of an East European underground. Gradually, but increasingly, contemporary civilization became a course in subject matter more than an historical inquiry into current problems. The Western civilization and later world civilization texts that it spawned and used reflected that change. They were compendia of information, catalogs of a cultural heritage, and annals of human achievement, not invitations to inquiry.

Teaching Historical Inquiry

To encourage students to pose, think through, and carry out historical explorations of current issues (i.e., to teach the value and skills of thinking historically) is a goal that can be accomplished within the context of any historical subject matter. Local, regional, family, and recent history--all offer the necessary high levels of interest, relevance, and discovery. The civilization model can also offer, as it did during its first decades at Columbia, attention to major national and international problems, a demonstration of the relevance of ancient, medieval, and non-Western historical experiences in its longer range and wider purview, and still answer some of the persistent demands that history provide "cultural enrichment" in fairly traditional ways. The civilization model is not inherently unsuited to teaching historical inquiry. It only lost the necessary ingredients to do so--attention to students interest, focus on genuine issues, and involvement of the students in the process of discovery--as it became a body of information to be transferred to the students.

Even if we could repeal the twentieth-century epistemological revolution and declare what information every school boy (and girl) should know, we would not be teaching them to think. People can learn to think when they realize that other people think differently than they do. They recognize their own ideas in response to the ideas of others. And they become willing to change or develop their own ideas when the ideas of others are compelling, interesting, intriguing, or disturbing, and when the issues are important enough to require some resolution. Thus, we involve students in the work of historical explanation not only by pursuing important problems, but also by seriously trying to "answer" these problems in ways that make them wonder. When our own answers are both thoughtful and tentative, both factual and partial, both satisfying and unsettling, there is sufficient room and tension for students to argue, consider, evaluate, and try it themselves.

Civilization textbooks of information do not teach students to think independently. They offer no examples of independent historical thinking to challenge the students. They do not engage the thinking capacities of students by making them interested, angry, or curious. Their pretense of definitive coverage, their tone of authority, and their avoidance of controversy tell students that there are no fundamental disagreements or that the correct answers are contained within the text. Even when these texts deal with debatable points by rehashing the pros

and cons, the implicit message is an answer to be learned (the pros and cons are such and such) and not a stimulus to question.

Students learn to take questions seriously when all of the answers are not in. And, of course, they never are. The pretense that they are can be deadening to historical inquiry.

In my own teaching, I have tried to use books that preserved important questions, even when I disagreed with their conclusions. Erich Fromm's Escape From Freedom, for instance, raised more questions about both the origins of Nazism and modern psycho-history than it answered, but it inevitably encouraged students to explore both issues more eagerly than a textbook summary would have. Even books that were patently absurd, like von Daniken's, were used because they formulated popular mythic yearnings in ways that, once made explicit, could be challenged with historical works, like L. Sprague de Camp's The Ancient Engineers.

In The West and the World, I tried to write historical essays that drew on some of the most interesting, challenging, and controversial historical work, historical writing that turned my head around and made me think. I tried to distill some of the historical insights and interpretations of people like Fromm, Mumford, McLuhan, Braudel, Genovese, Lasch, and Huizinga (to commit the egregious error of naming only a few) that made me think through a current problem more historically. The point was to offer the students an interpretation, written expressly for them, that would get them thinking just as I had. The assumption was that the best way to teach students how to think more historically was to do so. That my own interpretations turned out to be, upon reading and reflection, often outside the mainstream, I considered an additional spur for them.

Teaching Thinking

One of the characteristics of twentieth century pedagogical thought is that it has become almost fashionable to insist that we are interested in teaching students to think. I have said it, and will say it again. All of the good teachers I know say it. But there is very little consensus, and even less investigation, as to what we mean by that, how it pertains specifically to teaching history, and how one accomplishes it. I have so far confined myself to the observations that a) interest is paramount, b) we think about issues, topics, or problems, not periods (generally), and c) historical thinking is thinking about process and change (including continuity), i.e., the temporal dimension of human experience. Before I say any more than that, I want to make two points clear. First, there is much work to be done in learning theory, and my remarks are only tentative.[4] Second, epistemological abstractions have a way of becoming more "real" and doctrinaire (much like "behavioral objectives" in the '60s) than can ever be warranted by whatever research is likely to be done.

I noticed in writing the essays (chapters) in The West and the World that I was trying to write different kinds of history and, thus, teach students different kinds of historical thinking. It might be useful to elaborate on that a bit. In the first chapter "Masculine and Feminine: Nature and History," I was interested in (aside from the obvious content issue of the title: what is natural and what's historical in

masculine and feminine traits) the recognition of differences and the search for origins. I used Margaret Mead's Sex and Temperament to get students to see human variety and make some sense of it. The recognition of differences is, of course, a fundamental thinking skill; the assimilation of its meaning perhaps is not. The question of origins (in this case the origins of patriarchy) was broached in the first chapter, but more fully explored in the second "Matriarchy and Patriarchy: Agricultural and Urban Power." It is more decidely an historical question (though some would say a pseudo-question). Searching for the origins of something might always imply an infinite regress of questionable value, but as one of the most common formulations of historical questions in culture I asked it (in part to discuss the difficulties). The second chapter also teaches the discovery and meaning of "turning points" or periodization (clearly an historical skill) with a discussion of archeological distinctions between the paleolithic, neolithic, and urban. Further, the second chapter encourages the student to think about the interaction of cultural forms by relating technological artifacts to social organization and religious ideas in paleolithic, neolithic, an urban societies. Here, students are taught to see culture as a context, to relate the parts to the whole, and to weigh the evidence for such characterizations as "matriarchal" and "patriarachal."[3]

Without belaboring a rather rudimentary formal analysis, a few more characteristics might be helpful. "Cities and Civilization: Civility and Class," Chapter 3, asks students to think through causal chains both linearly and dialectically by arguing that opposite tendencies emerged from the same event--urban formation. "City-State and Capital City: Athens to Rome," Chapter 4, leads students through the construction of two "ideal types" of cities, defined according to function. Chapter 5 is an anecdotal history which makes its points almost entirely by referring to particular individuals, while Chapter 6 is a social-political history that mentions very few individuals. Chapter 7 draws its evidence from a wide net of sources (anthropology, art, literature, linguistics, and religion), while Chapter 8 is an extended examination of a few texts in political theory. And so on.

I think it is important for us and our students to become more self-conscious of the structures of explanation which we employ. But the subject of our historical inquiries (racism, ecology, etc.) should always be the primary focus. Philosophers may prefer to organize their courses in terms of formal thinking skills, but history courses so organized would lose touch with the specific, concrete, human reality that we seek to understand. By making the topics of inquiry, in presentation and explanation, intrinsically interesting, we might also be able to step back and ask questions about the formal characteristics of the explanations we have given. This allows us to deal with historiographical and epistemological issues not in the abstract or in reference to the work of the great historians, but in the context of our own historical explanations of pressing problems that we are at pains to provide.

NOTES

1. Columbia College Announcements, 1874-1875 (New York, 1974), p. 78. Questions renumbered. The other three questions concerned English history from 1603 to 1714, Aztec religion, and the conquest of Mexico.

2. Columbia College Announcements, 1919-1920 (New York, 1919), p. 34.

3. Justus Buchler, "Reconstruction in the Liberal Arts," in A History of Columbia College on Morningside, ed. Dwight C. Miner (New York, 1954), p. 101.

4. I am thinking of the work of Piaget and his school on the one hand and of work in the philosophy of science on the other. The most relevant work in the philosophy of science focuses on the formal qualities of "explanation" and distinguishes between (for historians) "causal," "genetic," and "functional" modes of explanation.

5. For an example of how this is done, see Instructor's Manual, note #2 of "Teaching Strategies and Aids" for Chapter 2, pp. 11-12, and some of the suggested questions for students, pp. 12-13.

Modernization as an Organizing Principle for World History

by

Cyril E. Black

Introduction

Modernization studies, as an approach to the comparative investigation of societal development, are concerned with the process by which societies have been and are being transformed under the impact of the scientific and technological revolution.

The concept of "modernization" embraces a considerable range of interpretations of human development, but these views share certain common assumptions that give the term a distinctive meaning and at the same time distinguish it from other conceptions. Three assumptions in particular deserve mention regarding the concept of modernization: the importance attributed to the capacities relevant to modernization developed by a society before the modern era; the role of the advancement of knowledge; and the utility of various policies that the political leaders of a society may follow in seeking both to convert its heritage of values and institutions to modern requirements and to borrow selectively from more modern societies.

Most interpretations of the process of modernization stress the differences in the institutional heritage of the Western and other societies and assume that the latter are likely to retain many distinctive characteristics long after they have undergone modernizing transformations. It would follow from this view that not just Western institutions but those of other societies as well can be adapted in varying degrees to the requirements of modernity. The problem of the later developing societies is not to discard their institutions in favor of those borrowed from the West, but rather to evaluate their institutional heritage and decide to what extent it can be converted to the requirements of the modern era.

The diverse societies of the world should be studied for their own interest and not simply in terms of their relationship to Western influence. To say this is not to say that Western influence is not a significant force, but rather that it is secondary to the conversion that the native institutional heritage of these societies must undergo.

One important contribution of the concept of modernization to the interpretation of human development--as compared with its interpretation in terms of liberalism, Marxism, or Marxism-Leninism--is that modernization places more emphasis on the behavioral and social sciences and less on Western or other models; it is more concerned with process than with goals.

Seen in historical perspective, modernization is a transformation of the human condition no less fundamental than that which took place some eight or ten thousand years ago from hunting and gathering to agriculture and the formation of civilized societies. As with this earlier transformation, its motivating force is a

heightened human understanding of the natural environment and a markedly increased ability to make use of it for human ends.

A comprehensive approach to modernization must view it as a process both of continuous change from the pre-modern heritage of institutions and values and as one that embraces all aspects of human activity and must be studied from a multidisciplinary point of view.

Periodization

Modernization is a continuous process, reflecting the influences on all aspects of human activity of a rapidly increasing ability to control nature. Any division of such a process into stages or periods is, of course, artificial, and numerous schemes of periodization can be developed that are valid for a variety of purposes. This very brief essay on the definition of comparative history will summarize some findings regarding those features of the process that appear to be common to all societies as they relate to preconditions, transformation, and advanced modernization, along with related problems of international integration.

Preconditions.

In considering the pre-modern heritage of societies, the primary concern is to identify those characteristics that are easily convertible to the requirements of modernization and also those that present particular obstacles. The implication of this concern is that some societies may have a much greater capacity than others for taking advantage of the opportunities offered by the scientific and technological revolution and that those lacking such capabilities may need to find substitutes for them.

The pre-modern capabilities that are particularly conducive to subsequent modernization include a continuity of territory and population under a government with a capacity to mobilize extensive human and material resources; an agrarian economy sufficiently productive to provide a significant surplus; a network of markets permitting a society-wide commerce in raw materials and manufactures; levels of urbanization, literacy, and specialized education sufficient to provide a basis for further development into a highly integrated modern society.

Not only those countries that underwent predominantly indigenous modernization (England and France, and their offshoots in the New World), but also such latecomers as the countries of Central Europe and Japan and Russia, where foreign influences played a major role, were relatively well endowed with the capabilities. Most others were not.

A further precondition of strategic importance for latecomers is their capacity to borrow from the earlier modernizers. Societies vary greatly in this respect. Some, such as Japan and Russia, were particularly well prepared by historical experience to be receptive to foreign influences. Similarly, the countries

of Central Europe, as reconstituted in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, were accustomed to borrowing from abroad. The numerous colonial peoples, for very different reasons, were likewise open to foreign influences. Others, paradigmatically the Chinese and to a lesser extent the Ottoman empires, were until the end of the nineteenth century particularly resistant to foreign influences. So strong was their belief in the inherent superiority of their indigenous heritage of values and institutions that it took very extensive exposure to more modern societies, involving humiliating military defeats over many decades, before their leaders came to accept the political, economic, and social opportunities offered by modern knowledge.

Transformation.

Study of the transformation from relatively non-modernized to relatively modernized societies is concerned with two basic problems: the conversion of pre-modern capabilities to modern uses and the introduction of new techniques and institutions--either developed indigenously, in the case of the early modernizers; or borrowed and adapted, in the case of the latecomers.

To judge from the experience of those societies that have gone furthest along this road, this transition calls for a number of fundamental changes. Modern knowledge must be accepted as superseding earlier conceptions of the human environment, and in varying degrees of specialization large segments of the population become involved in the production and distribution of knowledge. Transformation requires not only a political leadership capable of instituting the necessary economic and social changes, but also a much greater society-wide coordination based on political participation in a variety of forms. Policies designed to promote modern economic growth are called for by the state, directly or indirectly, through legal and institutional changes designed to encourage savings and investment. In the realm that particularly affects the individual and the family, a vast process of internal migration, universal education, and provisions for health and welfare must be administered on an unprecedented scale.

This process of transformation is more difficult for latecomers than for early modernizers because of the expectations aroused by the example of the latter and, of course, even more difficult for those latecomers lacking in some or even all of the desirable preconditions. More often than not, national territories must be consolidated and defended, and systems of national administration established at the same time that the disruptive processes of economic growth and social integration are in progress. Those societies lacking in essential preconditions must seek substitutes. Where no common language exists, as in India and many African states, a foreign language must be adopted. The failure of political leaders to establish stable administration often leads to military rule. Where a reservoir of administrative and technical personnel and infrastructure are lacking, as with many of the oil-producing countries, these must be imported wholesale from abroad. It is still too early to tell whether such efforts will succeed on the basis of nation-states or whether such societies will modernize primarily through eventual absorption into an internationally integrated society.

Advanced Modernization.

When the social indicators relating to the proportion of the population of a society engaged in manufacturing and services, living in urban areas, and completing primary and secondary education begin to approach 90 per cent, societies become preoccupied more with distribution than with development, more with science-intensive techniques than with machinery, more with the integrated organization of complexity than with spontaneous regional and sectoral development. They also become more concerned with the vulnerability and limitations of nature--even of land, water, and air--than with its exploitation.

Achievement of this level of development calls for a share of the gross national product devoted to the production and distribution of knowledge several times larger than in earlier decades. The organization of complexity calls for much more integrated forms of political participation, as much through systematic consultation of interest groups as through representative institutions based on universal suffrage. At this level the economic system becomes not only technology-intensive but also increasingly dependent on worldwide resources and markets. In patterns of settlement and provisions for health, education, and welfare, initiative tends to give way to collective and community procedures.

At all levels of modernization the international intellectual, political, and economic environment plays a vital role, and individual societies are gradually absorbed into the international system. If one wishes to divide the process into discrete stages, it would be justifiable to designate a state of international integration following that of advanced modernization.

The general trend of societal development is thus toward the absorption of local communities, customs, loyalties, and dialects into ever larger regional, national, and ultimately global aggregations of peoples. At the same time, the search for forms of organization appropriate to individual needs has also resulted in many countervailing tendencies represented by the rise of nationalism, the breakup of multinational empires, and the demands of ethnicity. As the priority of organization for development gives way in more advanced societies to the priority of more equal distribution, groups that have hitherto suffered discrimination on grounds of ethnicity, sex, age, or deviance advance claims for a more equal share in the distribution of goods and services.

Interdisciplinary Approach

The study of the process of change in the modern era must be set in a framework that is both global and multidisciplinary. The comparative study of modernization starts with the observation that unprecedented changes have taken place in the modern era in the advancement of knowledge, political development, economic growth, social mobilization, and individual change. It seeks to understand these changes, to evaluate the results of different policies of change in the various societies of the world, and to study the assets and liabilities brought to the process of change by the differing institutional heritages. It is an approach that seeks to reduce ethnocentric bias through the application of the comparative

method, and it does not assume that any of the patterns of policy currently predominant in the advanced societies are necessarily applicable to other societies or are themselves immune to drastic change.

As regards the advancement of knowledge, for example, the comparative study of modernization is concerned with the world views of pre-modern and modernizing leaders, the modes and structures of intellectual controversy, the share of society's resources that is devoted to basic and applied research, the proportion of the population that is engaged in primary, secondary, and higher education, and the extent and nature of its communications network. In the case of the less developed societies, crucial considerations include their capacity for borrowing from the more advanced societies, their employment of foreign specialists, and their interest in sending students abroad for specialized training. All these concerns are to some degree measurable, and all change over time.

In the political realm, the comparative study of modernization focuses on the relations between the central structures of coordination and control and the individuals and groups that make up a society. Size and specialization is one indication of the level of development of a state bureaucracy; this level may also be measured by how much money the central bureaucracy spends in relation to the regional and local bureaucracies. A political system may be gauged too by the effectiveness of its performance, that is, by its capacity to maintain order, to endure without violent change, and to command the loyalty of citizens. The participation of individuals in governmental decision-making may be judged both in terms of a society's formal institutions, such as elected local, regional, and national representative bodies, and in terms of its informal institutions, such as political parties and special interest groups--and the means by which political, economic, ethnic, and other social interest groups influence political decision-making. Societies may also be compared with regard to their prevailing political ideologies, especially as they relate to the role of the public and private sectors.

In the economic realm, both the changing structure of economic activity and rate of growth may be compared. It is customary to think of economic activity as divided into three main sectors: agriculture, industry, and the services. It is also customary to consider each of these sectors in relation to the proportion of the labor force they employ, the proportion of investments they absorb, their contribution to the gross national product, and their rates of growth. Growth is usually calculated in terms of gross national product. Though such estimates are not very accurate, they reflect adequately the main distinctions among societies at different stages of development. The relationship of a society's economy to that of other societies may also be assessed by the rate of growth of foreign trade, the composition of the foreign trade in terms of raw materials and manufactured goods, and the ratio of foreign trade to gross national product.

In many ways the most visible aspect of change as it affects human welfare is what may be called social mobilization--those changes that transform a society from many small and relatively isolated communities to one that is tightly knit by bonds of education, communications, transportation, urbanization, and common interests. The improvement of health from the advancement of knowledge leads to an abrupt increase in births over deaths, resulting in a population explosion that does not regain stability for several generations. This factor alone is a barrier to

human welfare as production must rise not only absolutely, but also relative to population growth if people are to benefit. The relationship of strata within a society is also drastically altered. A modern society of managers, specialists of many kinds, industrial workers, office workers, and farmers with technical skills must be created out of a population that is normally four-fifths peasants, and such a transformation influences the life of every individual. In some degree the sense of community and mutual self-help characteristic of pre-modern villages is created at a national level in the urban way of life, in the common education and socialization of children in national school systems, and in the expanding communication system of newspapers, radio, television, and rapid transportation. Yet even in the most advanced societies, human relationships remain less personal and cohesive than in agricultural communities, and individuals have a sense of isolation that is difficult to measure and evaluate. Further, with the drastic changes in stratification in the course of economic growth, the distribution of income tends to lag. Though the income of all strata of a population grows markedly in the long run, distribution of income has thus far remained decidedly unequal even in the most advanced societies.

The personality of an individual results from the interaction of biological characteristics with social environment--the immediate family, the community, and the larger society with which the individual comes into contact. Personalities vary as these biological attributes and environments differ, and the general process of change in the modern era has substantially transformed the environment within which individual personalities are formed. To attempt an understanding of personality adaptation, what needs to be measured or at least evaluated, is the ability of an individual to empathize with others beyond his immediate circle of acquaintances, the individual's acceptance of both the desirability of change and the recognition of a need for delayed gratification in the interest of future benefits, and the capacity of the individual to judge peers according to their performance rather than their status. As compared with individuals in earlier times, a modern personality may be described as more open, more tolerant of ambiguity, and more concerned with controlling the environment--and by the same token, perhaps less self-assured and stable. The psychological aspect of modernization has not been the subject of extensive research, but it has been demonstrated that modern characteristics can be measured and compared.

Modernization as a Process

The process of modernization may thus be viewed abstractly as the adaptation of diverse historical experiences before the modern era, to include the challenges of modernity common to all societies.

Underlying the theoretical problem of adapting tradition to modernity is, of course, the practical problem that there is no agreement whatsoever as to how this adaptation should be carried out in practice. No country has done it gracefully or without great turmoil. It is the most devastating and destablizing experience that the human community has undergone during its entire history on this earth.

Within the setting of this abstract problem of adapting tradition to modernity, research on comparative modernization is in practice concerned with

the continuing conflicts of leaders, political parties, and ideologies over how individual societies should seek to accommodate pre-modern belief systems to modern knowledge, establish workable political systems, promote economic growth, and deal with the many problems involved in restructuring social relations.

More particularly, it is important to recognize that modernization should not be equated with progress. It is the enhancement of the human capacity to exploit the environment, and this enhanced capacity can be used for any purpose. It can be used to promote human betterment in terms of health, education, and welfare, or it can be used to destroy all humankind.

Problems of Interpretation

This brief introduction both of pre-modern social characteristics conducive to future modernization and of factors apparently common to societies transforming to advanced modernization and international integration stages represents the initial conclusions based on one of the main lines of research on this subject.

Let us now direct attention to some of the problems raised by this interpretation, some trivial and others fundamental, from the point of view both of the exponents of this approach to comparative history and of their critics.

To start at the trivial end of the spectrum, some have found the term modernization either devoid of meaning or infinitely relative. Both of these criticisms may be valid in a literal sense, but the fact remains that this is the term generally used to describe the process in question. The critics do not argue that no such process is taking place, and they do not offer a satisfactory alternative. Industrialization, Westernization, rationalization, social change, or the scientific and technological revolution describe limited aspects of the process only. The very lack of content of the term recommends it as a vehicle for the study of a process whose content is still in an early stage of investigation. The term is generally used in China and Japan and is occasionally used in the European Marxist-Leninist countries in place of "the scientific-technological revolution" which they prefer.

Questions have also been raised regarding the units of analysis in modernization studies. The most reasonable position to take is that any two or more aspects of the human experience can be usefully compared in seeking to distinguish the universal from the particular. Whether one compares the experiences of two individuals in a single village or town, or the experiences of small groups of individuals in two or more countries, or the advancement of knowledge, political development, economic growth, social mobilization, and individual change or any combination of them at the local, regional, national, or global level, one can learn something about the process of transformation. The reason that most general studies are concerned with the national level of politically organized societies is that the decisions relevant to modernization are taken more at this level than at any other and that leadership, programs, statistics, and to a considerable extent ideologies, all tend to focus at this level. Civilizations, cultures, cultural-historical types, and sociocultural systems are all valid in some degree, but as discrete units of analysis they flourish better in the minds of scholars than in the organized activities of peoples.

Marxist and Marxist-Leninist interpretations of this process vary in their approach. The view that societal transformation is dominated by a world-system, "capitalist" in recent centuries and "socialist" at some future time, assumes that most countries are so dependent on the dominant few that the nation-state is not a valid unit of analysis.

Marxist-Leninist scholars prefer to focus on the national unit. They assume that in the long run "socialist" will be better able than "non-socialist" countries to take full advantage of the opportunities for human betterment offered by the revolution of science and technology and that an international group of "socialist" states will expand as their rivals shrink in number.

As already noted, international integration is becoming a dominant feature of transformation as more countries become highly modernized. The quesion here at issue is not the nature of human destiny, however, but the most practicable means of studying modern societal transformation as a form of comparative history.

Related policy questions raised by Marxist and Marxist-Leninist approaches to societal transformation include the dilemma faced by modernizers in confronting the choice between development and distribution, economic growth and equality. Modernization studies, relying on the historical record, including that of countries developed under Marxist-Leninist policies, have noted that income distribution has tended to become more equal only as countries reach an advanced stage of modernization, regardless of the ideology of their leaders. The open-ended approach of modernization studies, which seek to examine the record rather than advance a predetermined social policy, is not congenial to those who seek to employ history as an instrument of politics. More generally, modernization studies tend to view the record of societal transformation as "progressive" in only a limited sense and are fully aware that the advancement of knowledge has provided humankind with the ability both to satisfy human needs and to destroy itself. "History" provides no guide as to the uses that humans may make of their ever-increasing capabilities.

Some critics also see modernization studies as an essentially ethnocentric enterprise of Western social science. Whether or not their work is used by Western governments seeking to devise means to strengthen Third World countries against a perceived Communist threat, exponents of modernization studies are seen by some critics as defining modernity essentially in terms of Western institutions and using them as a benchmark for judging other countries.

There is indeed a school of thought that has defined "tradition" as the entire range of pre-modern institutions in less developed countries which must necessarily give way to a modernity defined in Western terms. In many textbooks, for example, pre-modern social institutions are described as impediments to progress; stress is placed on the importance of economic wealth and technology; development is seen primarily in terms of catching up with the West; and modernization is portrayed as adopting Western values and institutions rather than as adapting diverse pre-modern values and institutions to the common imperatives of modernity.

This discrimination of North against South is frequently accompanied by a discrimination of West against East, in the sense that countries under Marxist-

Leninist leadership are seen as backward regardless of their level of development on the grounds that their political institutions are not democratic in the Western sense.

These are minority views among students of modernization, however, and the main trend of their work is oriented toward concepts of analysis that are of universal validity. This is not as easy as it might seem. Only a generation ago, the Western countries were the only ones that were sufficiently developed to provide a basis for conceptualizing the direction that the process of transformation was taking. As with all societies, the modern functions that were being developed were so closely intertwined with their evolving heritage of institutions that it was very difficult to disentangle the universal from the particular. The recent development of Japan and Russia has now broadened this basis sufficiently to permit conclusions to be drawn not only about the variety of institutions that can perform similar functions, but also about the special problems confronting latecomers.

This broadening of the range of societies that is reaching an advanced stage of modernization only accentuates the problem because many of the relevant disciplines have not yet developed analytical concepts that are valid for all societies. For some disciplines this comes naturally. Economists can study gross national products, rates of growth, income distribution, the changing share of the labor force in agriculture, manufacturing and services, and the allocation of national product to consumption, capital formation and government in India or China as well as in the United States. Sociologists can deal with the demographic transition, social stratification, patterns of settlement, education, and mobility in one society as well as another. Anthropologists can study kinship and marriage, religious beliefs and behavior, and subsistence techniques in all societies.

Disciplines, such as history and political science, are much more ethnocentric, however, and history is especially oriented toward the particular. Political science is in a more ambivalent position with a strong ethnocentric base, but also with a capacity--that is still greatly underdeveloped--for more general concepts. In the rhetoric of the cold war, for example, it is common to contrast the democracy and civil liberties of the West with the totalitarianism of the Communist states. By stressing the particular type of political representation characteristic of Western societies, one can thus strengthen loyalty to one's own institutions and anathematize those of Communist states, while at the same time associating them with the fascist enemies of the Second World War.

Concepts that are handy for cold war rhetoric are not very useful, however, for the study of 170 or more societies in the process of transformation. Rather than using as analytical concepts the particular forms of representative government developed in the West, political scientists are turning increasingly to such concepts as organizational participation, interest groups, and bureaucratic politics which can be applied to a greater or lesser degree to all societies. African tribes and Communist countries, no less than France and the United States, have interest groups competing for their share of resources and influence on policy-making.

The central questions that latecomers should ask are: which aspects of this process are universal, applicable to all societies; and which features of the

institutions of the more advanced societies are essentially modernized versions of their own pre-modern heritages. This abstraction of the universal from the particular, of the functions from the forms, is probably the most difficult problem confronting those seeking to make use of historical experience for contemporary policy. In seeking to attain the levels of achievement made possible by the advancement of knowledge, latecomers must decide which aspects of their heritage are convertible to the new purposes and which foreign institutions they must borrow. These decisions are specific for each leader and country, and the comparative study of the experience of others can only sensitize them in a general way to the choices they face.

The comparison of modernizing societies is not just a theoretical exercise. A recent headline asserting that "China Asks Japan's Help in Modernization" is one that might have appeared many times around the world in a variety of contexts. One characteristic of the modern era is that, more explicitly than ever before, political and intellectual leaders have sought to learn from those societies perceived to be more advanced in the process of transformation. For such leaders, history is a vast laboratory in which innumerable experiments have been and are being conducted that are of direct interest to them. In this sense comparative modernization is a form of applied history.

Alternative Interpretations

There are three main alternatives to modernization studies as general interpretations of modern history: Westernization, Marxism-Leninism, and Neo-Marxism, particulary its world-systems approach.

(1) Westernization sees modern history essentially as the spread of Western values and institutions to the rest of the world. From this point of view the search for freedom is the engine of history, and generally speaking the countries regarded as most democratic in the Western sense are seen as the most modern.

The essence of this Western interpretation of history is that in the course of the modern era, the West European and English-speaking peoples have developed the political, economic, and social institutions that are best adapted to the modern way of life and are of universal validity. The strength of this argument lies in the fact that it was in Western Europe that the rapid growth of knowledge, characteristic of the modern era got its start and that the societies of Western Europe and their offshoots in the New World (the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) have in general been the most successful in making use of this knowledge for human betterment. The comparatively high standard achieved by these societies in health, education, and welfare are widely recognized, and as a group they tend to represent the models by which other societies measure themselves. They are in this sense the most modern societies, and it is not surprising that they should regard their institutions as appropriate for other societies to follow.

The interpretation of history associated with this Westernizing view, which is still the dominant one in American scholarship, is particularly concerned with the freedom of the individual from undue restraint on the part of the state, with the

development of a representative political system, with institutions providing for the accumulation and investment of capital, with a minimum of regulation by the state, and, in general, with the promotion of as much freedom as is consistent with changing standards of public order and equity. This emphasis on the freedom of the individual is reflected in the Latin root of the term "liberal" and lies at the heart of this conviction.

To question the universal applicability of doctrinaire liberalism is not to question the achievement of the West European and English-speaking countries in enhancing human welfare within their societies and in comparison with other societies. The issue is not the extent of these achievements, but the conclusions that have been drawn from them for countries with differing institutional heritages in the interpretation of modern history. Those favoring the Westernizing approach are inclined to maintain that the institutions as well as the level of achievement of the West European and English-speaking societies--the way in which things are done as well as what is done--are of universal validity. It would follow from this opinion that not only the political institutions, but also the economic, social, and religious institiutions of the West should be adopted by other societies if they wish to match the West.

Critics of the Westernizing approach point out that contemporary Western institutions are simply a modernization of their pre-modern political forms and that other societies with differing heritages of institutions are likely to adapt in other ways to the imperatives of modernity. British parliamentary democracy, for example, has evolved from a parliamentary experience that is conventionally traced back to the Magna Carta of 1215. Political participation in societies with other heritages, however, is likely to evolve along different lines. Worldwide, indeed, organizational participation is much more common than individual participation through electoral systems.

The initial impact of the advanced Western societies has been so profound that other societies have frequently been inclined to borrow Western institutions wholesale and to abandon their own. More often than not, such borrowings have not been successful, and thoughtful observers have come to the conclusion that the adaptation of native traditional institutions to new functions is more effective in the long run than the borrowing of Western institutions in a more or less unaltered form.

(2) The Marxist-Leninist approach envisages the development of societies from a primitive stage through slavery, feudalism, and capitalism to socialism and communism. Marxist-Leninist interpretations of world history have been diverse and at times contradictory, but their common theme has been the need for less developed countries to free themselves from colonial control. The correct timing of revolutionary actions varies from one interpretation to another. Early Marxists believed that the less developed countries had to develop politically and economically under bourgeois leadership over an extended period before they could reach a level at which introduction to socialism would be possible.

In recent years, many writers interested in problems of national development have interpreted the relations of the more modernized societies to the latecomers as a global extension of the class struggle in which advanced societies exploit the

less advanced. In this view, although some non-Western countries, notably Japan, may share the attributes of the imperialists, most would be subjected to a dependence from which they can only escape through a socialist revolution.

What these various Marxist approaches have in common is the belief that the engine of history is a class struggle provoked by the exploitation inherent in feudal and capitalist patterns of the ownership of the means of production. In this view, relations within and between countries should be interpreted essentially in terms of exploiters and exploited until such time as the introduction of socialism leads to the disappearance of exploitation and presumably the end of historical development.

It is significant in this context that the dominant trend in post-Stalin and post-Mao thinking about contemporary domestic development stresses the importance of the scientific and technological revolution rather than the class struggle. In its emphasis on evaluating the capacity of societies to take advantage of the opportunities offered by contemporary knowledge for political development, economic growth, and social welfare, this new Soviet view closely resembles that of modernization studies.

(3) The world-system approach is a contemporary version of Marxism which differs from modernization studies in a number of crucial ways. It envisages four stages of long-term development: the establishment of a capitalist world-system (1450-1650), system-wide recession (1650-1730) and a struggle for primacy among the core states (to 1815), the transition from agricultural capitalism to industrial capitalism (1815-1917), and revolutionary turmoil along with further consolidation of industrial capitalist world economy (1917-). Two contradictions of capitalism are seen as leading to a socialist world system: continuing production of surplus requires more demand which can only be produced by redistributing surplus; and when capitalists start buying off the exploited by letting them share privileges, the cost of co-option continues to rise until all are equal. This is a neo-Marxist approach that sees the class struggle as the engine of history. It appears to imply inevitable progress toward a desired end described as "good." The method is deductive. Modernization studies, by contrast, see the advancement of knowledge as the engine of history--leading to a greater enhancement of human control over the environment, along the lines set forth above. History moves toward no inevitable goal. The method is inductive.

The world-system approach employs the world as the unit of analysis. This is broken down into three subunits: the core (capitalist countries with strong states), the periphery (undeveloped countries with weak states), and the semi-periphery (states like Japan and Russia, among others, which are peripheral to the core states but also dominate the peripheral states). There is little emphasis on the capacities or development of individual states, especially in the periphery.

In modernization studies by contrast, the main unit of analysis is the nation-state, and each one is treated in terms of its international context. Under this approach, the assessment of pre-modern assets and liabilities of undeveloped countries places special emphasis on advantages and drawbacks of their status as colonies. As countries modernize, their interaction with other countries in the course of international integration is stressed. For example, the world-system

perspective stresses the influence of the world capitalist system in explaining the failure to develop of a country such as China. The modernization perspective, by contrast, places the main emphasis on the domestic weakness of the Chinese state.

The central problem of the world-system approach is that by placing such exclusive explanatory emphasis on the exploitation of the peripheral states by the core states, it fails to take into account many other aspects of historical development. It does not give adequate attention to the earlier periods of history as a formative background to the modern era and in particular tends to overlook the widely differing capabilities that the diverse societies of the world bring to the problem of adapting to the new functions made possible by the revolution in science and technology. It neglects such important consequences of modern development as overpopulation; pollution of air, water, and land; and exhaustion of raw materials; as well as the generic problems of political development, economic growth, social mobilization, and individual change that are common to all societies regardless of level of development of ideology. The world-system approach is also wildly optimistic in that it envisages only progressive development and fails to recognize that the growth of knowledge has given human societies the capacity to destroy themselves. Most important, the world-system approach makes no allowance for the diversity of human experience or for the unforeseeable developments that may result from the further growth of knowledge. It is an interpretation locked into the transition from capitalism to socialism, with the 1917 revolution in Russia as the major turning point, and it appears to envisage no further development once an ill-defined "socialism" has been achieved.

Global History, Modernization, and the World-System Approach: A Critique

by

Craig A. Lockard

Through much of the 1970's the public mood for millions of Americans was generally apathetic and complacent. Yet, during the more turbulent 1960's, Americans had to contend with a series of foreign developments which etched themselves forcibly on the American consciousness: oil cartels, insurgencies, revolutions, wars, starvation, and the fall of client regimes. Some events, such as the energy crisis and the Indo-Chinese refugees, have affected Americans directly; in other cases, the impact has been less apparent to the average citizen. For too many Americans the news from abroad has seemed bewildering. It is discouragingly clear that most Americans, including many political leaders, have insufficient knowledge about the realities of the modern world, particularly the pace of change in the Third World. Such a state of affairs is hardly surprising, given the way in which modern history and international affairs are taught in American schools. For better or worse, American educators have generally expected the study of history to provide students their basic knowledge about the world; anthropology, comparative sociology, geography, and international politics are seldom taught below the college level and normally attract far fewer students than history at the undergraduate level.

Large numbers of Americans have an astonishingly inadequate sense of history, and thus of the world beyond our borders. The little history presently being taught in American primary and secondary schools frequently has a narrow, bland and often even ethnocentric focus.[1] Students do, of course, study American history and sometimes even European history (Western Europe and the Ancient World), generally emphasizing political, diplomatic, intellectual, and/or cultural subjects. Few students learn about Asian, African, Latin American or East European history and culture, as any survey of college freshmen should substantiate.[2] Thus, any sense of history developed in our schools may well leave students with the notion that "civilization" means the history of Western civilization in which the United States constitutes the most brilliant and advanced--although perhaps flawed--representative. This historical view contains a number of value judgments, many of which are unrecognized by teachers and students. University or college level history teaching often does not provide much of an improvement. Global and Third World history is frequently slighted or ignored. Even when taught, many of the courses utilize prevailing perspectives--consciously or not--which fail to generate accurate understanding of Third World societies and their problems and aspirations or of the interdependent and global nature of modern historical change.

This essay is addressed generally to historians and particularly to those who may be unfamiliar with recent developments in the field of global history. It develops a critique of the way global and Third World history are studied and

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taught in the United States. The first section discusses the attention given by American college textbooks, courses, and history departments to global and Third World history and offers some observations on the nature of global history and the need for a universal approach. An extended analysis of two of the most important theoretical frameworks currently available to scholars interested in modern global and Third World history--modernization theory and the world-system approach--is also included. Special attention is accorded to some of the insights deriving from the latter perspective. This paper argues that the historical profession in the United States should devote more attention to the study of global history, a subject which could also benefit from some of the ideas developed by the world-system approach, which stresses the interrelationships between societies and the structure of the modern global community.

The global approach to history represents a fairly recent departure in modern historical scholarship which many historians may find uncomfortable. Much of historical analysis, whether in classrooms or research has focused mainly on nations--the United States, France, China or regions--Western Europe, Latin America, or East Asia. Historians are not necessarily more broad-minded than other scholars: parochial, occasionally even ethnocentric, viewpoints often characterize some members of the profession.[3] Except perhaps for an infrequent course on Western expansion or Colonial empires, in many cases taught from a Europe-centric approach, few history courses, other than the now seldom offered World civilizations survey, ever study broader areas such as North America, Asia, Plantation Societies, North Atlantic world, or Third World or attempt to undertake cross-continental or cross-societal comparisons. Considering the rapid changes of recent decades, it may seem surprising that many historians apparently also hold a bias against contemporary history and do not seem to believe that historians can fruitfully study the present (and even speculate about the future) as well as the past.[4] Some American colleges or universities have totally neglected the history of the various Third World regions (especially South and Southeast Asia, Africa, and the modern Middle East); many history departments (some of them large) offer no courses on these regions. Although Asia, Africa, and Latin America contain the bulk of the world's population and can boast of long and complex historical development, specialists on these regions hold relatively few academic positions; in history departments they are almost always badly outnumbered by Americanists and Europeanists.[5]

These lacunae exist despite the fact that in recent years the interest in world, or trans-regional history, has increased among scholars, resulting in an increasingly sophisticated literature on the subject. No doubt this interest constitutes a response to the global implications of recent events. Some historians have begun to see that a wider frame of reference is needed to understand a world that has become increasingly interconnected and interdependent economically, politically, socially, and culturally. As the historian Etienne Gilson wrote almost four decades ago:

> The throes of the contemporary world are those of a birth. And what is being born with such great pain is a universal human society . . . . What characterizes the events we witness, what distinguishes them from all preceding events back to the origins of history is . . . their global character.[6]

Global history provides the widest angle of vision and broadest possible view. Geoffrey Barraclough has noted the particular necessity for a global view in the study of contemporary history:

> One of the distinctive facts about contemporary history is that it is world history and that the forces shaping it cannot be understood unless we are prepared to adopt worldwide perspectives; and this means not merely supplementing our conventional view of the recent past by adding a few chapters on extra-European affairs, but re-examining and revising the whole structure of assumptions and preconceptions on which that view is based. Precisely because American, African, Chinese, Indian and other branches of extra-European history cut into the past at different angles, they cut across the traditional lines; and this very fact casts doubt on the adequacy of the old patterns and suggests the need for a new ground-plan.[7]

Nonetheless, the study of global history suffers from many unresolved problems.[8] Most historiographically acceptable studies of the subject, including all but three or four of the available world history textbooks, are still Western-centric. Despite their claims to a global approach, most works devote considerably more attention to Western Europe and its extension, North America, than to Asia, Africa, Latin America, or Eastern and Southeastern Europe. The publishers of one well known world civilizations text recently extolled the superiority of their product over its rivals by boasting that it accorded more attention to the Third World; this "attention" amounted to about one quarter of the pages.[9] Only a small number of global histories truly accord Asia, Africa, and Latin America the sort of comprehensive attention that they deserve.[10]

Such a situation leads to the perhaps unintended conclusion that most of the important historical developments occurred in the "West" when in fact for most of history China, India, the Indian Ocean basin, Southwestern Asia (the Islamic states), and the Eastern Mediterranean basin societies were considerably more impressive in their accomplishments. As Marshall G. S. Hodgson notes:

> Within this vast historical complex (Africa, Asia, Europe) Western Europe played a peripheral and till well into the Middle Ages a backward role . . . only in the High Middle Ages did Western Europeans begin truly to rise to the creative level of the core-areas of civilization.[11]

A major reason for the Euro-centrism was that most world history textbooks were really studies of Western civilization in which the authors included some non-Western developments as a concession to the "globalists." While these books may be laboriously researched accounts, they often suffer from the limitations of the traditional Western civilizations approach that William McNeill has so brilliantly dissected:

> The fundamental idea behind such courses went something like this: Humanity has fumbled through the centuries towards truth and freedom as expressed in modern science and democracy, American style. Landmarks of the past that matter are those that contributed towards

> our contemporary pinnacle of skill, knowledge, and wisdom. Meaningful history, in short, is the record of the progress of reason and liberty; and the place where it happened was Greece, Rome, Western Europe and latterly the United States . . . the ethnocentrism implicit in such a view of the past became less and less convincing . . . But so far historians seem to have found nothing to put in its place as an organizing principle for teaching general introductory courses.[12]

The distinguished specialist on African and Caribbean history, Philip Curtin, is even more critical of this Western civilizations approach to global history:

> This 'world history' was really the history of those peoples from whom we borrowed most of the technology and culture that later developed into American civilization. By any objective standard, it was a very distorted view of world history, but it served a purpose. It did help to explain the origins of the modern American Way of Life. It was therefore distorted for a sufficient reason. The danger of misunderstanding enters only when we forget that it was distorted and come to believe that it really is the history of the modern world. One of the failures of history teaching in past decades has been the failure to make this point clear. Most students exposed to 'world history' courses thought that they were really learning world history. In fact, we were not even trying to teach world history--only American history pushed back through time.[13]

Global historians--like those in other fields of the discipline--agree on little except that Western historians have traditionally neglected the societies of the Third World--not to mention Eastern Europe and the Byzantine Empire. Among the most contentious issues to be resolved: the extent to which the methodology and findings of other disciplines should be utilized;[14] the degree to which the traditional cultural, political, diplomatic, and intellectual approaches should be synthesized with, or subordinated to, emphases on such matters as social change, economic life, race relations, class structures, the role of women, technology, climate, demography, environment, and geography; and the possibilities of using comparative frames of reference.

Methodological problems also must be addressed: how does one teach or write global history? Most universities and instructors probably have employed a Western or Western-oriented approach rather than a truly global history because it is more manageable. Many of my present and past colleagues believe that a course on world history can be little more than a brief overview at a high level of generalization of a vast array of societies and developments without any coherence or depth. Indeed, it constitutes a real challenge, because few scholars can master all or most of the considerable body of knowledge let alone synthesize it into a coherent but substantial form.

For the most part, except for the study of some preliterate or document-weak societies, historiography is fundamentally a matter not of sources but of judgment. Thus, the problem is in many respects an analytical one: to find the threads and patterns of global or semi-global or long-term significance to serve as focal points. As Barraclough has written:

> Universal history is more than the sum of its parts; it cannot be divided and subdivided without being denaturalized, much as water, separated into its analytical components, ceases to be water and becomes hydrogen and oxygen.[15]

The dean of global historians in this country, McNeill, perhaps too simply, states it another way: "World history is no more difficult than national history. What one needs is a clear and distinct idea that will define what is relevant."[16] He argues that we must focus attention on certain aspects of reality and ignore others just as we must do with smaller-scale analysis. Each scale has its advantages and shortcomings; a plethora of information may obscure the whole while a paucity may deprive history of its variety. But without an organizing principle or consistent interpretation of some sort, history may become nothing more than a series of unrelated happenings, an unwieldy collection of national and regional histories.

The pitfalls and liabilities are considerable, of course, with macro-level analysis, due to the high level of generalization necessary to identify common patterns at the expense of micro-level idiosyncrasies and exceptions. Furthermore, unlike Western civilization, there are no agreed-upon criteria for analyzing global history; what to omit and what to consider remain very much matters for debate and disagreement. McNeill, who is greatly influenced by cultural anthropology, offers as his focus the diffusionist notion that "cultures and civilizations change mainly through interaction with one another as a consequence of contacts and collisions,"[17] but he maintains an open mind and believes a variety of approaches are possible. Nonetheless, McNeill seems to doubt that others will accept the challenge of finding global themes:

> Amidst all the variety and confusion is there no principle that can focus our attention and allow historians to find a meaningful pattern in the confusion? This is the key question that ought to be before our profession in the coming decade. If we cannot reduce the unmanageable mass of potential information about the world's history to intelligible proportions, then our accustomed role of introducing students to their public identity as members of a larger society than that defined by national borders will wither away.[18]

Leading global historians agree that the story of human beings over the broad sweep of history, from prehistoric times to the present, does possess some basic unity. Furthermore most would probably concur that some global overview is required to comprehend properly both Western or non-Western history. The best of the global histories available to Americans do have a consistent theme or organizing principle, usually determined by the dominant intellectual trends of the day. Thus, one prominent British historian, writing in the environmentally-conscious early 1970's, organized his interesting but complex book around the following ideas:

> The subject matter of world history has always appeared to me to be the study of processes which have brought mankind from the uncertainties and perils of primitive and precivilized life to the much more complex and very difficult uncertainties and perils of today. It

must focus on man's growing capacity to handle his environment and on his growing interdependence as a species.[19]

The fine American scholar, L. S. Stavrianos, perhaps overly influenced by the diffusionist ideas prevalent in the 1960's, adopts interaction within a broad global overview as his framework; "only then," he writes, "is it possible to perceive the degree of interaction amongst all peoples at all times, and the primary role of that interaction in determining the course of human history."[20] Even Barraclough, who is critical of an approach based on "diffusion" of culture and technology because it underplays the plurality of civilizations, concedes that "world history is concerned with points of contact and interrelationships . . . . It is a search for the links and connections across political and cultural frontiers."[21] Hence, for global history to have meaning it must embrace some broad overview which recognizes interaction between societies and regions, however much societies developed unique characteristics and technologies.

McNeill, Stavrianos, and others generally agree that this interaction was considerably less important before the European overseas expansions, beginning in the late fifteenth century, which led eventually to direct contacts between nearly all the widely scattered societies in the world. Still, even before 1500 few societies were completely isolated from others; while they existed in varying degrees of isolation there were periods of great trans-regional interactions and exchanges, what McNeill terms the "opening of the ecumene." Nonetheless, it is clear that 1500 A.D. marks a watershed after which the interaction between societies, regions, and continents increased dramatically, leading up to the present universal and interdependent human society, the outlines of which became clearly apparent by the late nineteenth century.

While global historians seeking to comprehend trans-contintental developments obviously find their most fertile material in the past five centuries or so, there is still, perhaps inevitably, great disagreement about the meaning and dimensions of early modern and modern history and of trans-regional and trans-societal interactions. Historians like McNeill and Stavrianos have laid a foundation for a new generation of global, macro-level, or comparative historians to build upon in order to raise our level of understanding, especially about the modern period of history. A number of scholars have searched for a principle or analytical tool on which to base a world-oriented study. It may be worthwhile to examine several of the most interesting results, without in any sense suggesting that this analysis provides comprehensive coverage of the field.

Most writers on modern world (and regional) history (the period since 1500)--including many "diffusionist" historians--have implictly or explicitly organized their material around the concept of "modernization" or the "modernizing process." Thus, Edward R. Tannenbaum contends that "during the past 100 years and for the forseeable future, modernization is the dominant force in the world."[22] There is an implicit assumption that all societies can be divided into traditional and modern, and that the idea of modernization can be applied universally. Many authors and teachers use the concept without applying any very rigorous definition. Indeed, a disconcerting number of historians and other scholars seem to use "modernization" without defining it explicity. Many historians believe a reasonably accurate description of the modernization concept of historical development might be

reduced to the following summary propositions developed by an innovative history department in a small New England university.[23]

> 1. The last two centuries or so represent a wholly exceptional period within the overall sweep of human history. During this period, the inhabitants of such regions as Europe, the United States, and Japan have passed through a profound transition. This transition has broken them loose from patterns of economic, social, political, and intellectual life that man has lived for millennia. It has carried them to what amounts to an entirely new and radically different order of existence, or level of civilization, which is without counterpart in the past.
>
> 2. Hence, we can distinguish in history two broad patterns or ideal-types of civilization: the 'traditional civilization' that obtained everywhere up to the eighteenth century, and the 'modern civilization' that increasingly has become the norm since then . . .
>
> 3. The transition from 'traditional' civilization to 'modern' civilization, or the process of 'modernization,' began in Western civilization. Subsequently, it has been carried outward into non-Western civilizations. In this set of facts--that it was Western civilization that first entered upon the transition to modernity, and that the consequences of its modernization have forced modernization upon the remaining traditional civilizations of the world--lie the uniqueness and the importance of Western history.

If this quote accurately summarizes the modernization approach as perceived by historians, the concepts are not altogether objectionable or unreasonable; but some scholars would disagree. Some readers may consider the following criticism superflouous; many Latin American, Middle Eastern, and African historians as well as a few Asianists, Europeanists, and North Americanists have in the past few years rejected the modernization approach as an adequate guide to understanding modern history. But intellectual trends percolate slowly through the compartmentalized historical discipline. Though there have been many challenges in recent years, especially from Marxist and neo-Marxist scholars, modernization is far from "dead"; it continues to reign supreme as the predominant paradigm among globalists, Asianists, and Europeanists while still enjoying some popularity among Africanists as well as a diminishing number of Latin Americanists.[24] Apparently it is also gaining popularity among Americanists, especially social historians.[25] Books and articles employing a modernization framework appear in astonishing numbers, confirming that it still dominates American academic thinking, most strongly perhaps in political science.[26]

Critics charge that the modernizaiton theory fails to explain adequately the complex interconnections and interactions of societies working through various international networks and processes. Instead it encourages a bland ethnocentrism which develops little sympathy or understanding among Americans for the aspirations and plight of Third World peoples. Indeed it fails to address the sources of the contemporary world's international and intersocietal tensions. Coming in to prominence in the 1950s and early 1960s, it complemented as well as justified the naive American notion that the selfless United States would help the rest of the

world to wealth, progress, and democracy. Furthermore, the framework is utterly ahistorical, failing to allow for diverse and uneven continuities from the past, although to be fair some modernization theorists seem to be aware of this deficiency. The implied notion that all societies are progressing toward the same fate ("convergence") constitutes another problem, for some Third World societies now seek different futures far removed from the model of America's affluent consumer society.

Most historians (including the writer) would probably agree that, in a broad sense, concepts such as "modern" or "modernization" have some value in differentiating the rapidly changing, technologically more complex world of the past several centuries from those of the earlier periods (what are called "traditional" societies). Perhaps they also help indicate a process of technological change and development, a process not necessarily correlated with changes in human relationships and consumption patterns as some writers believe. As L. E. Shiner has noted:

> So long as the 'tradition/modernity' concept is used in the limited, primarily heuristic way ideal types are meant to be used, it may continue to have its place . . . If they were treated as loose designations for a set of problems and interests rather than as operative concepts by which to guide research, they should not do much harm.[27]

Unfortunately, a large number of scholars, particularly since the late 1950's, have taken the concept somewhat further without necessarily making clear the ideological assumptions (a bias toward liberal democracy, capitalism, a Western lifestyle, high-consumption living standards, and the notion of progress) which support it or the non-universality of some of its features; indeed, for many scholars, "modernization" is a coherent theory postulating polar types of societies with wholly different characteristics. C. E. Black, an historian, represents this viewpoint when he notes:

> 'Modernity' has come to be rather widely employed to describe the characteristics common to countries that are most advanced (emphasis mine) in technological, political, economic, and social development, and 'modernization' to describe the process by which they acquired these characteristics.[28]

Obviously then to be "modern" is to be "advanced," to occupy a higher rung on the ladder of progress toward a better, more satisfying world. Political scientist Daniel Lerner goes even further: "Modernization is . . . the process of social change whereby less developed societies acquire characteristics common to more developed societies."[29]

The modernization theorists, progressing considerably beyond description, postulate some universal features of the modernizing process, including the notion of parallel stages (with their beginning and end points), and of easily defined characteristics of "modern" and "traditional" societies. Some have even developed sometimes often questionable strategies for bringing development and modernity to Third World societies based on the spread of "modern" (i.e., Western) value orientations, world views, political systems, and socio-economic structures. The essentials of this theory have been summarized by two critics as follows:

> This perspective assumes as its basic premise that the theoretical unit for the study of social change is 'society' in the abstract. Accordingly, the world is said to consist of a number of related but basically autnomous 'societies' . . . each moving upward along an essentially similar path of development. Some, of course, started their ascents earlier than others, thereby showing the way to late-starters; and some proceeded at times more rapidly than others, suffering accordingly from forcing historical change. But they all trace broadly parallel lines of development . . . . The task of the social scientist is . . . to construct, and test out, explanations as to why some 'societies' started earlier than others, why some developed faster than others, and why those currently lagging behind are lagging and what they must do in order to catch up to those already developed.[30]

Not all of the modernization literature fits into this mold, but one can certainly find prominent examples which well represent this approach.[31]

This is not the place to criticize in detail the modernization theory's problems or ideological suppositions (much of which is based on Western experience and cultural biases), for that has been done in detail elsewhere,[32] but we should note that an increasing number of historians, and their social science colleagues, have questioned the wisdom of relying too heavily or exclusively on the modernization concept (particularly its more vulgar manifestations) as an interpretation of, or analytical tool for the study of, recent historical development either in the entire world or for Third World societies in particular.

Teachers of history should be concerned that modernization theory reinforces--rather than challenges--Americans' sense of their own superiority over other peoples and cultures since it assumes that the United States has been at the cutting edge of historical development or progress. Global historians who choose, implicitly or explicitly, to employ an unmodified modernization framework have selected a paradigm that is incapable of explaining the complex interrelationships of societies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. As historian Theda Skocpol writes: "Modernization is best conceived not only as an intra societal process of economic development accompanied by lagging or leading changes in non-economic institutional spheres, but also as a world-historic inter societal phenomenon."[33] Students educated from a modernization perspective will certainly have difficulty comprehending the recent radical developments in countries like Iran, Chile, Vietnam, or Zimbabwe, for the theory is utterly deficient in explaining Third World revolution and counterrevolution.

The challenge to the modernization approach with subsequent development of alternative approaches has come from several directions. The most exciting and influential ideas on modern global history now come from those historians and social scientists, associated with the "world-system" approach, who view the modernization theorists' emphasis on relatively autonomous societies progressing toward a common goal as seriously deficient. Pioneered by both First and Third World scholars, and particularly by sociologists, this approach has received increasing attention from scholars, including historians with varied backgrounds and interests. As the best-known exponent of the world-system concept, American sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein, writes about the challenge to modernization theory:

> These scholars (the world-system theorists) raised into question the presumptions of parallel "societal" development, positing instead a view of a world-economy or world system that itself 'develops,' but whose segments or parts in no way follow parallel paths over historical time--indeed quite the contrary.[34]

Since it offers no comprehensive interpretation of modern history, the world-system approach developed by Wallerstein and other scholars is not global history in the sense that McNeill or Stavrianos present it--perhaps macro-history is a better term--but it is not unrelated either. The global historian and world-system theorist agree that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts while at the same time affirming that the parts cannot be properly understood without reference to the whole. There is also a common emphasis on the interaction of societies. Essentially the world-system scholars, taking a systemic and structural view of world development over the past several centuries, have established a holistic explanation for the social, political, and economic structure of, and interaction in, the contemporary world. As sociologist Daniel Chirot argues:

> Studying social change without studying its international context is theoretically unsound, and also dangerous, because it leads to the illusion that a contemporary society is the complete master of its fate.[35]

In many respects the world-system scholars are writing within a broad framework that can be termed global political economy.[36]

Essentially, the world-system approach views the modern world as a macro-system--more complex and rapidly changing but not necessarily superior to the earlier, less universal, network of societies--and takes into account a wide variety of factors--the political economy factor being the most critical--in studying this world and its evolution. To Wallerstein, in the last several centuries capitalism has defined the dominant force in the emerging world economy and a process as much as an economic system. Advocates of this approach stress that the world has become highly interdependent but that this exchange relationship is generally an unequal one favoring certain capital-rich societies at the expense of others. Historian Basil Davidson--a specialist on Africa--has succinctly summarized a variant of this theme far removed from the notions of "modernization' theorists:

> The development of the industrialized countries continues to imply the stagnation--now, even the regression--of the non-industrialized. The strong continue to feed upon the weak, and the weak continue to grow weaker; and it is to this, far more than to anything else, that one must refer the troubles and upheavals . . . of the newly independent regimes (in the Third World). Not until this system and relationship begin to be radically changed will there be, or can there be, any resolution of a crisis which threatens now to become catastrophe.[37]

Modern global history from the world-system approach might be briefly summarized as follows: The world-system originated in the fifteenth century, with the growth of capitalism and of commercial agriculture in Western Europe; expansion was essential to the process and led eventually to the direct control of

most of the non-Western societies by certain powerful Western countries. The capitalist economy of Western Europe continued to evolve and later spread to European settlement colonies like the United States. By the late nineteenth century, the modern world-system had become firmly established and universal as the powerful Western societies took advantage of industrial revolution; most of the world was drawn into the orbit of West European and North American capitalism, more likely than not through direct colonization, depriving the majority of societies of some or all of their autonomy. Colonialism served as a variously successful system for developing the Western core powers while at the same time bringing underdevelopment to most Third World societies. The development of geographically and culturally distinct regions was, therefore, part of an increasingly interlocked process of change with global implications. The twentieth century has witnessed some alterations in this integrated system (including the rise of both the United States and a challenging Communist world), but the heritage of the earlier world-system is still with us, including the continuation of a diminished autonomy for many societies.

Immanuel Wallerstein's work is essential to understanding the world-system approach. Wallerstein defines a world-system as "a unit with a single division of labor and multiple cultural and political systems";[38] furthermore, he stresses that various societies depend on economic exchange with others for their survival. His analysis postulates three types of societies developing in the modern world and defined by their position in the world-system at various periods: core-rich and powerful; peripheral--poor and underdeveloped; and semiperipheral intermediate. Wallerstein has developed a paradigm--a broad, loose but nonetheless coherent explanation that generates models which can be tested by other scholars. One of Wallerstein's students, Daniel Chirot, offers slightly modified form of the world-system approach. Chirot sees a world-system as consisting "of a set of interconnected societies. The state of being of each of these societies depends to some extent on its relative position in the world-system, which has strong, middling, and weak members."[39] Chirot's more flexible approach avoids some of the pitfalls, sometimes attributed to Wallerstein's work, without sacrificing the basic insights of the interpretations and concepts.

Wallerstein's ideas on the nature of the modern world grew out of his desire to make connections and understand relationships. His research on contemporary Africa convinced him that he must comprehend better the colonial past if he wished to understand the post-colonial present; to do so he realized he needed to grasp the broader context as well, abandoning the sovereign state as a "social system."[40] In other words, he concluded that the world as a whole must be considered in order to understand developments within its parts.[41] Historians seeking to come to grips with the colonial experience and its legacy in Southern Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean can certainly sympathize with Wallerstein's dilemma. As Kaye points out,[42] Wallerstein drew inspiration from two intellectual sources important for global history: Fernand Braudel and the interdisciplinary Annales French school of history, and the dependency theories developed by scholars like Andre Gunder Frank.

Braudel and those of his French colleagues whose work appears mainly in the journal Les Annales seek to write "total" history; their approach marks a revolt against a dominant historiography that emphasized political, diplomatic, and

military history and that focused on important personalities and events. The Annales historians and their followers outside of France did not entirely reject political history but they devoted more attention to social and economic developments. Braudel and his colleagues--writing what some called "geohistory"--synthesized historical and social science approaches and emphasized long-term patterns rather than what Braudel labels "eventism."[43] For example, in his work in the Mediterranean world (a trans-national unit) in the later sixteenth century, Braudel describes the sea basin as a complex mosaic; he analyzes a bewildering variety of topics, including landscape, climate, cultural ecology, patterns of migration and trade, town life, diet, crafts, festivals, and lives of peasants, the activities of merchants, and demography. The preoccupations of most historians--diplomatic maneuvering, dynastic marriages, treaties, political conflicts, wars--occupy only about a fourth of Braudel's text and are seen as less important than such matters as economic patterns.[44] Although Braudel and the Annales historians have not tried to write global history, their multi-faceted and integrated--although certainly imperfect--approach seems to offer much to global historians.

Wallerstein also draws heavily on Andre Gunder Frank's concept of the "development of underdevelopment," which stresses interregional relationships and processes. Frank argues that the process of under-development in the "periphery" of Latin America resembled the same process generating development of the core countries of the industrialized West; the capitalist development of Western Europe and later the United States, developed at the expense of the underdevelopment of the Third World societies. Latin America specialist Keith Griffin, a supporter of the Frank thesis, at least in its broad outlines, believes that:

> The automatic functioning of the international economy which Europe dominated first created underdevelopment and then hindered efforts to escape from it . . . . Underdevelopment is a product of historical processes.[45]

According to this thesis, "underdevelopment" and "undevelopment" are qualitatively different phenomena. Frank charges that:

> Even a modest acquaintance with history shows that under-development is not original or traditional and that neither the past nor the present of the underdeveloped countries resemble in any important respect the past of the now developed countries. The now developed countries were never underdeveloped, though they may have been undeveloped.[46]

Underdevelopment, in other words, implies a position of weakness and lack of autonomy in the world economy, what some scholars term "dependency." Thus, there is an unequal exchange relationship in which some societies have direct or indirect influence over others lacking full control of their destinies. For specialists on Africa or Soutnern Asia, this approach stresses the redistributive rather than modernizing aspects of colonialism and neo-colonialism. This is a far cry from the assertion of modernization theories that countries commence the journey from tradition to modernity with the adoption of "rational" (i.e., Western) forms of education, government or economic patterns.

There are serious problems with both Frank's historiography and his formulations.[47] And, while dependency theory or its variants has become

influential in Latin American and African studies, difficulties abound in applying the framework to the entire Third World or even to some countries.[48] But the basic point of dependency theory--that "the interplay between the internal . . . structures and international structures is the critical starting point for an understanding of the process of development"[49] --seems reasonable for much, although perhaps not all, of Latin America, and certainly has some applicability to Africa, Southern Asia, and the Caribbean. Therefore, if accepted undogmatically and allowing for many variables, the concepts of "dependency" and "development of underdevelopment" can assist global historians who emphasize long-term patterns, causation, and trans-societal relationship.

Wallerstein also is convinced of the relationship between the development of capitalism in Europe and the underdevelopment of the Third World; fundamentally, his concept of the world-system involves economic exchange relations of a world market economy. Many, although not all, of Wallerstein's formulations--for example, his views on capitalism and unequal exchange--are influenced by Marxian and neo-Marxian thought and his work does fall broadly, although not dogmatically, within the neo-Marxist tradition. The appeal should not be restricted to Marxian-influenced scholars, however. Such a thorough going and broad-based formulation--especially as presented in his book on the origins of the world system in sixteenth and early seventeenth century Europe[50] --may also engender great criticism and controversy.[51] A few scholars totally reject Wallerstein's work, and others, including some with a Marxist orientation, criticize it in part. Some critics consider Wallerstein's analysis as too mechanical, even perhaps corrupted by economic determinism. The most incisive and detailed critic is Theda Skocpol, who finds Wallerstein's historiography and theory-building somewhat deficient although she admits his overall attempt at designing a coherent framework for studying modern world history. Her comments are worth quoting at length:

> Wallerstein's arguments are too misleading theoretically and historically to be accepted at face value . . . . Like other important pioneering works, Wallerstein's Modern World-System overreaches itself and falls short of its aims . . . . No one should suppose, however, that I am suggesting that we dismiss or ignore Wallerstein's ongoing study of the world capitalist system . . . . On the contrary, I can think of no intellectual project in the social sciences that is of greater interest and importance. Even if Wallerstein has so far given imperfect answers about the historical development of capitalism, still he has the unequalled boldness of vision to raise all the important issues. Even the shortcomings of this effort, therefore, can be far more fruitful for the social sciences than any minute successes by others who attempt much less.[52]

It is interesting that only a few historians and sociologists have found the analysis of the broader paradigm to be altogether unconvincing, especially in regard to the Europe-Third World relationship. Most of the reviews by historians have certainly found flaws, mainly of detail, in his treatment of European history, but the majority of reviews--including some by non-Marxists--accord his book either whole-hearted or qualified approval.[53] A fuller critique of the entire scheme awaits completion of the remaining volumes in the series when Wallerstein's conceptions will be more fully developed.[54] It should also be noted that

Wallerstein has invited debate about his work and has not attempted to impose any particular orthodoxy on those who find the broad framework useful. In his view the bare essentials of the world-system approach include an emphasis on "political economy" and the notion of a working social system, world economy, larger than any state;[55] both themes are grounded in Marxism but certainly do not appeal solely to Marxists. Within this broad framework there remains much room for debate on both theoretical and empirical matters. Global historians, then, need not uncritically accept Wallerstein's research to find utility in the general paradigm of an interconnected world-system developing over time and having an essentially economic base.

Although the world-system approach[56] is increasingly influencing both historians of the Third World and of Europe, particularly younger scholars, it is still far from becoming the dominant mode of interpretation on the development of the modern world. Nor has it, unlike modernization theory, penetrated the pages of world history textbooks or other broad studies of global history. This results in part from the pioneering nature of the existing work, but also may be due to the theoretical and ideological orientations of the world-system scholarship, heavily influenced by Marxism and its undermining of the "Western civilization" bias.

It is possible that Chirot's recent and stimulating book[57] on the sociology of world politics and the evolution of the world-system in the twentieth century may alter that situation, although it has so far received little attention from historians (but not sociologists, political scientists, and anthropologists).[58] Chirot's carefully developed and well-documented sociologically-oriented analysis is not without problems and controversial interpretations. While the author sometimes too easily formulates generalizations from his data, his historiography and grasp of a wide range of sources are impressive. More modest in his goals and scope than Wallerstein, he has nonetheless succeeded in developing a coherent and, in many respects, a persuasive interpretation of recent history that emphasizes interrelationships. He also offers a truly macro and frequently comparative perspective focusing on key themes rather than details. Chirot effectively integrates the recent histories of Europe, North America, and the Third World in attempting to comprehend the relationship between internal and international social, economic, and political change. His book is aimed at understanding "the changing world system and how the shifting balance of international economic, political and cultural forces shape and are shaped by changing class structures within the core, semi-peripheral and peripheral societies."[59] Like Wallerstein he sees the main differences between core and peripheral societies as not that of industrialization and value orientations--the emphases of the modernization theorists--but of wealth and specialization. Of particular interest are his thoughts on the continuing evolution of and rapidly changing balance of power in the world-system. He believes that Third World societies will increasingly reject emulation--as modernization theorists believe--but to close themselves off from the economically powerful states, forcing the Western societies to seek a future less dependent on the control of resources in poor countries.[60]

Chirot's ambitious and flexible approach utilizes history, politics, economics, and sociology and is inspired by Wallerstein, but his work is more synthetic of mainstream scholarship and constitutes a modification of Wallerstein's perspective. It may thus receive a more sympathtic reception among non-Marxist scholars.

Chirot's work may be too sociological for historians uninterested in social science perspectives or methodology, although it ranges widely over a variety of themes, is superbly written for undergraduates, and is especially strong on socio-economic patterns. Those advocating the modernization approach will find many of his interpretations most discomforting. Although I do not agree with all of his ideas, Chirot's analysis of modern history appears to explain the modern world and its tensions more convincingly than modernization-oriented historians. Chirot's ideas also frequently differ from many Marxist scholars who will probably find his work interesting but inadequate.

The world-system approach (or paradigm) has its imperfections and limitations, including sometimes excessive oversubordination of micro-level to macro-level analysis and the neglect of cultural and ethnic factors. No paradigm will probably ever explain modern world history in a fully satisfactory manner and the world-system approach--at least as presently constituted--is weak in several areas.[61] However, it seems to offer considerably more possibilities than modernization theory (shackled with too many Western biases) and in any case still stands at a formative stage of development. The paradigm adds a systemic and structural theoretical formulation for the study of recent global history; moreover, this framework is strongest in explaining relationships between societies and regions, one of the patterns Americans seem least able to understand. In doing so it helps to challenge the ethnocentrism and parochialism of the American world view. Utilization of a world-system perspective in an undogmatic form helps students understand that the world consists of interdependent units of uneven influence and power. It gives them insights into the nature of international interaction and the structure of international relations and the world economic system. A world-system approach situates the United States within a broader context of historical processes and change. It remains to be seen whether, like modernization theory, the world-system paradigm--grounded to some extent in neo-Marxism--is riddled with implicit Western biases. In any case, it does in many respects provide the sort of "clear and distinct idea" that McNeill calls for to help us define what is relevant. As such the general approach, if used critically, provides a useful pedagogical as well as analytical tool for global history.[62] Surely, it provides a basis for American students to obtain a clearer, more realistic picture of the relationships between the United States and the rest of the world (not just of Western Europe) and of their own place in that world. Increasingly, global or other historians will need to deal with the questions and interpretations raised by the world-system approach.

Notes

1. This opinion is confirmed by several recent studies of history textbooks in American schools. See the devastating critique of the ethnocentric biases to be found in primary and secondary school textbooks dealing with Asia. Asia in American Textbooks: An Evaluation Based on a Study Conducted by the Asia Society with Support from the Ford Foundation (New York: Asia Society, 1976).

2. Relatively few students enter my sophomore-level survey course on Asian civilizations with any prior knowledge of Asian religion, history or culture. Students entering my African history survey course generally have even less background. My experience in that course has convinced me that, despite several decades of sympathetic scholarship on Africa, Paul Bohannon's opinion of fifteen years ago is still germane: "Africa has, for generations now been viewed through a web of myth . . . . Only if the myth is stripped away can the reality of Africa emerge." Africa and Africans (Garden City: Natural History Press, 1964), p. 1. Conversations with colleagues at other non-elite colleges suggests to me that students at UWGB are by no means atypical in these matters.

3. One critic wrote several years ago in a critique on the limited impact of the Annales school in North America that historians specializing on the United States "are often considered by their peers among the world's most intellectually parochial." (Alden Whitman, "History from the Bottom Up: A New Way to Examine the Past," New York Times, May 11, 1975.) This criticism is hopefully less applicable today. Historians specializing on Western Europe are sometimes accused of contempt for other fields of history. I am always reminded of the sneering contempt that the acclaimed British historian Hugh Trevor-Roper holds for African history; I have misplaced the exact quote or citation but Trevor-Roper wrote something to the effect that the study of African history is the study of quaint, picturesque but deservedly obscure societies whose development was irrelevant to the European mainstream of history and civilization.

4. I am constantly amazed that so many historians believe they should confine their attenton to the period before 1950 (or perhaps 1940 or 1960) and leave more recent or contemporary developments to political scientists. For example, one historian of my acquaintance ends his survey course on the history of American foreign relations at the Korean War and totally ignores the Vietnam conflict on the grounds that it is too early to understand the war historically. This comes despite the fact that much of the best and most convincing writing on the Vietnam war (and revolution) derives from historians. See Alexander Woodside, Community and Revolution in Modern Vietnam (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976). Another acquaintance concluded his survey course on modern Chinese history at 1949 because he felt ill-equipped as a historian to deal with the revolutionary developments since the Communist triumph; in any case, he added they were covered in a political science course (which, of course, his history students might or might not take). I well recall as an undergraduate in the early 1960's taking courses on European and Asian history that ended their coverage with World War II. For an interesting but controversial study of the future using historical materials by a respected historian, see L. S. Stavrianos, The Promise of the Coming Dark Age (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1976). Many historians believe that, by definition, they should study only the past. Donald Gawronski, for example, contends that "history is the interpretative study of the recorded fact of bygone human beings

and societies." History: Meaning & Method (Glenview: Scott Foresman, 1969), p. 3. Yet, I believe that historians can fruitfully study the present and future through a perspective emphasizing the relevance of the past and the long-term directions of continuity and change.

5. As an example, I know of one large southern state university with a full-time history faculty of 22 members; 20 of these teach American or European subjects, leaving the heavily populated rest of the world to 2 members (1 East Asianist, 1 Latin Americanist). To say the least, such a composition suggests well how they define what is important in history. None of their members offers a course on world or comparative history. A large and academically outstanding university in the northeast offers no history courses on Africa, South Asia, the modern Middle East, or world history despite a distinguished history faculty of 35 members. Even universities that are strong on Third World history sometimes fail to teach world or comparative history; thus, the history department of one large Midwestern university with fine and well-known programs on Asian, African, and Latin American studies offers no undergraduate survey of world history and no undergraduate or graduate courses on comparative Third World history. The various regions are studied in isolation, without any attempt at integration.

6. Quoted in L. S. Stavrianos, The World Since 1500: A Global History (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1966), p. 3.

7. An Introduction to Contemporary History (Baltimore: Penguin, 1967), p. 10.

8. For a recent perceptive discussion of some of these problems and of world historians see Barraclough, Main Trends in History, especially Chapter 5.

9. This data comes from an advertising brochure from W. W. Norton received in 1978 which announced a new (fifth) edition of the Burns and Ralph text, World Civilizations. According to the brochure, Burns and Ralph has many advantages over 3 of its major competitors (the interesting information is contained in a chart on the contents of the books). For example, of its 1319 pages, it allocates 52 to Africa, 7 to Southeast Asia, 91 to India. The total African, Asian, and Latin American coverage totals 347 pages, or 26 percent of the total. However, China and India receive together over half of the total Third World coverage and even this is considerably less than the space allocated for Medieval and Renaissance Europe. Ancient Greece and Rome receive 106 pages of treatment as compared to 95 for China (from prehistory through Mao). But this inadequate space devoted to the Third World was indeed the most generous among the four texts surveyed. The least global of the four "world" civilizations texts proved to be Strayer, Harbison, and Gatzke, The Mainstream of Civilization (second edition); of the 838 pages in this well-known and much used volume, Southeast Asia merits all of one page, Latin America 4, Africa 6, and China 29. Altogether the Third World receives considerably less than ten percent of the coverage in Strayer, a good indication of where the authors consider the "mainstream" of civilization to reside. No wonder that Americans suffer from ethnocentrism towards other cultures and societies. Students reading Strayer and some of the other texts would be forced to get background on the non-Western world from supplementary reading, no doubt reinforcing the notion that Third World history and civilization is supplementary to the Western variety.

10. The best available texts in the United States with a reasonably sound global (as opposed to Western-oriented) perspective and emphasis are the several works of L. S. Stavrianos and William McNeill. The Stavrianos books include Man's Past and Present: A Global History (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1975), The World to 1500 (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1975), and The World Since 1500 (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1975). McNeill's volumes include A World History (New York: Oxford, 1971) and The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1963). McNeill's works are more challenging intellectually but Stavrianos writes more clearly for undergraduate students and (except for an odd neglect of Southeast Asia) offers better understanding of the Third World. Both authors are wide-ranging and eclectic in their approaches but rely too heavily on the concepts of diffusion and modernization. Nonetheless, they benefit from the application of a relatively coherent theme to their material. A recent text by J. M. Roberts, History of the World (New York: Knopf, 1976), is somewhat more Western-centric but is an acceptable attempt to write a truly global history. A History of World Civilizations (New York: Wiley, 1973), edited by Edward R. Tannenbaum, makes similar claims but is less satisfactory although not without redeeming qualities. For a devastating critique of the Western-centric orientation of Tannenbaum, see the review by Theodore Von Laue in The History Teacher (May, 1974): 481-3. There are a large number of other world history texts which are historiographically sound, well-intentioned, and well-written but unacceptable as truly global histories because of their strong (and indeed often planned) emphasis on the Western experience.

11. "The Interrelations of Societies in History," Comparative Studies in Society and History (January, 1963): 248. This article is a masterful brief analysis of some major patterns of pre-modern world history and also provides an effective critique of some self-centered perceptions inherent in the Western world view, including the classification of the continents by Western geographers.

12. "History for Citizens," American Historical Association Newsletter (March, 1976): 5.

13. African History (Washington: AHA Service Center for Teachers, No. 56, 1964), pp. 1-2.

14. In a broad sense, I am sympathetic to many of the recent influences into historical study from the social sciences and am myself especially interested in the perspectives of cultural anthropology and sociology for my own research interests on the Third World. I agree with E. H. Carr: "The more sociological history becomes, and the more historical sociology becomes, the better for both." Carr, What is History? (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1964), p. 66. No doubt my own predilection for the social science approach reflects my training in Southeast Asian and comparative history. Harry Benda has observed that Southeast Asian historiography has been a new and comparatively underdeveloped field, allowing contributions and methodologies from many sources and disciplines in the 1950's and after because it had no established tradition. See "The Structure of Southeast Asian History," Journal of Southeast Asian History 3 (March, 1962): 106-38. Furthermore, historical researchers found themselves working closely with

anthropologists and political scientists in the field. For an interesting examination of this situation, see John Legge, "Southeast Asian History and the Social Sciences," in C. D. Cowan and O. W. Wolters, Southeast Asian History and Historiography (Ithaca: Cornell, 1976), pp. 388-404.

15. Quoted in Stavrianos, Man's Past and Present, p. 3.

16. "Studying the Sweep of the Human Adventure, The Chronicles of Higher Education (January 30, 1978): 32.

17. Ibid.

18. McNeill, "History for Citizens," p. 5.

19. Roberts, History of the World, p. xiv.

20. Stavrianos, World Since 1500, p. 3.

21. Barraclough, Main Trends in History, pp. 160-62.

22. Tannenbaum, History of World Civilizations, p. v.

23. "The Study of History at the University of Hartford: A Statement Prepared by the Department of History" (Hartford, Conn., ca. 1971), p. 2. The History Department reorganized their curriculum to correspond to the theme of modernization. According to their 1978-79 catalog, Hartford still utilizes this approach.

24. Most of the major textbooks on East Asian history, for example, are written from a strong modernization framework. For some incisive criticism of the modernization bias in East Asian Studies and textbooks at college and precollege levels, see James Peck, "The Roots of Rhetoric: The Professional Ideology of America's China Watchers," in Edward Friedman and Mark Selden, eds., America's Asia: Dissenting Essays on Asian-American Relations (New York: Vintage, 1971); Asia in American Textbooks.

25. See Daniel Scott Smith, "Modernization and American Social History," Social Science History (Spring, 1978): 361-67; Richard O. Brown, Modernization: The Transformation of American Life, 1600-1865 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1976).

26. The persistent influence of modernization theory among political scientists was the subject of several papers at the 1979 meetings of the American Political Science Association. See Malcolm Scully, "Scholarly Views Differ on Nature of Change in the Third World," Chronicle of Higher Education (September, 1979): 7.

27. L. E. Shiner, "Tradition/Modernity: An Ideal Type Gone Astray," Comparative Studies in Society and History 17 (1975): 252.

28. The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), p. 6.

29. "Modernization: Social Aspects," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: Crowell Collier & MacMillan, 1968), p. 386. Many modernization scholars retain their strong faith in the theory and are unimpressed by criticism. For example, sociologist Wilbert E. Moore reaffirms in his latest book most of the ideas that have molded his work for several decades, devoting less than two pages to a cursory and not very sophisticated or convincing refutation of his critics. Moore declares firmly on page 1 that:

> All people everywhere are subject to, and many are actually participating in, a process of social change that is called modernization . . . . Modernization may be more closely identified as rationalization of the ways social life is organized and social activities performed. By this I mean the use of fact and logic in the choice of instrumental behavior for the achievement of various identified goals.

The Westerncentric ramifications of Moore's analysis are considerable. See World Modernization: The Limits of Convergence (New York: Elsevier, 1979).

30. Terence K. Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein, "Patterns of Development of the Modern World-System: Research Proposal," Review (Fall, 1977): 111-12.

31. See the influential writings of W. W. Rostow, such as the Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: University Press, 1960) and his recent The World Economy: History and Prospects (Austin: University of Texas, 1978). Rostow's work constitutes the vulgar extreme of the modernization approach and its "progress" orientation. Thus, Rostow wrote the following defense of colonialism: "There is no doubt that without the affront to human and national dignity caused by the intrusion of more advanced powers, the rate of modernization of traditional societies over the past century-and-a-half would have been much slower than, in fact, it is," Stages of Economic Growth, p. 28. The problems with this approach to colonialism should be obvious. Yet, Rostow is still taken seriously by development specialists and many historians, especially economic historians.

32. See J. Samuel Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela, "Modernization and Dependency: Alternative Perspectives in the Study of Latin American Underdevelopment," Comparative Politics 10 (July, 1978): 535-57; Shiner, "Tradition/Modernity," pp. 245-52; Dean C. Tipps, "Modernization Theory and the Comparative Study of Society: A Critical Perspective," Comparative Studies in Society and History 15 (March, 1973): 199-226; James Peck, "Revolution Versus Modernization and Revisionism," in Victor Nee and James Peck, eds., China's Uninterrupted Revolution from 1840 to the Present (New York: Pantheon, 1975), 57-217. Even some pioneer modernization theorists are beginning to have second thoughts about their earlier writings. See the essay by S. N. Eisenstadt and Ronald Dore on "convergence" in Hans-Dieter Evers, Modernization in South-East Asia (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1973). This volume also contains several useful articles by Southeast Asians raising serious questions about the modernization framework for their region.

33. Theda Skocpol, "France, Russia, China: A Structural Analysis of Social Revolutions," Comparative Studies in Society and History 18 (April, 1976): 179.

34. "The Tasks of Historical Social Science," Review (Summer, 1977): 7.

35. Social Change in the Twentieth Century (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1977), p. 256.

36. Wallerstein defines "political economy" in the following terms: "Political economy tells us that we are assuming that meaningful analysis cannot separate the phenomena of the real world into three (or more) categories--the political, the economic, the social--to be studied by different methods and in closed spheres . . . . . The economy is 'institutionally' rooted; the policy is the expression of socioeconomic forces; 'societal' structures are a consequence of politico-economic pressures." "Preface," in Barbara Hockey Kaplan, ed., Social Change in the Capitalist World Economy, vol. 1, Political Economy of the World-System Annuals (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1978), p. 7. Wallerstein also rejects traditional disciplinary boundaries: "My concern with history, with social science, and with politics is not a matter of engaging in three separate . . . activities, but a single concern, informed by the belief that the strands cannot be separted . . . I believe . . . that history and social science are one subject matter, which I shall call . . . historical social science." The Capitalist World-Economy: Essays by Immanuel Wallerstein (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ., 1979), pp. vii-ix.

37. Basil Davidson, Can Africa Survive: Arguments Against Growth Without Development (Boston: Little Brown, 1974), p. 29.

38. Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis," Comparative Studies in Society and History 16 (Sept, 1974): 390. This essay provides a summary of his position.

39. Social Change in the Twentieth Century, p. 13.

40. Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century (New York: Academic Press, 1974), pp. 3-11. This is the first of a projected four-volume work tracing the development of the modern world-system. The second volume is The Modern World-System II: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy, 1600-1750 (New York: Academic Press, 1980).

41. It is interesting to note that nowhere does Wallerstein ever cite the work of the major global historians--McNeill, Stavrianos, Hodgson--so it is difficult to know what, if any, influences or ideas he derived from them.

42. Harvey Kaye, "Totality: Its Application to Historical and Social Analysis by Wallerstein and Genovese," Historical Reflections (Winter, 1979): 408-409.

43. A sundry phenomenon to "eventism" is what I like to call "chronologism", the emphasis on a chronological progression of events and developments generally for one society rather than on longer term patterns. An excellent and, to my mind, unfortunate example of "chronologism" can be found in the graduate program of a prominent and academically superior East Coast university. For the Ph.D. preliminary examination, candidates in European history were required to select a

200 year period for one country over which they would be examined (e.g., France 1615-1815); there was no room here for the processes of historical change or for comparative analysis (with other societies or time periods) or for the long-term patterns of change and continuity. The field of study was defined and delineated chronologically rather than because of a problem focus, as if historical developments can easily be pigeon-holed into small and separate boxes demarcated by certain dates and national boundaries. In its most absurd form, "chronologism" can lead historians to an overemphasis on dates. I once had a colleague whose examinations in his history courses consisted entirely of the matching up of dates and events.

44. Ferdinand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, 2 vols. (New York: Harper & Row, 1973). As might be expected many historians are critical of the historiography, methodology, assumptions, and/or framework of Braudel. For a particularly entertaining and interesting recent critique see Hans Kellner, "Disorderly Conduct: Braudel's Mediterranean Satire," History and Theory 18 (1979): 197-222. Kellner makes the reasonable point that global history--to be complete--"must have events as well as persistence." Another serious problem is that Braudel offers more of an encyclopedia than a narrative treatment of historical change so that it becomes difficult not to get bogged down in details.

45. "Underdevelopment in History," in Charles K. Wilber, ed., The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment (New York: Random House, 1979), p. 78.

46. Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution (New York: Monthly Review, 1969), p. 4.

47. Frank did not originate all of the ideas with which he is identified; some came from Latin American scholars. But he was their best-known early exponent writing in English. Unfortunately, he has offered a somewhat cruder and less flexible version of dependency theory than the Latin Americans. On this point see especially Valenzuela and Valenzuela, "Modernization and Dependency." His unreliable documentation and use of historical sources has alienated some historian reviewers of his works. A good, generally sympathetic introduction to Frank's thought can be found in David Booth, "Andre Gunder Frank: An Introduction and Appreciation" in Ivor Oxaal, Tonly Barnett and David Booth, eds., Beyond the Sociology of Development: Economy and Society in Latin America and Africa (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), pp. 50-85. Frank himself has recently completed the first of a two volume study on the development of the modern world-system, World Accumulation, 1492-1789 (New York: Monthly Review, 1978).

> For example, Harold Blakemore impressively challenges both Franks interpretation of, and utilization of sources on, Chilean economic history. He accuses the German scholar of "sweeping generalizations based on very partial study . . . . In his search for the one single, and simply understood, agent of underdevelopment in Chile, he has substituted the clarity of dogma for the complexity of truth." "Limitations of Dependency: An Historian's View and Case Study," Boletin de Estudios Latino Americanos y del Caribe 18 (June, 1975): 74-87.

48. The literature on dependency is voluminous as are the writings criticizing, utilizing, or celebrating the Frank thesis. Even among Marxists debate has been intense and often extremely arcane to non-Marxists; in many respects Frank and other dependency theorists do not fit easily into any dogmatic Marxist approach. Among many others, four essays with four different points of view can provide a useful introduction to the subject: Valenzuela and Valenzuela, "Modernization and Dependency" (mostly sympathetic to its use in Latin America); A. G. Hopikins, "Clio-antics: A Horoscope for African Economic History" in Christopher Fyfe, ed., Africa Since 1945: A Tribute to Basil Davidson (New York: Africana Publishing House, 1976), pp. 31-46 (generally sympathetic but critical of its unmodified application to Africa); Colin Leys, "Underdevelopment and Dependency: Critical Notes," Journal of Contemporary Asia (1977): 92-108 (critical from a Marxist perspective); Anthony Smith, "The Case of Dependency Theory," in W. Scott Thompson, ed., The Third World: Premises of U.S. Policy (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1978), pp. 207-26 (critical from a mainstream perspective). One of the major criticisms, even made by some Marxists, is that some of the countries most "dependent" and receptive to Western investment and attention are also the wealthiest, suggesting to some writers that neglect by the world-system is worse than exploitation. I would like to acknowledge here that my own views on dependency benefited from conversations with Emil Haney, Tonly Galt, Norman Owen, Peter Smith, David Buck, Tom Skidmore, and Harvey Kaye--some of whom disagree with my ideas. Smith, in particular, believes the approach works rather well from some Latin American countries (e.g., Chile and pre-Castro Cuba) and less well for others (such as Mexico).

49. Philip J. O'Brien, "A Critique of Latin American Theories of Dependency," in Oxaal, Barnett, Booth, Beyond Sociology of Development, p. 25.

50. Wallerstein, Modern World-System.

51. One of the strongest attacks came from the respected economic historian Rondo Cameron, a specialist on Europe, who accused Wallerstein of "reification and teleology . . . . One expects to find errors of fact in history books written by amateurs. They are here in profusion, but mostly they are of minor importance in comparison with the distortions of fact in the author's reasoning," Journal of Interdisciplinary History (Summer, 1976): 142-43. Cameron's smug, cynical, self-righteous tone throughout the review does not lend credibility to his argument. In some of his other writings Cameron has launched attacks on Braudel and the Annales school.

52. Theda Skocpol, "Wallerstein's World Capitalist System: A Theoretical and Historical Critique," American Journal of Sociology 82 (March, 1977): 1075-89.

53. For example, Frederic Lane, a specialist on European economic history, comments that "taken as a whole, Wallerstein's attempt at synthesis, in spite of its shortcomings, seems to me to focus on worthwhile questions and to embody many good ideas," "Economic Growth in Wallerstein's Social Systems: A Review Article," Comparative Studies in Society and History 18 (Oct, 1976): 532. Andrew Appleby, writing in the American Historical Review, 80 (Dec, 1975): 1323-4, finds some problems with Wallerstein's analysis of English rural history but concludes by

praising "Wallerstein's impressive attempt to bring order to the confusing social and economic transformation of early modern Europe and its impact on the rest of the world." For an interesting attempt to broaden some of Wallerstein's ideas on the world-system to the political sphere, see George Modelski, "The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State," Comparative Studies in Society and History (April, 1978): 214-35.

54. The world-system approach is being further developed at the new Fernand Braudel Center for the Study of Economics, Historical Systems, and Civilizations at the State University of New York at Binghamton (Wallerstein is the director) and through its journal, Review (edited by Wallerstein). The Section on the Political Economy of the World-System of the American Sociological Association also promotes study of the world-system paradigm.

55. Wallerstein, "Preface," Social Change in Capitalist World Economy, p. 7.

56. See Angus McDonald, Jr., "Wallerstein's World Economy: How Seriously Should We Take It," Journal of Asian Studies 38 (May, 1979): 535-40.

57. Social Change in the Twentieth Century.

58. See the Reviews (both of them highly favorable) in the American Political Science Review 72 (Dec, 1978): 1511-12, and Contemporary Sociology 7 (Sept. 1978): 627.

59. Social Change in the Twentieth Century, p. 14.

60. Recent developments in the Middle East and Iran would seem to substantiate these views; on the other hand China appears to be rejoining the world-system and seeking"modernization" (but not capitalist democracy) after several decades of self-reliance, which may simply mean that isolation and self-reliance are necessary to build up strength so as to deal with the world system from a basis of influence rather than dependency.

61. In a recent communication Chirot has expressed the fear that the world-system approach, once a fresh idea, may some day become stale dogmatism. Should Chirot's suspicions be confirmed in the next few years, this once promising perspective may turn out to have little more utility than long-stultified modernization theory.

62. I am using a modified version of the world-system approach (with Chirot's book as the core text) in my interdisciplinary freshman-level course on modern world history at UWGB. This course emphasizes the global nature of change since 1500, with special stress on the interaction between Europe and the societies of Asia, Africa, and the Americas; roughly half of the sessions discuss the twentieth century. Since it is not possible to be comprehensive, I concentrate on certain important themes (the rise of capitalism, the impact of colonialism and imperialism, nationalism and revolution, etc.) so as to take maximum advantage of history's power to explain and illuminate the present. The course defines the subject in a conceptual way by deliberately restricting the foci and explicitly developing an interpretation of how and why the modern world developed the way

that it did. The interpretation utilized relies heavily on world-system ideas and on the notion--derived from McNeill and Stavrianos--that the interaction of civilizations is a major force for social change. To complement Chirot's world-system framework, I also require the Stavrianos text, The World Since 1500, which contains a liberal diffusionist bias and gives adequate survey of both Western and non-Western historical development. To bring a third perspective to the liberalism of Stavrianos and the somewhat neo-Marxist approach of Chirot, I also utilize the interesting but very flawed Danish-produced film The History Book, which presents in 3 hours a dogmatic ("vulgar") Marxist view of the evolution of the modern world. Obviously, many phenomena in modern history are open to controversy in their interpretation, a point reinforced to students by the very different assumptions of the readings and films. But debate and controversy should be encouraged, not ignored under the guise of "consensus" or "value-free objectivity" (which may or may not exist). One point of the course is to demonstrate that the meaning of modern history can be perceived in different ways; it is necessary for instructor and students to take a broad-minded attitude toward the various ideas and interpretations presented.

APPENDICES

Appendix A

Conference on the Teaching of World History

by

Kevin Reilly

The regional conference on world history held at the U.S. Air Force Academy from May 12 to 14 was serious, hard-working, well-attended, and expertly organized by the academy staff. Including secondary school, college, and university history teachers from New York to Hawaii, it was perhaps more of a "world" than a "regional" conference. While many of those present were already teaching courses in world history, many others had been sent by their institutions to find out how to develop such a course. From beginning to end, the conference centered on models and methods of world history instruction. The overriding concern for the teaching of world history took on the dimensions of an organized movement with specific plans and proposals.

In his keynote address, Professor William H. McNeill, University of Chicago, posed the question that brought 180 (rather than the expected 40 or 50) conferees together when he asked what it takes to establish a course like world history as the standard introductory course. He noted that two previous standards had been established by the profession. The first was the national survey course in American history, established after the 1880s and 1890s for both intellectual and administrative reasons when the intellectual work of J. Franklin Jameson and the administrative needs of training immigrants coincided. The second standard, the Western civilization survey, originated in the Columbia University climate of World War I and the postwar period, and then again in the work of Ferdinand Schevill at the University of Chicago around 1930. But the intellectual justification of focusing on a Euro-centered world and exploring the tensions between Athens and Jerusalem were not sufficient to establish a standard until the Great Depression made the economics of an easily reproducible standard administratively compelling. If American history had been established to train immigrants, Western civilization surveys were eventually accepted because they were cheap.

What, then, has delayed the establishment of a world civilization survey? Certainly the intellectual reasons for teaching world history have been as compelling since World War II as were the reasons for Western civilization after World War I. Few today would dispute the claim that we live in a tightly integrated world which we often fail to understand because of the limits of our Europocentrism. Our policy successes in Europe contrast starkly with blunders in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Why haven't we revised the introductory history course to meet new global needs? Professor McNeill's tentative response was that the administrative reasons were lacking. Specifically, unlike the Depression, there

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was no strong economic impetus to course conformity. In fact, since Sputnik the academic world has been able to use large amounts of money in extravagant ways. Instead of standardizing undergraduate education, universities have transported the graduate seminar to the undergraduate classroom. Truth became the view from the bottom of gopher holes. Students simply opted not to go down those gopher holes when given the choice.

The lack of compelling administrative reasons for the establishment of a world history course is only part of the problem. Much still has to be done to establish the intellectual direction and substantive content of such a course. Professor McNeill discussed that issue by asking for world history courses that would exhibit the conceptual framework that would speak to the problems of our culture today in much the way that the Athens/Jerusalem (or Enlightenment vs. Judeo-Christian) rubric informed the debates of the Western civilization course. Professor McNeill saw some possibilities for such creative tension in the conceptual distinctions between nature and culture, continuity and change, and tradition and modernity. A history of the world evokes the tensions between a single system and a plurality of cultures, or between one and many paths to "modernization."

Ross E. Dunn, San Diego State University, introduced the Thursday morning session on "Approaches to World History" by pursuing this question of the conception of the world history course. He proposed three necessary characteristics of the world history course. First, he said it must be comparative, i.e. interested in cross-cultural differences; one might, for instance, compare twelfth-century Europe with Sung China. Second, a world history course ought to be geographically relevant to the broader global view; one might think of basins, rims, and ecumenes, for example, as readily as nation-states. Third, a properly conceived world history course should be cosmopolitan and ecumenical; one might personalize the experience with many cultures by using the experience of the traveler (Marco Polo, Ibn Batuta, or Ibn Rushd, for example).

One of the secret agendas of conferences is to leave no stone unturned at the opening session in the hope that there will be rocks left to walk on at the end. Thus, participants rose to present various suggestions: that world history courses could be taught simply with teams of department specialists, and most departments still do not have specialists in non-Western histories; world history courses should avoid adversary structures (we/them, traditional/modern, Western/non-Western), and such adversary structures are most useful; secondary school courses are essentially different, and their problems are essentially the same. Professor McNeill rose to suggest the gathering of world history syllabi so that the numerous approaches could be made available to all. Ross Dunn agreed to continue to serve as a clearinghouse of information for the participants. He noted that a world history group had developed in response to an AHA session at the 1981 annual meeting in Los Angeles.

The Thursday afternoon session was devoted to "Modernization as an Organizing Principle for World History." Professor C. E. Black was the persuasive proponent of the approach, as he has been at least since The Dynamics of Modernization was published twenty years ago. He insisted that "modernization" did not mean "Westernization" or progress. One might study Western

modernization first, but only because that is the way it happened. The value of the approach is that it leads students to see the interrelationships between intellectual, technological, demographic, and political changes that have in fact shaped the modern world. Professor Black cautioned against defining the characteristics of modernity too narrowly; modern politics might be democratic or totalitarian, for instance. Similarly, he insisited on studying the process of change rather than the particular events of 1789 or 1911. After Professor Black's theoretical presentation, Air Force Academy professors Major Lester Pittman, Major David Spires, and visiting Professor John M. Thompson, presented an account of the Academy's one-semester course, "Modern World History."

Discussion of the modernization model was wide-ranging. Some wondered about the rationale for the 1500 A.D. starting point. Professor Black emphasized the importance of scientific, intellectual, and cultural developments in that period; acknowledging an increase in knowledge as the "key." Asked how he would teach modernization, Professor McNeill responded that he would be tempted to see the European Renaissance as the result of more important economic and technological developments in Sung China around 1000. Another participant complained that the modernization model overlooked the most important part of a world history course: the ancient and traditional world. Finally, Craig Lockard presented a paper arguing that modernization usually did mean Westernization, and that Westernization tended to blame the victim for the poverty of Java or Honduras instead of understanding that poverty in the context of a world system of exploitation (as shown by I. Wallerstein and neo-Marxists).

The Thursday evening session on "World History in Secondary Education" was chaired by Howard Mehlinger, Indiana University. He began by listing the various reasons that have been given for studying history and suggested the most convincing of these for state legislatures was still the development of citizenship. He discussed a number of problems with the organization of the school day in secondary schools and with the development of imaginative teaching strategies among many secondary school textbook publishers. Among these were the habit of teaching the same courses each day in most secondary schools. He urged experimentation with two-track schedules as in most colleges--Monday/Wednesday or Tuesday/Thursday sequences. Textbook publishers, he said, still tailored their history texts to please the largest single adopting unit, the Texas school system. He provided a brief survey of the adoption and printing history of secondary world history texts that suggested something other than the survival of the fittest. He discussed some of the problems and successes of the textbook project which he and Professor Thompson had designed to exchange Soviet and American secondary texts so that each body of students could better understand the other's views and their own misconceptions. He commented favorably on the world history text that Professor Thompson had developed which included, among other materials, a play to aid the students in an understanding of the industrial revolution.

Friday morning sessions were divided between "World History in the College Curriculum" and "World History in the Secondary School Curriculum." I attended the former which included two presentations. The first course described was that of Peter F. Sugar, coordinator of world history at the University of Washington, Seattle. It is comparative, genuinely global and taught by a large team of specialists who meet often. I offered a brief rationale for my approach in The

West and the World: A Topical History of Civilization which stressed the variety of students and the value of encouraging them to think historically about topics of current interest. These and a number of other approaches were discussed. Loyd Swenson, University of Houston, presented an outline of his team-taught world civilization course with an urban focus. David Felix spoke about his New York City program to train world history teachers for the secondary school system.

The afternoon meeting on materials and strategies for teaching world history was moderated by John M. Thompson. His introduction, and his scanning of the audience for suggestions of teaching materials, led to the conclusion that secondary school world history teachers are far ahead of college teachers in the diversity and breadth of their teaching materials and tools. They are more practiced in the use of simulation games, more inventive in the development of role playing or dramatic sequences, and better able to distinguish between what produces only heat from what gives off light.

I was the moderator of "Conclusion and Critique," the final session. Some participants spoke of the obstacles we face from colleagues who still find it easier to declare world history unteachable than to learn to teach it. The Teaching Division of the AHA could be enormously helpful in aiding the recognition of the world history course as a legitimate, even recommended subject for the introductory history course.

In the longer run, the Teaching Division could administratively encourage the teaching of world history that Professor McNeill asked for at the opening session. One suggestion was that the AHA seek funds necessary to establish a national committee to review world history courses and recommend some of the models to the profession. This, it was pointed out, was how the "new Math" was established as the norm.

There can never be one orthodox world history course; almost all participants agreed there should not be. But the AHA could be quite helpful in aiding the crossfertilization, communication, and evaluation that is necessary as we seek out the most instructive ways of familiarizing our students with their shrinking world.

Appendix B

World History Association Established

by

Kevin Reilly

A World History Association was established December 28, 1982, at the AHA meeting in Washington, C. The organizational meeting was attended by over a hundred historians interested in the study and teaching of world history. Such an organization had been suggested at the AHA meeting in Los Angeles in 1981, planned at a Teaching Division regional conference at the Air Force Academy in the spring and realized with striking unanimity in Washington.

There was general agreement that the time for world history had arrived. Speakers alluded to the shrinking of the world, the interdependence of global problems, threats to global survival, and the general lack of global awareness of many students ("my students don't know if the East is on the left or right") to underscore their sense of the timeliness of world history courses.

While there seemed to be little agreement about the best way of teaching world history, most agreed that one of the first orders of business ought to be to explore the various ways world history courses are currently taught and to review the tools and materials available. A newsletter seemed an appropriate vehicle. Ross Dunn (San Diego State University) summarized some of the ingredients of a newsletter: essays on the conceptualization of world history, course ideas, syllabi, reviews of texts, notices of relevant meetings, and possible grant opportunities. Ray Lorantas (Drexel) said that his university would be willing to support such a newsletter.

A wide diversity of views was expressed on the goals of the organization. The development of a world history core curriculum was urged centering on an introductory survey. Others sounded a warning about concentrating on survey teaching to the detriment of research and conceptual issues. Western civilization courses were acceptable arenas for deepening global understanding (for some) and inveterately provincial backwaters that might best be ignored (for others). "We should develop world history courses which are not 'add-ons' to Western civilization courses," one participant cautioned. "But we should also see Western civilization as central to world history," the same participant added.

A steering committee was elected to take the sense of the organization and carry through with its intentions. The members were Joe Dixon (USAF Academy), Ross Dunn (San Diego State), Samuel Ehrenpreis (Bronx Community College), Craig Lockard (Wisconsin), Ray Lorantas (Drexel), William H. McNeill (Chicago), Howard Mehlinger (Indiana, Bloomington), Ernest Menze (Iona), Kevin Reilly (Somerset

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County College, NJ), Mary Rossabi (Fieldston School, Riverdale, NY), Lynda Shaffer (Tufts), Loyd Swenson (Houston), Wu Tien-wei (Southern Illnois) and Martin Yanuck (Spelman). The steering committee was specifically instructed to raise dues (of "up to ten dollars"), choose officers, support the inclusion of two world history panels for the 1983 meeting, and arrange a business meeting.

The steering committee members who were present met briefly after the general meeting. They agreed that a two-day conference of the entire steering committee would be advisable, around May, to set the direction of the organization. Kevin Reilly agreed to make arrangements and serve as president pro tem. A dues structure of ten dollars for the employed and two dollars for students and the unemployed have been accepted. Ernest Menze has agreed to serve as treasurer pro tem and those who wish to be members are requested to send their dues to him at Iona College, New Rochelle, NY 10801. Ray Lorantas has agreed to serve as editor of the newsletter and is looking for contributions (syllabi, reviews, essays, notes, etc.) sent in care of him at Drexel University, Department of History, Philadelphia, PA 19104.

There are many things that can be done to encourage the study and teaching of world history. The establishment of an organization to accomplish that goal is, we think, a useful step. But the existence of an organization also raises the question of what it should do. We intend to facilitate the exchange of syllabi, support world history panels, review teaching materials, and show ourselves and our colleagues the value and means for making the study of history more global. We could also encourage student or faculty international exchange programs. We could sponsor or seek funding for retooling workshops for Western civilization faculty or for regional conferences on the teaching of world history. We could seek support for an invitational conference on the conceptualization of world history or on teaching models of world history. We could survey departments on the nature of world history teaching now. There are many things we could do. Your suggestions, comments, and help would be enormously useful. The newsletter can provide a forum for such proposals and comments, but letters to the steering committee c/o Kevin Reilly, Somerset County College, Somerville, NJ 00876, are welcome as well.

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This report contains the ideas of participants in the World History Teaching Conference, sponsored by the US Air Force Academy's Department of History 12-14 May 1982. The various articles discuss the value of world history to secondary education, analyze the problems of teaching world history to college undergraduates, and suggest approaches for improving the quality of world history instruction.

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